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Introduction 
 
Climate change is an inevitable and urgent global challenge. According to the fifth 
assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014), 
average global surface temperature has increased by about 0.8 °C between 1880 and 
2012. For the 21st century global warming exceeding 2 °C on average relative to the 
period 1850 - 1900 is projected by most scenario models. The IPCC-report concludes 
that it is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-20th century. 
Climate change and sustainable development are closely connected. Climate change is 
expected to impact the availability of basic needs like freshwater, food security, and 
energy, while efforts to combat climate change, both through adaptation and mitigation, 
will similarly inform and shape the global development agenda (UN, 2015). The 
distribution of climate change impacts and vulnerabilities is considered to be uneven 
across countries, and low-latitude, less-developed areas are generally at greatest risk due 
to both higher sensitivity and lower adaptive capacity (IPCC, 2007, 2014). Thus, 
developing countries will be among those most adversely affected and least able to deal 
with the anticipated shocks to their social, economic and natural systems (UN, 2015). 
Moreover, these highly vulnerable countries will carry a greater part of the global costs 
of climate change although the rising CO2 emissions are mainly the responsibility of 
industrialized countries (e.g., Mertz et al., 2009). 
To address these issues, the United Nations (UN) aim to define a new vision for a post-
2015 development agenda by agreeing upon a set of sustainable development goals 
(SDGs) at the climate change conference held at the end of the year 2015 in Paris. The 
proposed SDGs include SDG 13: ‘Take urgent action to combat climate change and its 
impact’. Besides ‘strengthen the resilience and adaptive capacity’ and ‘integrating climate 
change measures into national policies, strategies and planning’, one major target of 
SDG 13 is to ‘promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-
related planning and management in developing countries, including focusing on 
women, youth and local and marginalized communities’ (see SDG-proposal, UN, 2015). 
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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and post-
2015 development agenda identified five key issues that are relevant for achieving the 
proposed SDG 13 (see CAFOD, 2014, p. 2-3): 
 Low carbon development: the aim is to promote low carbon development 
pathways that will meet the development needs of current and future generations, 
while at the same time decoupling economic growth from increased dependency on 
fossil fuel usage and enabling an overall reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.  
 Mitigation: the primary goal is to agree on legally-binding emission reduction 
targets. The post-2015 agenda can support mitigation by addressing the way a 
number of relevant sectors are structured e.g. energy, agriculture or transport, among 
other sectors. 
 Adaptation, risk and resilience: the aim is to integrate adaptation, climate 
resilience and risk management into existing development processes and discussions 
on poverty, food security, health, resilient cities and infrastructure. 
 Finance: one of the cornerstones to creating change within a global development 
framework as well as a binding climate deal is sufficient finance for tackling the 
massive transitions toward low carbon development and climate resilient 
development. There is an urgent need for sufficient public funds and innovative 
sources, as well as private finance. 
 Technology: the UNFCC calls for technology transfer in “all relevant sectors” and 
the Rio Declaration emphasizes that countries should cooperate to share scientific 
and technological knowledge, and enhance development through the transfer of 
technologies. 
In my thesis I address the issue of adaptation, risk and resilience in the context of 
developing countries. In particular, I provide (1) a better understanding of the 
macroeconomic relationship of climate change, violence and agriculture and (2) insights 
into the microeconomic dimension of adaptation, that is, analyzing behavior and related 
decision making processes of individuals exposed to the risks of climate change.  
My thesis consists of two parts. The first part contributes to (1) by providing a literature 
review of studies explaining certain forms of violence and especially the connections 
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between climate change and violence as well as an empirical study about the 
connections of climate variables (temperature and rainfall) and agricultural production in 
sub-Sahara Africa. The microeconomic dimension of adaptation in (2) is addressed in 
the second part of my thesis by analyzing case study data from vulnerable small-scale 
societies in developing countries. In the remaining three papers I use household surveys 
and economic field experiments to examine people’s risk preferences and stereotypes 
(second paper), people’s willingness to pay for local public goods that dampen the 
adverse effects of climate change (third paper) and underlying mechanisms that promote 
human cooperation (fourth paper). All three studies focus on decision making processes 
that are relevant for adaptation and demonstrate that societal and cultural characteristics 
of a society and the respective economic system are key drivers of human behavior. 
The behavioral research of the second part of my thesis can be broadly categorized into 
two groups: (1) Artefactual field experiments, which are the same as conventional lab 
experiments but with a non-standard subject pool (second and fourth paper) and (2) 
framed field experiments/questionnaires, which are identical to artefactual field 
experiments but with field context in either the commodity, task, or information set that 
the subjects use (third paper) (see Harrison and List, 2004). The main advantage of 
doing experiments with a non-standard subject pool is to improve the external validity 
of findings that are based on participants from Western, educated, industrialized, rich 
and democratic (WEIRD) societies (see Henrich et al., 2010). Moreover, Henrich et al. 
(2010) make a compelling argument that conditions in tribal societies are relatively novel 
within evolutionary history and that data from non-Western small-scale societies are 
essential for testing hypotheses about human psychology, especially in the domains of 
preferences and decision-making. The findings of this thesis contribute to the origins of 
human decision-making processes and, therefore, are of general interest for the 
scientific community. 
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Part I of the thesis 
Agriculture is an important sector for many developing countries, contributing more 
than a fifth to their gross domestic product and employing more than a quarter of their 
total labor force (World Bank, 2012). The vulnerability of the agricultural sector to both 
climate change and variability is well established in the literature (see IPCC, 2014). 
Moreover, climate change will have significant impacts on the forms of migration that 
compromise human security (see IPCC, 2014), and several studies already have shown 
that climate change increases the risk of violent conflict (e.g., Barnett and Adger, 2007; 
Burke et al., 2009; Hsiang et al., 2013). However, an empirical study about the 
relationship of climate change and the risk of genocide is missing so far. 
In the first paper, Genocidal risk and climate change: Africa in the twenty-first century 
(Exenberger and Pondorfer, 2014), my co-author and I provide a literature review of 
studies explaining certain forms of violence and especially the connections between 
climate change and violence as well as an empirical study about the connections of 
climate variables (temperature and rainfall) and agricultural production in sub-Sahara 
Africa. Further, we also provide an assessment of institutional risk factors given the 
historical record of sub-Sahara African states with respect to genocide and projections 
about the future development of agricultural production for the first half of the twenty-
first century to also assess environmental risk. In doing, so we are able to identify 
countries of joint risk (mainly countries in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa 
region). To successfully prevent the occurrence of genocides, research, policy, and 
activism will have to join forces to identify the places and groups at risk and address 
these risks by, for example, raising the costs of violence, improving dispute settlement, 
and identifying viable alternatives. 
 
Part II of the thesis 
Small Island Development States (SIDS) in the South Pacific and in the Indian Ocean 
are particularly threatened by impacts of future climate change and associated triggered 
coastal processes. Scientific evidence for an increased frequency and severity of storms 
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and storm surges as well as sea level changes in connection with climate change 
continuously augments (e.g., IPCC, 2014) and international discussions about the need 
for adaptation measures gain momentum (UN, 2015). 
To combat climate change, people living in SIDS face many challenges including the 
decision to invest in adaptation strategies. Each of these adaptation strategies are 
associated with different risk levels since the benefits and outcomes are uncertain to the 
local population. To provide optimal adaptation strategies, it is then essential to 
understand how people make decisions under risk and uncertainty and, further, to 
analyze the underlying factors that determine people’s risk attitudes. In the context of 
small-scale societies it is particularly important to consider the different role of men and 
women in the adaptation process (see SDG 13; UN, 2015). In many traditional small-
scale societies, women often face social, economic and political barriers that limit their 
adaptive capacity. Often these barriers are based on cultural specific stereotypes of 
women’s behavior. Beyond statistical discrimination, incorrect stereotypes further 
worsen suboptimal decision making and the associated welfare and efficiency losses. 
This is especially so when stereotypes are internalized, thus lowering the self-esteem and 
confidence of the stereotyped group (Correll, 2001; Crocker and Major 1989; Jones et 
al., 1984; Rosenberg, 1979). So far, no study exists that investigates gender differences in 
stereotypes of risk preferences in a small-scale society. 
In the second paper, Gender Differences in Stereotypes of Risk Preferences: Experimental Evidence 
from a Matrilineal and a Patrilineal Society (Pondorfer et al., 2014.), I, together with my co-
authors, use cross-cultural data collected from controlled economic field experiments to 
examine gender differences in risk preferences and, more importantly, stereotypes about 
risk preferences of men and women. To assess the importance of culture for gender 
differences we collected data from two island societies that are very similar along many 
important dimensions (i.e., climate conditions, economic system, educational level, etc.) 
but have opposite cultures when it comes to women’s social status: the patrilineal 
Palawan in the Philippines and the matrilineal Teop in Papua New Guinea. We find no 
gender differences in actual risk preferences, but evidence for culture-specific 
stereotypes. We are the first to show that men from a patrilineal society (the Palawan) 
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overestimate women’s actual risk aversion and men from the matrilineal society (the 
Teop) underestimate women’s actual risk aversion. Hence, men in both societies use 
female sex as a significant signal for risk preferences, but in opposite directions. In the 
context of adaptation to climate change, these findings suggest that particular attention 
should be given to women’s adaptive capacities. For example, since men in traditional 
societies often rely on women in terms of food provision, biased perceptions of 
women’s risk level could lead to wrong assumptions about future food supply. 
Besides individual risk preferences, it is important to understand how people value 
certain adaptation strategies and in what form they can contribute to them. Some 
elements of adaptation to climate change response are, in effect, public goods. In the 
context of SIDS, these include, for example, conservations of important habitats, 
implementation of storm protection or building dams to combat sea level rise. The 
concept of valuation is a prominent method in environmental and resource economics 
to measure the value of these public goods. The motivation for valuation studies is to 
generate a better and more comprehensive informational base for the policy formulation 
and decision taking process. One fundamental question when valuing public goods in 
developing countries is the choice of the appropriate payment vehicle. Since regular 
cash-income does not exist for the majority of the population and market integration is 
low, households in rural areas have less experience with monetary exchanges. In these 
cases labor time may be a more appropriate payment vehicle. A common finding of 
studies using labor time as payment vehicle is that households are more often willing to 
contribute working time as compared to money (see Gibson et al., 2015 for a recent 
overview). However, so far empirical evidence is missing if the labor time elicitation 
format reduces respondent’s uncertainty of contributions.  
In the third paper, Eliciting preferences for public goods in non-monetized communities: Accounting 
for preference uncertainty (Pondorfer and Rehdanz, 2015), my co-author and I use 
household data collected from a field survey to analyze and compare uncertainty of 
people’s stated willingness to contribute (WTC) time and money for a local public good 
in a non-monetized small-scale community in Papua New Guinea. We do so by 
establishing an open-ended method for eliciting people’s WTC, the Range-WTC-
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method, which elicits the upper and lower bound of a person’s WTC. We find that 
uncertainty is reduced when respondents are asked for labor time contribution instead 
of monetary contributions. Thus, we provide empirical evidence that, indeed, labor time 
is preferred to money in the elicitation of stated WTC in non-monetized communities.  
Public goods are characterized as non-excludable and non-rivalrous, and thus, are 
subject to the free-rider problem. In the context of adaptation this means, that people 
may benefit from the implementation of local adaptation measures without contributing 
to its implementation (conservation of e.g., natural habitats or construction of e.g., sea 
walls). In order to successfully implement local adaptation strategies which appear in the 
form of public goods, it is then particularly relevant to understand the underlying 
mechanisms of human cooperation. 
According to evolutionary and economic theories, humans, like other animals, are 
expected to behave selfishly, maximizing material gains for themselves (Alexander, 1987; 
Dawkins, 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Nevertheless, human cooperation occurs 
in all known societies and is common between genetically-unrelated individuals and 
where repeated interactions may be uncommon. Altruistic punishment is one of the 
most prominent theories that have been proposed to explain the existence of human 
cooperation. Altruistic punishment is based on the idea that individuals exhibit strong 
reciprocity (Gintis, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr et al., 2002). That is, individuals 
are willing to cooperate with others and to punish defectors, at a personal cost, even 
when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. In a cross-cultural project 
Henrich et al. (2006) showed that individuals in small-scale traditional (e.g., foragers) as 
well as large-scale complex societies (e.g., college students) engage in second-party 
punishment (punish as active party) and third party punishment (punish as by standers). 
It is proposed that second-party punishment may be sufficient to explain cooperation in 
small-scale societies, while third-party punishment is a necessary condition if a society 
becomes more complex (Marlowe et al. 2008, 2010). However, the focus of these 
studies is on costly punishment with respect to deviations of a distribution norm across 
these societies. None of the conducted experimental economic games is adequate to 
examine the level of cooperation in the form of a collective action problem (e.g., 
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prisoner’s dilemma in its simplest form). Further, they neglect the issue of anti-social 
punishment (i.e., punishment of cooperators). The existence of anti-social punishment is 
correlated with the lack of norms of civic-oriented behavior (Herrmann et al., 2008). 
Anti-social punishment may then be widespread in small-scale societies where norms of 
civic cooperation are weak, and thus, should be considered when investigating the 
effectiveness of altruistic punishment in maintaining cooperation. 
In the fourth paper, Cooperation and punishment patterns in a small-scale society: A comparison 
between second-party punishment and third-party punishment (Pondorfer, 2015) I use data from a 
controlled field experiment to compare second-party punishment and third-party 
punishment and, further, to address the issue of anti-social punishment in a small-scale 
community in Papua New Guinea. I find that second-party punishment promotes 
cooperation significantly more than third-party punishment in the context of a collective 
action problem. The data provides also evidence that third-party punishment is even 
destructive since the level of cooperation drops below the baseline condition in which 
punishment mechanisms are not existent. Furthermore, the data reveals that anti-social 
punishment is endemic and seems to have a spiteful component. For the successful 
implementation of adaptation strategies, this means, that local characteristics and 
respective social norms should be taken into account before requesting individuals in 
small-scale communities to contribute to a local public good of any form. 
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Part I: The relationship of climate change, violence and agriculture 
Paper 1: Genocidal risk and climate change: Africa in the twenty-first 
century0F1 
Andreas Exenbergera and Andreas Pondorferb 
a University of Innsbuck, Universitätstraße 15, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria 
b Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiellinie 66, 24105 Kiel, Germany 
 
Abstract 
Climate change is often related to various adverse effects, among those are endangering 
food security and raising the risk of conflict. Some scholars go as far as identifying 
climate change as the main driver of civilizational crisis. But empirical evidence is rather 
inconclusive so far, particularly about its relationship to violence, and even more so, 
genocide. In this paper, we provide a literature review of studies explaining certain 
forms of violence and especially the connections between climate change and violence 
as well as an empirical study about the connections of climate variables (temperature 
and rainfall) and agricultural production in sub-Sahara Africa. Further, we also provide 
an assessment of institutional risk factors given the historical record of sub-Sahara 
African states with respect to genocide and projections about the future development of 
agricultural production for the first half of the twenty-first century to also assess 
environmental risk. In doing so, we are able to identify countries of joint risk and 
promising directions of further research. In this context, we chose sub-Sahara Africa as 
our focus area for various reasons: firstly, because of widespread poverty, institutional 
weakness and dependence on rain-fed agriculture, sub-Sahara Africa is the macro region 
where the effects of climate change will very likely play out most adversely; further, it 
also assembles a pronounced historical record of violent conflict, notably including 
genocidal episodes; finally, mutual enforcement and endogeneity issues are particularly 
viable there, not the least in the form of a large potential impact of technological and 
institutional improvements. 
Keywords: Genocide, Climate Change, Sub-Sahara Africa, Institutions, Agriculture 
JEL classification: O13, Q54, Q10, N47
                                                 
1 A modified version of this paper is published as: Exenberger, A., Pondorfer, A. (2014). Genocidal risk 
and climate change: Africa in the twenty-first century. The International Journal of Human Rights, 18(3), 350-
368. (DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2014.914706) and Exenberger, Andreas; Pondorfer, Andreas (2015): 
Genocidal Risk and Climate Change: Africa in the Twenty-first Century. In: Zimmerer, Jürgen: Climate 
Change and Genocide. Environmental Violence in the 21st Century. London; New York [u.a.]: Routledge, 
ISBN 978-1-13-888642-1, S. 88 - 106. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2007, timely connected to the Stern report on the economics of climate change and 
the fourth assessment report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
(Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2007), Jürgen Zimmerer stressed the issue of ‘environmental 
genocide’ in an editorial of the Journal of Genocide Research and called for a ‘fresh and 
wider look at the causes of genocide’ (Zimmerer, 2007, p. 350). Because works about 
climate and genocide remain nevertheless scarce, debate is still necessary, given the 
potential large-scale effects of climate change on societies world-wide, especially on 
poor regions lacking adaptive capacities and characterized by low opportunity costs of 
violence. For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) predicted 
‘[m]ajor losses in agricultural production leading to increased malnutrition and reduced 
opportunities for poverty reduction. Overall, climate change will lower the incomes and 
reduce the opportunities of vulnerable populations. … Developing countries are likely 
to become more dependent on imports from the rich world, with their farmers losing 
market shares in agricultural trade’ (UNDP, 2007, p. 90). But overall, while there is no 
doubt among scientists that accelerated climate change (especially global warming) is 
taking place and wide compliance that there is a considerable anthropogenic component 
to it, scientifically sound agreement has not thus far been achieved either about the 
relationships between observed changes and more complex environmental processes 
(like the occurrence of storms, for example) or of any related social processes. 
One of the most distressing social processes is genocide. As basic understanding of this 
violent act, we glean from the UN Genocide Convention of 1948 (intended destruction, 
in whole or part, of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group) with two relevant 
extensions: first, we limit our interest to mass killings and neglect other forms of 
genocidal violence (like the destruction of culture or systematic discrimination); 
secondly, we also add political groups as potential targets of violence (a phenomenon 
usually referred to as ‘politicide’). Thus, we end up with a practical understanding of 
‘genocide’ as geno- and/or politicidal mass killings. Further, because of the crucial role 
of intentionality, we usually observe genocide as a policy choice, more viable under 
certain conditions (particularly polarizing forces), sometimes even being ‘disturbingly 
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rational’ (Anderton, 2010). Consequently, while ideology plays an important role and 
psychopathic perpetrators have their place in genocide studies, most of the time people 
solved conflicts without turning to genocide, mainly because it simply did not make 
sense as a promising strategy from the viewpoint of potential perpetrators. Thus, the 
influence of climate change altering the framework in which political strategies are 
placed becomes increasingly relevant. In this context, we understand climate change as 
anthropogenic, continuous and sustainable warming (rise in average surface 
temperature) with associated phenomena (sea level rise, more frequent and more severe 
droughts and other extreme weather events, generally enlarged weather variability, etc.), 
which is increasing the relevance of water availability and hence the role of rainfall 
especially in rain-fed subsistence agriculture. While climate change may result in extreme 
weather events, it is itself a long-run trend originating in the industrial revolution and 
increasingly effective in the last half-century. 
In theory, direct and indirect causal links between climate change and conflicts are 
manifold (Buhaug et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2011; Scheffran et al., 2012). It is often 
claimed that a changing climate will induce armed conflicts connected to increasingly 
scarce resources and flows of refugees from desertification and sea level rise. It is likely 
however, that there is a relationship between food security and violence; however, such 
a relationship is likely to be complex, strongly related to distributional and 
marginalization patterns and nonlinear. As Gleditsch (2012, p. 6) puts it, ‘the effect plays 
out in interaction with exogenous conflict-promoting factors’. Thus, it is hardly a 
surprise that empirical research about the conflict-climate-nexus is not able to provide 
clear evidence. Quite the contrary, results are either inconclusive (sometimes to the 
point of counterevidence) or sceptical about connections (remaining statistically 
insignificant). Hence, there is indeed a need of further research of all kinds: cross-
country, case studies and systemic analysis. Our largely empirical contribution brings 
two strands of empirical literature together: the study of mass violence and climate 
change and the study of the effects of climate change on agricultural production and 
hence results in a comparative assessment of institutional and agricultural risks on a 
country-basis. Although this work is essentially explorative and it is not possible to 
predict genocides from its results (also because of the large relevance of contingency in 
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this context), this will allow us both to look at a certain kind of combined danger and, 
thus, to contribute to genocide prevention by identifying countries where potential 
scarcity induced crisis (a climate-related decrease of agricultural production) correlate 
with institutional factors of genocidal violence (regime types and forces of path-
dependence). 
Overall, the relationship between food security and violence is complex, strongly related 
to distributional and marginalization patterns, nonlinear, and self-enforcing. Further, 
while political and socio-economic factors are likely to be more relevant than climatic 
ones, there is especially a considerable and often overlooked combined risk. At the same 
time, projections are very sensitive to assumptions about technological development and 
to political and economic improvements. This paper aims to contribute to all these 
issues. In this context, we choose sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) as our specific case for two 
obvious reasons: first, it is a macro region with a diverse history of mass violence; 
second, its agricultural potential will be most negatively affected by climate change. 
Although the factors of influence regarding the investigated relationships are complex 
and not at all African ‘by nature’ (but much more linked to specific patterns of colonial 
extraction, prominently land use patterns, export-oriented production, and the 
discrimination of certain population groups), they are particularly related to a high 
degree of vulnerability, connected with poverty and bad governance which result in a 
lack of resilience on the local and national level (UNDP, 2007). Further, climate-change-
related losses are suggested to be especially substantial in the case of smallholder 
farmers, still dominating SSA agriculture, where both cash-crop and subsistence 
production will be affected, limiting the capacity to achieve and sustain food security by 
a loss of available revenue as well as a loss of food. Finally, expert assessments support 
special emphasize on Africa. The geno-/politicide database of the Political Instability 
Task Force (PITF), for example, contains 128 out of 273 country-years from Africa, 
constituting fifteen postcolonial SSA episodes.1F1 Further, the NGO Genocide Watch 
provides a more extended list with more than a third of all cases after 1945 being from 
Africa. This also holds for their most recent ‘countries at risk’-list, published in April 
                                                 
1 See the PITF homepage, especially http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITF GenoPoliticides 
2014.xls. 
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2012: three out of nine ‘extermination’ cases are from SSA (Congo Kinshasa, Somalia, 
Ethiopia), as well as six out of eleven ‘preparation’ cases (Nigeria, Chad, Equatorial 
Guinea, Congo Brazzaville, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau) 2F2 In sum, if there is 
a problem, it is very likely that it is urgent and relevant to Africa and this contribution 
provides information about which cases deserve or even require a second, more detailed 
look. 
This analysis proceeds as follows: the next section provides a review of studies about 
mass violence and especially on connections with climate change; in the following 
section, we assess genocidal risk as the correlation between agricultural risk (the 
projection of increased food insecurity based on an cross-country analysis of the 
influence factors of agricultural production in SSA) and institutional risk (vulnerabilities 
related to political, economic and conflict-related factors); finally, we draw some 
conclusions and provide an outlook with respect to further research, which is especially 
necessary in the form of comparable in-depth case studies (while this paper is largely 
about quantitative cross-country evidence). These conclusions confirm that the 
understanding of the issue is still insufficient, but that it is very likely that vulnerability is 
self-enforcing, that the interplay of political, socio-economic and climate factors is 
especially relevant, and that results are very sensitive to assumptions about technological 
development. What is beyond the scope of this paper, however, is a detailed assessment 
of the impact of colonial patterns, particularly of land use, although these issues are 
certainly relevant to explain differences in vulnerabilities to climate change dynamics. 
 
2. The empirics of mass violence and climate change 
2.1 Quantitative cross-country studies about mass violence 
There is a large and ever-increasing body of empirical literature about factors 
influencing the vulnerability to or the outbreak, intensity and duration of mass violence 
(sometimes in a binary form on the basis of conflict-years, sometimes in the continuous 
form of probabilities). A growing cottage industry of data mining and processing about 
                                                 
2.See the Genocide Watch homepage, especially http://genocidewatch.net/alerts-2/new-alerts/. The 
Central African Republic has recently been added to the list of emergencies. 
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conflicts has developed over the previous decades. Works begin from rather different 
perspectives, such as the study of interstate or civil war, of geno- and politicides, or of 
what Rummel (1994) termed ‘democide’. The factors usually stressed encompass the 
economy (greed versus grievance), politics (autocracy versus democracy), demography 
(young men), culture (ethnic, linguistic, or religious fragmentation), geography 
(insurgency promoting terrain), and ideology (communism or racism) (e.g., Krain, 1997; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Busby et al., 2013). In a recent 
quantitative cross-country civil war study, Collier et al. (2009) summarize and recall 
influencing factors usually found to carry explanatory power: besides poverty and 
primary commodity exports (where nonlinearity and endogeneity have to be 
considered), they particularly find peace (long times of peace between episodes of war), 
social fractionalization (actually linguistic and religious), and the implicit French security 
umbrella (being a former colony of France) to be statistically significant factors. Besides 
identifying and quantifying these factors of influence, the general and empirically well-
grounded conclusion from this work is that civil war dynamics usually are more driven – 
from the perspective of (potential) rebels and in reaction thus also the governments – by 
appropriating resources than by overcoming injustice. 
Quantitative studies about genocide have learned from these kinds of exercises. In her 
path-breaking study about political upheaval escalating (or not) into geno-/politicide 
between 1955 and 2001, Harff (2003) departed from the challenge ‘to identify general 
conditions under which governments, and rival authorities in internal wars, choose such 
a strategy’ and identified six risk factors, which in combination raise the probability of 
escalation from about 3 percent (in absence of all risks) to about 90 (in presence of all 
six).3F3 Harff’s (2003) risk factors include a history of prior genocide, an exclusionary 
ideology from the elite, an autocratic government, a ruling elite from an ethnic minority, 
low trade openness, and a high magnitude of political upheaval. There is also a swing 
effect, most dramatically observed in Rwanda and Burundi: ‘Case studies suggest that 
the more intense the prior struggle for power and the greater the perceived threat the 
                                                 
3 But there is large uncertainty and the 95%-confidence interval in the presence of all risk factors is 
ranging from 67 to 98 %. However, Harff (2003) was also able to ‘postdict’ episodes (genocides and non-
genocides alike) with a remarkable accuracy of 74 %. 
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excluded group poses to the new regime, the more likely they are to become victims of 
geno-/politicide’ (Harff, 2003, p. 61). Finally, active discrimination against ethnic 
minorities contributes importantly to an explanation of the emergence of ethnic 
conflicts but much less to an explanation of why these conflicts escalate to genocide. 
However, there are also missing suspects in Harff’s (2003) narrative: particularly 
poverty, which is relevant for upheaval but seemingly not for its escalation, external 
political links, which seem to be dominated by economic considerations, analysis of any 
colonial heritage, and a discussion about the relevance of post-colonial extractive 
patterns.  
Easterly et al. (2006) analyze the influence of income and (Western style) democracy 
levels in 163 episodes of mass killings of unarmed civilians from 1820 to 1998. 
Generally, the results show that the occurrence and especially the number of victims 
increase with a decrease in income; this occurs to an even greater degree in cases of 
(Western style) democracy though, in their analysis, the relationship with democracy is 
subject to several important qualifications (about data quality, statistical significance, and 
causal relationships). In their words: ‘We find that episodes of mass killing are more 
likely at intermediate levels of income and less frequent at the highest levels of 
democracy’ (Easterly et al., 2006, p. 146). In an excellent review of the democide- and 
the geno-/politicide-literature by Wayman and Tago (2010) the focus is on the onset of 
mass killings and the role of military governments. These authors also provide a 
methodological discussion about the implications connected to the respective datasets 
and definitions. They also raise doubts about the relevance of political indicators, 
especially in case of geno-politicides. In this context, case study evidence is more 
reassuring: a qualitative comparative study of Rwanda and Botswana, for example, 
clearly supports the relevance of political inclusiveness (a democratic mediation of the 
political process) with respect to genocide occurrence (Mayersen and McLoughlin, 
2011). While it is obvious that the discovery of diamonds in Botswana has supported 
wealth creation in comparison to Rwanda, it is not obvious from the onset that mining 
diamonds supports wealth dispersion (indeed, resources of this kind had the opposite 
effect in many other countries); instead, it was the political institutions of Botswana that 
ensured wealth dispersion.  
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2.2 The climate-violence nexus 
While the empirical literature about violence is able to identify some causal factors, the 
literature about the relationship between climate change and violence is less conclusive. 
Barnett and Adger (2007, p. 644) summarize that ‘it is important to stress that climate 
change will not undermine human security or increase the risk of violent conflict in 
isolation from other important social factors’. A more recent and more detailed study 
explicitly shows that for civil wars in Africa, climate related factors are at best marginal 
compared to socio-economic, political, and geographic factors: ‘there is no direct, short-
term relationship between drought and civil war onset, even within contexts presumed 
most conducive to violence. At the same time, the analysis solidifies claims of recent 
scholarship on the importance of ethnically inclusive institutions for maintaining peace’ 
(Theisen et al., 2011, p. 105). 
On the other hand, given the high vulnerability of African societies to the forces of 
climate change, especially with respect to agricultural production (due to limited capacity 
in general and the large relevance of rain-fed agriculture in particular), one may go as far 
as comparing the African present with the European past. In this context, some scholars 
have claimed that climate change, via its impact on agro-economic systems, was the 
main driver of social and political upheaval in Europe between 1500 and 1800, peaking 
in the ‘crisis of the seventeenth century’ (Zhang et al., 2011; Tol and Wagner, 2010). 4F4 
This is in line with claims in the IPCC assessment report of 2007 and the Human 
Development Report of 2007-08 regarding more recent connections. These reports 
suggest that a loss of agricultural potential of 16.6 % is predicted for SSA until the year 
2080, even if potential positive effects from carbon fertilization are taken into account 
(these numbers are fully in line with our results). Further, regional impacts are diverse, 
although positive outcomes on the country level remain a rare exception in Africa 
applying only to Egypt and possibly Kenya (see Cline, 2007). 
Nonetheless, endogeneity remains an issue, and not just a technical one, because socio-
economic development is strongly linked to adaptation capacity. While industrialization 
                                                 
4 Tol and Wagner (2010) also found that conflict was more likely in Europe in periods of cooling, but less 
likely so in the industrial era. 
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contributes (or at least has contributed) to growth and democracy (on the local level) 
and to climate change (on the global level), it also increases the resources available and 
improves the capacity for adaptation to its adverse effects, although with considerable 
distributional consequences.5F5 Consequently, no effect of climate change on economic 
growth is found in countries with an income above the global median, while the impact 
is large in countries below the median, thus strongly affecting most of SSA (Dell et al. 
2008). Further, democracies are better able to organize environmental protection (Li 
and Reuveny, 2006). Additionally, these dynamics give way to vicious or virtuous circles 
of mutual enforcement. Devitt and Tol (2012, p. 141) conclude that the ‘the impact of 
civil war and climate change … are sufficiently strong to keep a number of countries in 
Africa in deep poverty with a high probability’. Two particular channels of negative 
influence have been pointed out: a deterioration of public resources to support the 
population and a reduction of the opportunity costs of rebellion. Particularly, ‘armed 
conflict is more likely to occur in states where existing institutions and mechanisms for 
conflict resolution cannot provide people with the assurance that climate-induced 
economic problems will be resolved without recourse to violence’ (Koubi et al., 2012, p. 
117). However, empirically there is only weak support for a mediating effect of political 
institutions and no support for a direct climate-conflict-nexus via economic growth. 
Relationships are obviously more complex. Butler and Gates (2012) argue that there is 
indeed a positive relationship between resource abundance, not scarcity, and conflict, 
given that there is a ‘property rights bias’ (differences in the access to property rights); 
they find that this relationship is intensified if differences in resource endowments are 
large. By applying a broader concept of conflict, Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) and 
Miguel et al. (2004) show that large deviations in rainfall result in increased social 
conflict in Africa; violent conflict is especially correlated to wetter years while non-
violent is to drier ones. A particularly relevant factor is the marginal status of a group: 
‘Environmental issues can be catalysts to low-level conflict in marginalized 
communities, but the critical factor is the extent of political and economic 
                                                 
5 Gartzke (2012) argues that industrial development is at the same time promoting climate change but 
diminishing the likelihood of interstate war. 
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marginalization. Small, politically insignificant ethnic groups experience most conflicts 
related to environmental pressures’ (Raleigh, 2010, p. 69). 
Overall, while there is a complex and rather indirect relationship between climate 
change and violence, further conditions have to be met to let a situation of stress 
escalate into large-scale killing and even more so genocide. What most studies have in 
common is that they stress historical, political and economic reasons for the occurrence 
of genocide: a history of violence, a rather exclusionary political process, and rather 
poor and exclusionary economic performance. In this context, a recent work by Busby 
et al. (2013) seems to be particularly worth mentioning. By using the method of 
geographically mapping different insecurity risk factors in Africa, mainly on a sub-
national level, they are able to show the large differences of vulnerabilities in geographic 
space and also the clustering of their occurrence. They especially focus on a 
combination of climatic and socio-economic factors, including both the aggregate and 
the household levels. Aside from several methodological caveats they extensively discuss 
in their study, the regions they identify as particularly problematic largely overlap with 
the countries identified in the rest of this paper. 
 
3. Assessing genocidal risk 
3.1 Agricultural production and climate change in sub-Sahara Africa 
We now turn to the effects of climate change on agricultural production in Africa by 
estimating an agricultural production function including labor, livestock, fertilizer, 
capital, land, and irrigation as well as precipitation, temperature, and the incidence of 
droughts as input factors.6F6 For the sample period 1961-2009 we assemble 2,190 
                                                 
6 We estimated the function log(Υit) = β0 + β1log(Lit) + β2log(Vit) + β3log(Fit) + β4log(Kit) + β5log(Mit) 
+ β6log(Rit) + β7log(PRCit) + β8log(TEMPit) + β9log(Droughtit), with β0 = log(A), i.e. productivity, i 
denoting country and t denoting year. Υ represents the agricultural output (measured as the FAO index in 
value terms), while L, V, F, K, M and R refer to input factors, i.e. labor, livestock, fertilizer, capital, land 
and irrigation. PRC, TEMP and Drought denote the climatic factors precipitation, temperature and 
incidence of droughts. Considering the fact that there are unobserved country specific and time varying 
effects, a two-way error component regression model (two-way fixed effects) is chosen for the analysis. 
The methodology is based on Solow (1956) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). For agricultural production 
functions see, for example, Hayami and Ruttan (1970), Craig et al. (1997), Fulginiti et al. (2004), and 
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observations for 46 sub-Sahara African countries.7F7 There is considerable variation in all 
variables and a large degree of heterogeneity across the countries, pointing to the 
relevance of idiosyncrasies supporting the use of a fixed-effects-model. However, there 
is also a clear temperature trend and the five-year-average in the period 2005 to 2009 is 
0.67 ° Celsius higher than the 30-year-average in the period 1961 to 1990 while rainfall 
development, unsurprisingly much more volatile, is more U-shaped with particularly bad 
years in 1983, 1992 and 1990 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Mean annual temperature and precipitation in sub-Sahara 
Africa, 1961-2009  
 
Source: Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (2013).  
                                                                                                                                          
Barrios et al. (2008). A detailed description of the methodology can be found in Exenberger and 
Pondorfer (2011). 
7 All agricultural inputs are taken from the FAOSTAT database (http://faostat.fao.org/), the agricultural 
output data Y is measured in international US$, indexed with relation to a base period 2004-06. We newly 
introduce the variable R, which is irrigated area in thousands of hectares, including areas equipped for full 
and partial control irrigation, equipped lowland areas, pastures, and areas equipped for spate irrigation. 
Climate data (normalized average annual rainfall and temperature on country level) is taken from the 
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and Ian Harris from East Anglia University 
(http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/~timm/cty/obs/TYN_CY_1_1.html). Data about the droughts is taken from 
the international disaster database (http://www.emdat.be/). 
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Table 1: Agricultural production and climate change in sub-Sahara Africa 
Dependent variable: agricultural production; time period: 1961-2009 
           
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
           
Tractors 0.035  0.034  0.034  0.035  0.035  
 (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.031)  
Fertilizer 0.027 ** 0.029 ** 0.029 ** 0.027 ** 0.029 ** 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Livestock 0.274 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.273 *** 0.265 *** 
 (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.043)  
Labor 0.298 * 0.300 ** 0.302 ** 0.301 * 0.262 * 
 (0.150)  (0.146)  (0.147)  (0.151)  (0.151)  
Land 0.794 *** 0.788 *** 0.786 *** 0.792 *** 0.730 *** 
 (0.220)  (0.214)  (0.214)  (0.219)  (0.226)  
Irrigation         0.046  
         (0.036)  
Precipitation   0.159 *** 0.155 ***   0.162 *** 
   (0.050)  (0.051)    (0.048)  
Temperature   -1.334 * -1.322 *   -1.222 * 
   (0.677)  (0.671)    (0.637)  
Drought     -0.016  -0.027 *   
     (0.015)  (0.015)    
Constant -10.138 *** -9.996 *** -9.996 *** -10.133 *** -9.283 *** 
 (1.818)  (1.740)  (1.739)  (1.813)  (1.844)  
           
No. of observationsa 1,894  1,894  1,894  1,894  1,894  
R2 0.823  0.829  0.829  0.823  0.831  
No. of countries 46  46  46  46  46  
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time fixed effectsb Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Cluster country  country  country  country  country  
F-testc 23.63  25.02  22.68  21.74  22.36  
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * constitute significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
a 296 observations were dropped because of missing data about tractors and fertilizers. 
b Time effects are significant (Wald test). 
c The F-test refers to the input variables (time effects and input variables were tested separately). 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the multivariate standard regression, explaining the 
relevance of production factors influencing agricultural output. In model 1, a standard 
specification was estimated without climate variables and irrigated area. 8F8 As expected, all 
                                                 
8 For other examples of aggregate agricultural production functions in Africa, see for example (Frisvold and 
Ingram, 1995; Barrios et al., 2008). 
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inputs have a positive sign (thus are stimulating output), and, except for modern capital 
(tractors), all inputs are statistically significant with land being particularly relevant. 
Equally, the coefficient of traditional capital formation (livestock) is higher than the 
coefficients of modern inputs (tractors, fertilizers); this is linked specifically to 
investment and educational opportunities. Rainfall and temperature are also significant 
(although only weakly in case of temperature). Further, in all models testing for rainfall 
(2, 3 and 5), rainfall emerges as a more relevant factor of production than the modern 
inputs, underlying the prevalence of rain-fed agriculture. Thus, decreases in rainfall 
experienced by large parts of sub-Sahara Africa during the sample period reduced 
agricultural output while the effect of temperature was comparably marginal. There is 
also the expected negative effect of droughts on production, though this is not 
significant (despite model 4 when other climate variables are skipped). In model 5, 
irrigation is also included, but with weak results (to be explained by its little prevalence 
in sub-Sahara Africa). 
 
3.2 Countries at risk, part I 
The PITF database contains fifteen postcolonial episodes of geno-/politicides in sub-
Sahara Africa. There are many more contested cases, including most prominently 
killings in the context of the African World War, the Communist regime in Ethiopia, 
continuing violence in Somalia and Ethiopia, the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, the Sierra 
Leonean civil war, and the Mozambiquean war of independence. To avoid discussion 
about the inclusion of contested cases, we stick to the restricted list of fifteen given in 
table 2. While there is hardly any doubt that the occurrence of mass violence is much 
more wide-spread in sub-Sahara Africa than in only these cases, the problem is to 
identify intended and discriminate killing, which is indispensably necessary to make it 
genocidal. 
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Table 2: Genocidal episodes in sub-Sahara Africa 
Episode 
duration 
(years) 
killings 
(total) 
brief description 
Extreme cases (killings > 10,000 per month) 
Rwanda, 1994 0,3 750,000 Rwandan genocide 
Nigeria, 1967-70 2,7 1,225,000 Famishing strategy during Biafra war 
Burundi 1993 0,3 48,000 Political struggle by massacre 
Burundi 1988 0,1 12,000 Political struggle by massacre 
Large cases (killings between 1,000 and 10,000 per month) 
Uganda, 1980-86 5,2 240,000 Anti-opposition government violence 
Angola, 1998-2002 3,3 120,000 Civil war related genocidal campaigns 
Angola, 1975-94 19,1 546,000 Civil war related genocidal campaigns 
Uganda, 1971-79 8,3 216,000 Anti-opposition government violence 
Rwanda, 1963-64 0,6 12,150 Civil war related genocidal campaigns 
Burundi, 1965-73 8,3 129,750 Hutu-Tutsi political struggle 
Smaller cases (killings < 1,000 per month) 
Somalia 1988-91 2,8 29,150 Anti-rebellion government violence 
Congo Kinshasa, 1964-65 1,0 
6,150 
Civil war related genocidal 
campaigns 
Congo Kinshasa, 1977-79 2,8 14,150 Anti-rebellion government violence 
Ethiopia, 1976-79 3,5 13,500 Anti-opposition government 
violence 
Equatorial Guinea, 1969-
79 
10,5 31,300 Anti-opposition government 
violence 
Source: PITF (2012). 
Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Uganda, and Congo Kinshasa faced recurring genocidal 
violence.9F9 The two largest cases presented are also connected to agriculture. In the case 
of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (and also Burundi in 1993), there is hardly any doubt 
that the redistribution of land played a role in the killings, and thus, at least partially also 
                                                 
9 What we call “genocidal violence” here, is a summary of geno-/politicides according to the PITF 
definition: “Genocide and politicide events involve the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of 
sustained policies by governing elites or their agents […] that result in the deaths of a substantial portion 
of a communal group or politicized non-communal group. In genocides the victimized groups are defined 
primarily in terms of their communal (ethnolinguistic, religious) characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, 
groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups” 
(see PITF, 2013). 
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in their motivation.10F10 But other factors clearly dominated and, aside from serious 
population pressure, there is not much sign of a relevant climate-induced deterioration 
of living conditions before the genocides.11F11 Further, in the still heavily contested case of 
the Biafra war (1967-70), starvation clearly was part of the military strategy of the 
Nigerian army to break secessionist resistance. Nevertheless, in both cases a factor 
related to climate became an instrument of, rather than a reason for, of killing. 12F12 
Based on historical, economic, and political reasons for mass violence, we assemble 
seven data series (form the years 1975 to 2009) in three categories to characterize SSA 
countries. The three categories are: (1) the historical record of violence (data on the 
number of conflict years and average conflict intensities in conflict years); (2) the 
presence of economic difficulties (data on the number of years in recession, the average 
contraction in these years, and the 2009 log-level of GDP per capita in PPP$); (3) the 
presence of political suppression and exclusion (polity2 and polcomp scores, i.e. the 
degree of autocracy and the level of political competition). An overview of common 
characteristics of the countries concerned is given in Table 3. The table is already 
ordered by ascending levels of institutional risk: when all four of these risk factors are 
present, the country is ranked at the top; where none are present, the country is ranked 
at the bottom13F13.   
                                                 
10 In an interview study of 340 Rwandan households, it is shown that besides male sex and Tutsi ethnicity 
also (higher) age and (larger) land ownership was a relevant risk factor for being killed (see Verwimp, 
2003). The same is shown for Burundi in 1993 by making use of a representative sample of 7,520 
households (see Bundervoet, 2009). 
11 From table 2, only the episode in Burundi, starting in October 1993, had a possible connection to bad 
weather, not even climate. In October and November 1993, the two first months of the wet season, 
rainfall fell short by three quarters compared to a 30-year-average. 
12 This may also be the case in Ethiopia in the 1970s and even more in the 1980s, when repression by the 
Communist regime and secessionist war were also connected to a deterioration of food security. 
13 A factor is regarded as being ‘present’, when the country performance is below the sample median. 
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Table 3: Countries at risk in sub-Sahara Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Congo Kinshasa 25 3.6 231 20 -4.0 -5.1 2.4 
Djibouti 4 1.0 2,061 21 -2.5 -4.4 3.3 
Liberia 13 2.9 397 16 -4.2 -2.8 3.8 
Rwanda 10 3.5 1,031 11 1.1 -5.8 1.6 
Cote d'Ivoire 6 2.0 1,343 21 -0.4 -6.9 1.7 
Mauritania 5 3.0 1,574 15 0.3 -5.9 1.8 
Congo Brazzaville 6 2.0 2,220 13 1.1 -4.6 2.4 
Uganda 30 2.9 1,152 12 1.2 -3.5 2.9 
Burundi 15 3.7 368 20 0.2 -3.1 2.9 
Sierra Leone 11 3.0 873 14 -0.3 -2.9 3.0 
Ethiopia 21 5.3 684 15 1.2 -3.1 3.4 
Nigeria 26 2.0 2,034 18 0.4 -0.9 3.4 
Swaziland 0 - 3,440 13 1.3 -9.5 1.2 
Eritrea 0 - 592 12 0.8 -6.5 2.0 
Gabon 0 - 10,280 19 -1.1 -6.0 2.2 
Tanzania 0 - 1,189 10 1.7 -3.8 2.5 
Guinea 2 1.0 826 15 -0.1 -4.7 3.3 
Cameroon 1 1.0 1,811 13 0.3 -5.9 3.6 
Togo 0 - 734 18 -1.7 -4.7 3.6 
Burkina Faso 0 - 902 14 1.0 -4.6 3.7 
Zimbabwe 12 1.8 143 21 -2.9 -2.1 3.8 
Angola 31 6.4 4,754 17 1.7 -4.5 3.8 
Chad 24 3.8 1,276 16 0.9 -4.0 3.9 
Guinea-Bissau 0 - 818 16 1.5 -2.1 3.7 
Central African Republic 6 1.5 648 20 -1.2 -2.3 3.8 
Niger 8 1.0 534 19 -0.4 -1.3 3.9 
Kenya 6 1.5 1,206 15 0.4 -2.5 4.1 
Mozambique 12 6.0 759 12 1.4 -1.7 4.7 
Mali 6 1.0 999 11 2.1 0.3 4.9 
Senegal 8 1.0 1,492 13 0.5 1.0 7.8 
Lesotho 0 - 1,311 13 2.1 -0.3 3.9 
Malawi 0 - 653 19 -0.8 -2.3 4.3 
Zambia 0 - 1,765 22 -0.5 -1.7 4.4 
Comoros 0 - 916 24 -1.1 0.3 4.8 
Ghana 2 1.0 1,239 11 1.0 -0.3 5.1 
Benin 0 - 1,116 14 0.5 0.4 5.5 
Madagascar 0 - 753 20 -0.7 1.1 5.6 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Cape Verde 0 - 3,779 6 2.9 3.2 5.8 
Gambia 1 1.0 1,465 16 1.3 1.7 6.0 
Botswana 0 - 8,868 11 4.2 7.0 9.0 
Namibia 0 - 4,733 18 0.1 6.0 9.0 
Mauritius 0 - 9,484 3 3.6 9.8 9.8 
Notes and sources: 
(1) conflict years: number of years in ‘civil conflict’ between 1975 and 2009; MEPV database (Monty 
G. Marshall, Major episodes of political violence, 1946-2008, http://www.systemicpeace.org). 
(2) conflict intensity: average intensity (from a low 1 to a high 10) in these years of ‘civil conflict’; 
MEPV database. 
(3) income: GDP per capita in 2009 in PPP$ (base year 2005, using chain rule); PWT database (Alan 
Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.0, Center for International 
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, May 2011, 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php). 
(4) recession years: number of years with negative income growth between 1975 and 2009; PWT 
database. 
(5) economic performance: average annual income growth (geometric mean) between 1975 and 
2009; PWT database. 
(6) democracy: average of the polity2 score between 1975 and 2009, i.e. the difference between the 
democracy and autocracy score (from an autocratic -10 to a democractic +10); Polity IV database 
(Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2010, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). 
(7) political competition: average of the ‘polcomp’ score, between 1975 and 2009,  which is denoting 
regulation and competitiveness of political participation (from a low 1 to a high 10); Polity IV 
database. 
 
 
Thus, we see that the countries regarded as particularly at risk share a combination of 
several risk factors: a history of recurring conflict, a large vulnerability to economic 
crisis, a lack of democracy, and a more exclusive political process, which all raise the risk 
of violence. And while Djibouti, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, and Congo Brazzaville are 
certainly debatable (as the ‘violence factor’ is hardly developed), the overall picture is 
clear. This is further supported when the occurrence of genocidal episodes (see Table 2) 
is surveyed: most of these occurrences happened in impoverished countries in some 
kind of political or economic crisis, while no events (excepting perhaps Uganda in 1980) 
happened in a democratic environment; further, none happened in times of economic 
prosperity and only three events occurred under competitive (but highly conflictual) 
political conditions. 
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3.3 Countries at risk, part II 
For the second part of the risk section, we use our estimation for a projection of 
agricultural production until 2050.14F14 We use the IPCC-SRES scenarios A1B and A2 15F15 
and develop three projection scenarios (see Table 4). 16F16 Further, we simulate future 
climate change impacts by using the Hadley Centre Global Environmental Model 
applied to our data from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research.17F17 In the 
pessimistic scenario, A2, livestock growth is low, agricultural area not expanding, and 
population increase is fast. Further, elasticities and the stock of modern inputs are fixed 
(no technical improvements and adaptation). In the more optimistic scenario, A1B, 
livestock growth is higher, agricultural area enlarges and population growth is lower. 
The third scenario A1B_TT, finally, allows for irrigation and adaptation by enlarged 
elasticities (representing the ‘technology trend’ we added to the base scenario). This 
scenario is quite visionary, but helps to see how small changes in assumptions affect 
projections. Finally, model 2 (see Table 1) is used to show how agricultural production 
will develop under rain-fed conditions in the first two scenarios, while model 5 is taken 
to catch improvements in the third scenario. 
  
                                                 
14 A comparable approach is used by Devitt and Tol (2012), but their story is about civil war and drought 
risk as well as the effects of civil wars and climate change on economic growth until 2100. 
15 See IPCC (2000). The A1 scenario family assumes a future world of rapid economic growth and 
convergence, increased interactions and low population growth (A1B referring to a ‘balanced’ use of fossil 
and non-fossil sources of energy). The A2 scenario family assumes a heterogeneous world of self-reliance, 
in which economic growth is slower, but population growth larger. 
16 We use population projections from Gaffin et al. (2004), applying the same quantitative procedure for 
all countries in our sample. Concerning agricultural land, we apply FAOSTAT data and constant area for 
the A2 scenario, a continued trend (with respect to the average growth 1990-2010) for the A1B1 scenario, 
and an accelerated trend (1.5 times the average growth 1990-2010) for the A1B1_TT scenario. 
Concerning livestock, we apply a linear trend and assume an increase by 50 % until 2050 (with respect to 
the average stock 2005-09) for the A2 scenario, and an increase by 150 % for the A1B1 and A1B1_TT 
scenarios. Concerning tractors, fertilizers and irrigation, we assume constant stocks (only in the A1B1_TT 
scenario, the elasticity of fertilizer and irrigation is constantly increasing to 0.1 in 2050, which is not overly 
optimistic; because Barrios et al. (2008), for example estimated a coefficient of 0.078 in Asian countries 
for the use of fertilizers in the period 1961-2000). 
17 Temperature and rainfall projections are calculated as comparisons of 30-year averages (from 14 years 
before until 15 years after the respective year) with base period averages (1961-90), calibrated with Tyndall 
Centre for Climate Change Research data. Projections are based on Falloon and Betts (2006), Stott et al. 
(2006), Johns et al. (2006) and Martin et al. (2006). 
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Table 4: Summary of the assumptions used for projections 
 A2 A1B1 A1B1_TT 
Tractor fixed stock fixed stock fixed stock 
Fertilizer fixed stock fixed stock 
fixed stock + increasing 
elasticity (0.1 in 2050) 
Area equipped for 
irrigation 
none none 
fixed area + increasing 
elasticity (0.1 in 2050) 
Livestock 
livestock increases by 
1.5 (base 2005-09) 
livestock increases by 
2.5 (base 2005-09) 
livestock increases by 
2.5 (base 2005-09) 
Agricultural areaa 
fixed area 
(base 1990-2009) 
continuing trend (base 
1990-2009) 
continuing trend with 
higher growth rate 
Populationb increasing less increasing less increasing 
Time effectsc constant trend constant trend constant trend 
Notes and Sources: 
a In countries with negative annual growth during 1990-2009, the agricultural area was fixed in all 
three scenarios. 
b Data for population projections were taken from Gaffin et al. (2004). 
c Time effects were projected by using a linear spline model with different growth rates prior to 1975 
and after 1975: βt = β0 + β1t + β2(t – 1975)*D1975, where D1975 denotes a dummy variable, which is 1 
from 1975 and 0 otherwise; see Schmalensee et al (2008). 
 
As Figure 2 shows, overall production increased from 1961 to 2009. However, 
simulation results under A2, A1B, and A1B_TT follow different paths. While growth 
rates are declining in all scenarios over time (by almost half between 2020 and 2050, and 
respectively one third in the case of A1B_TT), production is increasing rather slowly in 
A2, faster in A1B, and quickly with adaptation in A1B_TT. Hence, while an expansion 
of labor power is not very influential, the intensification of the use of even basic 
technologies strongly impacts food production and, hence, the chances of food security 
in sub-Sahara Africa regarding average per capita production. This was already 
mentioned by the IPCC in 2007, which concluded that climate change will further shift 
the focus of food insecurity to sub-Saharan Africa but also that the impact of the 
applied socio-economic pathways (SRES scenario) on the numbers of people at risk of 
hunger is significantly greater than the impact of climate change. 18F18 
  
                                                 
18 These particular conclusions are made ‘with high confidence’ in a statistical sense (IPCC, 2007). 
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Figure 2: Estimated and predicted agricultural production in sub-Sahara Africa 
(log value index), 1960-2050 
 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Table 5: Average annual growth rates of population and agricultural production in sub-
Sahara Africa, 1970-2050 
 Population Production 
 A2 A1B1 observed A2 A1B1 A1B1_TT 
 2010-50 2010-50 1970-2009 2010-50 2010-50 2010-50 
Country group with …       
… high vulnerability 2.0 1.6 1.99 1.52 2.18 4.02 
… medium vulnerability 1.6 1.3 2.42 1.33 2.10 4.12 
… low vulnerability 1.1 0.8 1.83 1.10 1.62 3.56 
TOTAL 1.5 1.2 2.11 1.30 1.95 3.90 
 
What is more relevant with respect to risk, however, is a comparison we make by 
splitting the sample in three groups according to the combined average level of income 
and food supply between 1998 and 2002. 19F19 This is done to grasp the country’s capacity 
to meet demands by domestic production and imports (the latter certainly being 
                                                 
19 The data used to construct a multiplicative index are taken from Angus Maddison (GDP) and 
FAOSTAT (nutritional energy); see http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm and 
http://faostat.fao.org/ respectively. 
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dependent on income). Table 5 reports means of the projection results for these three 
groups, the first being the group with the highest vulnerability (i.e. with rather low levels 
of GDP per capita and nutritional energy supply per head per day). 
All reported numbers are to be taken with great caution because projections contain 
many uncertainties. But the general trends are clear: the rather pessimistic A2 scenario 
produces unfavorable results for all groups (the least for the countries with low 
vulnerability), pointing to an increasing risk in the future; the rather optimistic A1B 
scenario, on the other hand, points to improvements in all groups and large 
improvements in the A1B_TT scenario. However, when country-level data is 
investigated, certain countries of particular risk can be identified. Under the A2 scenario, 
most countries will likely face a deterioration of food supply on a per capita level and 
this is the more the case, the worse the situation in the country already is. But some 
regions face this problem also under the A1B scenario, most notably Angola (where 
only 77 % of population growth is met by increased production), Somalia (87 %), and 
Congo Kinshasa (89 %). 
Two further caveats are necessary. The first is that in all cases distribution is crucial 
because, while production would in many countries be sufficient to assure food security, 
malnourishment is prevalent due to unbalanced access. Take the obvious example of 
Angola, a relatively wealthy country: if the income generated by its rich resources were 
more equally distributed, current and foreseeable food insecurity problems could 
completely vanish. The second caveat is that no matter which scenario is applied, 
technology is absolutely crucial and could result in significant improvements. However, 
as confirmed by our analysis, this does not mean that it’s necessary for Africa to achieve 
a high-tech agro-industry; in order to achieve food security, it would be sufficient to 
apply appropriate techniques to improve yields in a low-tech- and small-scale-farming 
environment. 
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4. Conclusions and outlook 
A qualitative summary of our overall results is given in Table 6. The risks are 
denominated as ‘high’, ‘high-medium’, ‘medium’, and ‘low’ respectively. The order of 
countries reflects the risk classes, a preference for empirically well-grounded institutional 
risk within these classes, and, finally, a comparative assessment of idiosyncratic factors. 
All countries not mentioned in this list do not come up with more than medium risk in 
no more than one of the two dimensions. 
Table 6: Institutional and environmental risks in sub-Sahara Africa in the twenty-
first century 
 Institutional risk Environmental risk 
Congo Kinshasa high high 
Somalia high-mediuma high 
Liberia high medium 
Angola medium high 
Burundi high-medium high-medium 
Ethiopia high-medium high-medium 
Mauritania high-medium medium 
Sierra Leone high-medium medium 
Uganda high-medium medium 
Chad medium high-medium 
Eritrea medium high-medium 
Djibouti high low 
Rwanda high-medium low 
Nigeria high-medium low 
Côte d’Ivoire high-medium low 
Congo Brazzaville high-medium low 
Burkina Faso medium medium 
Guinea medium medium 
Madagascar low high-medium 
Zambia low high-medium 
Notes: 
a In the case of Somalia, we lack comparable data with respect to the institutional risk factors; 
hence, we assessed the risk to be ‘high-medium’ for obvious reasons (Somalia being a failed state 
affected by various historical and ongoing inter- and intra-national conflicts). 
 
We draw three conclusions from these results. First, understanding relationships 
between climate change and violence, very probably transmitted via socio-economic 
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tensions and political moderation, is still insufficient. It is likely, however, that there is a 
relationship between food security and violence, but it is also likely that this relationship 
is complex, strongly related to distributional and marginalization patterns, and nonlinear. 
Our results also confirm that those countries already vulnerable to violence will most 
likely remain so and their relative position may deteriorate because of adverse dynamics. 
Further, communities so marginal that they are virtually invisible and hence not 
reflected in comparative quantitative data (to which this study was restricted) may be 
particularly affected. When looking at the presence of risk factors from the perspective 
of potential perpetrators, it is highly likely that the costs of adaptation to climate change 
are high compared to the political and economic costs of violence and particularly of 
genocide. 
Secondly, evidence clearly shows that climatic factors are very unlikely to influence the 
outbreak, intensity, and duration of violence directly, while political, and socio-
economic factors are much more relevant. However, because of the interference of state 
capacity there is a considerable combined risk. Increasingly adverse effects from climate 
change, such as a deterioration of food security, and its negative consequences for 
economic growth and institutional quality, which are also empirically better grounded, 
may lead to a vicious cycle resulting in certain forms of violence possibly resulting in 
genocidal episodes. Feasibility also plays a role in genocides, in the sense that the larger 
the magnitude of political upheaval, the greater the willingness to take ‘extreme 
measures’ and the opportunity to seek ‘final solutions’ (Harff, 2003; Krain, 1997).  
Thirdly, projections of future agricultural production, in the peripheral environment of 
SSA the most relevant factor for political stability and economic prosperity directly 
affected by climate change, are very sensitive to assumptions about technological 
development, which are consequently crucial. Thus, there is much to be gained even 
from low-tech improvements. Development, especially in poor countries, would 
considerably change the actual outcome and peace-building efforts may even completely 
offset negative effects of climate change. But the complex interaction and the relevance 
of feasibility also allow for a specific corridor (at a low level) of development, in which 
the risk of violent outbreaks may increase. Equally, the experiences of past decades raise 
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concerns about a proper utilization of agricultural technologies and good governance 
practices in Africa – but not because of African backwardness, but because of the 
rational decisions of people confronted with specific challenges, existential constraints, 
and very diverse incentive structures. In the end, the developmental path a country or a 
society follows, including the degree of violence in general or the occurrence of 
genocide in particular, is crucially dependent on individual and collective decisions made 
by the stakeholders involved (including the international community), providing – or 
denying – the means to combat adverse developments and the effects of climate change. 
Hence, further research is necessary; the study of climate change and violence is only 
just beginning. We would especially welcome comparative case studies of the countries 
at risk identified in this study and systematic work willing to prudently generalize 
insights from these studies,20F20 as well as further interdisciplinary collaborative 
quantitative cross-country analysis. While case studies are particularly relevant because 
they allow a more detailed look at the actual means of transmission of climate change to 
the probability of conflict and genocide, among those the ones identified by cross-
country analysis, the crucial factors moderating transmissions are institutional and not 
necessarily idiosyncratic (Hofmann, 2014). Therefore, we also need institutional 
approaches to comparatively analyze the effects of climate change on the political and 
socio-economic sphere and further on the outbreak and continuation of organized and 
unorganized violence. In particular, we need interdisciplinary studies about threshold 
conditions and baseline shifts. We also need studies at the largest systemic level to 
understand how the international system and the global economy affect climate change 
and the means of adaptation and how these dynamics interact with local patterns (Kent, 
2014). Finally, better data is welcome in all these fields, especially more decentralized 
and nuanced data on institutions of land-use and the settlement of conflict. 
Overall, when facing climate change, violence is not a first-best-solution on the societal 
level, but it may be rational from a perpetrator perspective. Further, insufficient 
institutions are certainly the more serious problem to tackle when striving to prevent 
                                                 
20 Although Sudan is excluded in our analysis and Kenya does not figure prominently because of its 
relatively positive agricultural outlook on average, a rather connected example for a study combining 
theoretical and empirical work is provided by Scheffran et al. (2014) in this volume. 
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genocide. But climate change has important and mutual interconnections with bad 
institutions. Of particular relevance are connections to marginalization and vulnerability 
and the organization of conflict regulation on the local level when previously marginal 
groups are affected (Levene and Conversi, 2014). This article has contributed to the 
identification of countries at risk. Although some of these are ‘usual suspects’ (like in the 
Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa region), the picture has certainly become clearer 
and more nuanced with respect to the degree of risk. But for successful prevention to 
occur, research, policy, and activism will have to join forces to identify the places and 
groups at risk and address these risks by, for example, raising the costs of violence, 
improving dispute settlement, and identifying viable alternatives. The task is mighty 
indeed, but the benefits certainly outweigh the costs. 
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Abstract 
We use a controlled experiment to analyze gender differences in risk preferences and, 
more importantly, stereotypes about risk preferences of men and women across two 
distinct island societies in the Pacific: the patrilineal Palawan in the Philippines and the 
matrilineal Teop in Papua New Guinea. We find no gender differences in actual risk 
preferences, but evidence for culture-specific stereotypes. Like men in Western societies, 
Palawan men overestimate women’s actual risk aversion. By contrast, Teop men 
underestimate women’s actual risk aversion. We argue that the observed differences in 
stereotypes between the two societies are determined by the different social status of 
women. 
 
Keywords: Gender roles, culture, stereotype, experiment, risk aversion 
JEL classification: C93, D81, J15, J16
                                                 
1 A modified version of this paper will be published as: Pondorfer, A., T. Barsbai, T., & Schmidt, U. 
Gender differences in risk preferences and stereotypes: Experimental evidence from a matrilineal and a 
patrilineal society. Management Science, forthcoming. 
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1. Introduction 
Evidence from Western societies suggests that women are more risk averse than men. 22F1 
Such differences have important implications for economic outcomes such as 
occupational choice, investment and consumption choices, or insurance coverage. 
Findings from rural and traditional societies, however, cannot confirm the verdict of 
systematically different risk preferences of women and men (e.g., Binswanger, 1980; 
Henrich and McElreath, 2002). Even novel and rare experimental work conducted in 
societies where the roles of women and men are mirror images in specific aspects of 
social norms provide only mixed results. Gneezy et al. (2009) observe gender differences 
in competition but not in risk preferences among the patriarchal Maasai in Tanzania and 
the matrilineal Khasi in India. Gong and Yang (2012) find that women are more risk 
averse than men in patriarchal and matrilineal societies in China but the gender gap is 
smaller in the latter one. These findings suggest that gender differences in risk 
preferences cannot unequivocally be attributed to nature. Rather such differences may 
also be culture-specific and evolve during socialization. 23F2 
In this study we go beyond the analyses of gender differences in risk preferences and 
examine gender differences in stereotypes about risk preferences of men and women. 
We do so by comparing two traditional island societies which mainly differ in the social 
status of women: the patrilineal Palawan in the Philippines and the matrilineal Teop in 
Papua New Guinea. 
Stereotypes play an ambiguous role in decision making. On the one hand, by 
highlighting differences between groups, they allow easy processing of information and 
                                                 
1 See Eckel and Grossman (2008b), Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Bertrand (2011) for reviews of the 
experimental literature as well as Charness and Gneezy (2012). Women have also been shown to be more 
socially oriented, more selfless, less willing to compete and less willing to negotiate than men. However, 
according to Filippin and Crosetto (2014) gender differences in risk preferences are task-specific and less 
ubiquitous than usually claimed. 
2 See Gneezy et al. (2009, pp. 1644) for an intriguing discussion of the nature-nurture debate. Booth and 
Nolen (2012) also provide evidence for the role of nurture within a Western society. They show that 
English girls in an all-girls group or attending a single-sex school are less risk-averse than girls in 
coeducational schools. 
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categorization of people (Brewer 1999). 24F3 On the other hand, stereotypes are necessarily 
selective and highlight only the most distinctive features of a group (Hilton and von 
Hippel, 1996). They may hence be associated with biased assessment of an individual’s 
actual risk preferences and ultimately lead to statistical discrimination. Whether one sex 
is, rightly or wrongly, stereotyped as more risk averse, has important and potentially 
adverse consequences for the opportunities, choices, and outcomes of an individual 
with that sex (e.g., Ball et al., 2010; Roth and Voskort, 2014). In an economic 
transaction with another party, it is often the risk preference perceived by the other 
party – not the typically unobservable true risk preference – that matters.  
For instance, Wang (1994) finds that investment brokers offer women lower risk 
investment options (with lower expected returns) than men, which is consistent with the 
stereotype that women are more risk averse than men. Women may then make different 
and potentially suboptimal investment decisions compared to a situation in which they 
would receive unbiased advice. Stereotypes may also cause the underrepresentation of 
women in higher management positions. Johnson and Powell (1994) find no differences 
in decision quality and risk propensity between female and male managers and argue 
that the exclusion of women from such positions may be based on false stereotypes 
derived from observations of the non-managerial population. Heilman (2001) comes to 
a similar conclusion arguing that gender stereotypes bias the evaluation of work 
performance against women and thus hamper women from climbing up the 
organizational ladder. Relatedly, Eckel and Grossman (2002) note that employers may 
offer women lower initial wages in employment negotiations and bargain more 
aggressively if they expect women to be more risk averse and hence more willing to 
accept a given offer than men. In the context of developing countries, gender 
stereotypes may explain why microcredits are primarily given to women rather than men 
(Morduch 1999): If women are expected to be more risk averse, the perceived chances 
of debt retirement are higher. 
                                                 
3 Stereotyping can be taken as the most cognitive component of category-based reactions, i.e. reactions to 
people from groups perceived to differ significantly from one’s own (Eagly and Chaicken, 1998; Petty and 
Wegener 1998).  
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While women in Western societies are often more risk averse than men, men perceive 
women to be even more risk averse than they actually are (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 
2002; Daruvala, 2007; Eckel and Grossman, 2008a; Grossman and Lugovskyy, 2011). 
Men’s biased perception persists even if information about women’s actual risk 
preferences is provided (e.g., Grossman, 2013).25F4 Beyond statistical discrimination, 
incorrect stereotypes further worsen suboptimal decision making and the associated 
welfare and efficiency losses. This is especially so when stereotypes are internalized, thus 
lowering the self-esteem and confidence of the stereotyped group (Correll, 2001; 
Crocker and Major, 1989; Jones et al., 1984; Rosenberg, 1979).26F5 For instance, Carr and 
Steele (2010) show that concerns about their risk stereotype increase women’s risk 
aversion in financial decisions. Following Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) identity model, 
the internalization of risk stereotypes may also explain women’s occupational sorting 
into jobs that require relatively less risk taking.  
Despite the wealth of literature on gender stereotypes, the existence of culture-specific 
stereotypes has, to our knowledge, not been investigated so far. This is somewhat 
surprising given the expected importance of culture in explaining the presence of 
stereotypes (Fiske, 2000). We use a simple gamble choice task based on the design of 
Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008a) to measure a subject’s risk preference. To examine 
gender stereotypes in the patrilineal society of Palawan and the matrilineal society of 
Teop, each subject is asked to predict the gamble choice of another female and male 
subject from the same society. We are hence able to examine whether a person’s sex is 
considered as a signal of risk preference in each society. Stereotypes change with the 
social structure and norms of a society, in particular with the status of groups (Crocker 
et al. 1998, Fiske 2000). We therefore expect gender stereotypes to be culture-specific. 
Specifically, we expect men from the patrilineal Palawan to exhibit different stereotypes 
about female risk preferences than men from the matrilineal Teop. In order to address 
                                                 
4 Similar evidence exists for the stereotype that women are less talented and interested in mathematics and 
science. In spite of equal performance, men are much more likely to be hired for an arithmetic task than 
women even if information on performance is provided (Reuben et al., 2014). 
5 This argument is similar to the stereotype threat theory (Steele, 1997). 
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the internalization of stereotypes, we also analyze women’s self-confidence and 
engagement in economic activities that are typically performed by men. 
We find no significant gender differences in actual risk preferences in each of the two 
island societies. However, consistent with our expectation of culture-specific 
stereotypes, we are the first to show that men from a patrilineal society (the Palawan) 
overestimate women’s actual risk aversion and men from the matrilineal society (the 
Teop) underestimate women’s actual risk aversion. Hence, men in both societies use 
female sex as a significant signal for risk preferences, but in opposite directions. Men’s 
biased perception of women’s risk preferences implies suboptimal opportunities and 
choices for women. The fact that these biases are culture-specific suggests that 
stereotypes are not universal by nature, but (co)determined by nurture. 
 
2. Subject pool: The patrilineal Palawan and the matrilineal Teop  
Most explorations of gender differences in risk preferences are based on experiments 
conducted in what Henrich et al. (2010) call WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, 
rich, and democratic) societies. They make a compelling argument that these societies 
are relatively novel within evolutionary history and that data from non-Western small-
scale societies are essential for testing hypotheses that relate to the human condition. 
To assess the importance of culture for gender differences in stereotypes, we conduct 
experiments with subjects from small-scale societies where culture and its influence on 
the social order of a society play a more prominent role in daily life than in modern 
societies. We are thus more able to disentangle the role of culture from other factors 
related to economic development that may potentially confound the relationship 
between culture and stereotypes. 
To isolate the effect of culture and women’s social status on stereotypes, the ideal 
experiment would randomly assign different gender roles to otherwise identical 
societies. Such an experiment is, however, not feasible. To get as close as possible to this 
ideal experiment, we resort to the second best approach and conduct a cross-cultural 
study. Specifically, we study two societies that are very similar along many important 
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dimensions but have opposite cultures when it comes to women’s social status: the 
patrilineal Palawan in the Philippines and the matrilineal Teop in Papua New Guinea.  
Both the Palawan and the Teop are originally indigenous tribes and live in small-scale 
island societies located in the Pacific Ocean. They share the same geo-ecological 
conditions and their remote location has limited exposure to external cultural influences. 
We can therefore exclude the possibility that differences in geography or climate drive 
differences in risk preferences, and possibly gender differences in risk preferences, too. 
This setting is an improvement relative to the literature initiated by Gneezy et al. (2009), 
which compares patriarchal and matrilineal societies that do not necessarily share geo-
ecological conditions. In our two study societies, the social status of women and men is 
based on social norms that regulate land ownership and resource-related user rights. 
These norms are in favor of men among the patrilineal Palawan and in favor of women 
among the matrilineal Teop. The following paragraphs provide more details on each 
society. 
The Palawan are an indigenous ethnic group of the Palawan archipelago in the 
Philippines. Our subjects were recruited from small coastal settlements located in the 
Rizal area in the south of Palawan Island. Their main source of livelihood is farming and 
fishing. Although the household is not strictly organized along patriarchal ideology, the 
husband is the publicly acknowledged head of a household and main decision-maker. As 
such, he is expected to be the breadwinner for the family. Conversely, the wife is 
credited primarily for her ability to have children, take good care of them and her 
husband, and manage the household finances (Alcantara, 1994). Men hold user rights 
over land and other resources including those provided by the sea. Traditional 
leadership in Palawan communities is based on the blood line. Community members 
who have “royal” blood are eligible for leadership, but only if they are men (Limsa, 
2014). 
The Teop form a unique language group of Bougainville Island in Papua New Guinea 
and represent a matrilineal and matrilocal island society. Our subjects were recruited 
from small coastal settlements located in the northern part of the main island. Similar to 
the Palawan, the mainstay of the Teop is farming. This subsistence pattern is 
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supplemented by fishing, hunting and foraging (Reagan and Griffin, 2005). Women’s 
social position in Bougainville culture has its origin in land. The matrilineal kinship 
structure gives women considerable power over material resources and activities that are 
economically and ritually important. Women’s prerogative over land includes defining 
land boundaries, giving permission to hunt or to harvest timber, and the exclusive right 
to veto decisions on land-related matters. While male relatives have rights to ownership, 
their rights are limited and conditional on female relatives’ permission (Saovana-Spriggs, 
2003). Moreover, unmarried, divorced, or widowed brothers and sons reside in the 
home of their female relative. Even married men who live with their wife’s family are 
expected to spend much of their time in their mother’s or sister’s household. Still, there 
are some predominantly male domains. Women hardly participate in politics and do not 
physically take part in tribal or civil conflicts. Priesthood also remains a male profession. 
Moreover, the Teop rely on big men (chieftains) to enforce norms in everyday life 
(Cochrane 1970).  
 
3. Experimental design and procedure 
Our experimental design closely follows Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008a). We 
implement a simple and incentivized task for measuring risk preferences. This task is 
particularly adequate for a subject pool with limited numerical skills (Dave et al. 2010, 
Charness et al., 2013). Subjects are shown five gambles and asked to choose which of 
the five they wish to play for real. The gambles include one sure thing with the 
remaining four increasing linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the 
standard deviation of expected payoff. All are 50/50 gambles. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the gamble choices, the payoffs associated with each possible outcome, 
expected payoffs, and the standard deviations of expected payoffs. The gambles are 
represented in a way that is easy for subjects to understand. The use of 50/50 gambles 
keeps the task as simple as possible.27F6 
                                                 
6 See Eckel and Grossman (2008b) for a discussion on advantages and disadvantages of measures of risk 
preferences. 
 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN STEREOTYPES OF RISK PREFERENCES  50 
 
This design can also be used to measure a subject’s gender stereotypes about risk 
preferences in a simple way. After subjects choose their most preferred gamble, we ask 
them which of the five gambles an unidentified female and male subject from their 
society had chosen for her- and himself. Hence, the sex of the other person is the only 
information that a subject has to make a prediction of that person’s gamble choice. We 
use monetary incentives to encourage subjects to spend effort on their prediction.  
 
Table 1: Gambles, expected payoff, and risk (for the Teop in Papua New Guinea) 
Gamble 
Probability 
(%) 
Option A Option B 
Expected 
payoff 
Variance 
Standard 
deviation 
1 50/50 4 Kina 4 Kina 4 Kina 0 0 
2 50/50 6 Kina 3 Kina 4.5 Kina 2.25 1.5 
3 50/50 8 Kina 2 Kina 5 Kina 9 3 
4 50/50 10 Kina 1 Kina 5.5 Kina 20.25 4.5 
5 50/50 12 Kina 0 Kina 6 Kina 36 6 
Gambles increase linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the standard deviation of expected 
payoff. 1 Kina ~ 0.4 US$. Gambles for the Palawan in the Philippines were adjusted based on purchasing-
power parity.  
 
The experimental procedure is the same for sessions conducted in the two societies. In 
each society we collected data from several villages.28F7 For each session, we recruited 
adult subjects in advance and asked them to come to a central place in the village 
(school, church or community places).29F8 After answering a short questionnaire, all 
subjects received a payment as an appreciation for completing the questionnaire and a 
show up fee to hold endowment effects constant. Together, these payments amounted 
to about US$ 1, equivalent to about a quarter of the daily minimum wage in each 
country.30F9 
Subjects were then asked to move one by one into a private area where the experiment 
was conducted. The experimenter read out the instructions and explained the tasks. In 
                                                 
7 Specifically, we recruited subjects from five (three) villages of the matrilineal (patrilineal) Teop 
(Palawan).  
8 Village heads and our local assistant helped us recruit the subjects from the adult population in the 
villages. No more than two persons were recruited from the same household to minimize contamination 
and learning between subjects. 
9 To make endowment effects and stakes comparable across the two societies, we adjusted payments 
based on purchasing power parity (see, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=699). 
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the first task, subjects were asked to choose their preferred gamble. Each gamble was 
presented as a pair of money cards (see appendix Figure A1). The chosen pair was then 
put into a bag and shuffled. 
Before subjects could draw their card from the bag, they were asked to complete the 
second task. In this task, subjects were shown two closed envelopes, one containing the 
gamble choice of an unidentified female subject and one containing the gamble choice 
of an unidentified male subject. Subjects were then asked to predict which gamble the 
other female and male subject had chosen for her- or himself.31F10 For each correct 
prediction, they received an additional payment. 32F11 Subjects were told that pairs in the 
envelopes were changed after each participant such they could not use any information 
they could have potentially received from previous participants. As a final step, subjects 
drew one card form the bag with their chosen gamble and received their payment. 33F12 On 
average, this additional payment summed up to about US$ 1. 
To ensure that all subjects fully understood the instructions and could communicate 
with the experimenters, we hired local assistants. They translated our experimental 
instructions into the local language. Different assistants translated the instructions back 
into English, so we could check for accuracy. All instructions were read aloud to the 
subjects, first in English by the experimenter then in the local language by the 
assistant.34F13 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Subject characteristics 
                                                 
10 We changed the order of presenting the envelopes after each subject. 
11 Assuming that each subject has a distribution of risk preferences in the society in mind, our incentive 
system implies that each subjects should predict the mode of her (his) assumed distribution. We can, 
however, not control whether subjects indeed behave like this or whether there exist systematic deviations 
which, if culture-specific, could bias our results. 
12 For more details, see the experimental instructions in the Appendix. 
13 A male experimenter and a female assistant conducted each session to control for potential gender 
effects related to the experimental setup. 
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Table A1 in the appendix summarizes the main socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the subjects from the two societies. In total, 103 people from the 
patrilineal Palawan (49 men, 54 women) and 96 people from the matrilineal Teop (48 
men, 48 women) participated in the study. Several observations are noteworthy. First, 
the average age (41-42 years) is about the same across society and sex (p = 0.49). 35F14 
Second, households of Teop people are larger than those of Palawan people (6.03 
versus 4.83, p < 0.01). The difference can be explained by the fact that married Teop 
men are still counted as members of their mother’s household even if they reside 
elsewhere. Third, reflecting the different social status of women in the two societies, 
Teop women have a significantly higher educational attainment than Palawan women (p 
< 0.01). While all Teop women in the sample have completed some form of formal 
education, about one quarter of Palawan women have no formal education at all. 
However, Teop men and Palawan men do not significantly differ in their educational 
background (p = 0.42). Fourth, wealth, as measured by the number of comparable 
assets households own, is only marginally larger in Teop than in Palawan (p = 0.08). 36F15 
We can find no significant differences in wealth between men and women within 
societies (p = 0.20 for Teop and p = 0.50 for Palawan). Fifth, farming and fishing are 
the main economic activities in both societies. However, wage labor, in particular as a 
secondary activity, is more prevalent in Palawan. Sixth, due to the strong presence of 
Christian missionaries in Bougainville all Teop subjects are Christians, while about 35 
percent of Palawan subjects are Muslims. 
 
4.2 Actual risk preferences 
Figure 1 shows the mean gambles that women and men choose for themselves 
separately for the patrilineal Palawan and the matrilineal Teop. Table 2 lists the 
distribution of gamble choices by sex and society in more detail. Across sex, Palawan 
subjects are considerably less risk averse than Teop subjects. The mean gamble choice is 
                                                 
14 All tests of socio-economic and demographic differences in means are conducted using a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test. Our results are robust to using a t-test. 
15 We considered the following six assets which are of comparable value and use across the two societies: 
torch, lamp, chair, generator, mobile phone, radio. 
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3.43 among Palawan subjects and 2.73 among Teop subjects. The difference is 
statistically significant (p < 0.01).37F16 About 55 percent of the Palawan choose the risky 
gambles 4 and 5, compared to 31 percent of the Teop. By contrast, 44 percent of the 
Teop people select the less risky gambles 1 and 2, compared to 23 percent of the 
Palawan.38F17 
Figure 1: Mean gamble choices 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of own gamble choice 
 Teop (matrilineal)  Palawan (patrilineal) 
Gamble 
All 
subjects 
(%) 
Men 
(%) 
Women 
(%) 
 
All 
subjects 
(%) 
Men 
(%) 
Women 
(%) 
1 22 (23%) 11 (23%) 11 (23%)  16 (16%) 8 (16%) 8 (15%) 
2 20 (21%) 8 (17%) 12 (25%)  8 (8%) 7 (14%) 1 (2%) 
3 24 (25%) 13 (27%) 11 (23%)  22 (21 %) 9 (18%) 13 (24%) 
4 22 (23%) 12 (25%) 10 (21%)  29 (2%) 13 (27%) 16 (30%) 
5 8 (8%) 4 (8%) 4 (8%)  28 (27%) 12 (24%) 16 (30%) 
Total 96 (100%) 48 (100%) 48 (100%)  103 (100%) 49 (100%) 54 (100%) 
Mean (s.d.) 2.73 (1.28) 2.79 (1.29) 2.67 (1.28)  3.43 (1.38) 3.29 (1.41) 3.57 (1.34) 
Gambles increase linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the standard deviation of expected 
payoff (see Table 1). Figure 1 shows the mean gamble choices by sex and society.  
                                                 
16 All tests of gender differences in means are conducted using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Our results are 
robust to using a t-test. 
17 Palawan men’s mean gamble choice is significantly higher than those of Teop men and women (3.29 vs. 
2.79, p = 0.07 and 3.29 vs. 2.69, p = 0.03). The same is true for Palawan women’s mean gamble choice 
(3.57 vs. 2.79, p < 0.01 and 3.57 vs. 2.67, p < 0.01). 
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Although the Palawan and Teop appear to have different risk preferences, we observe 
no gender differences in risk preferences within the two societies. We cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the gamble choice of Palawan (Teop) women equals the gamble choice 
of Palawan (Teop) men at usual significance levels (3.57 vs. 3.29, p = 0.31 for Palawan; 
2.67 vs. 2.79, p = 0.61 for Teop).  
To ensure that these findings are not confounded by different background 
characteristics of subjects across sex or society, Table 3 presents results from a simple 
regression model. We use ordinary least squares as expected payoff (and risk) increase 
linearly with gambles.39F18 Columns 1-4 pool data from Palawan and Teop subjects and 
provide a sense of data patterns across the two societies. Columns 5-7 and 8-11 split the 
data by society, permitting the explanatory variables to have heterogeneous effects in 
each society. We include village-fixed effects in columns 5-11. Estimation with village 
fixed effects only exploits variation within villages and eliminates all village-level 
heterogeneity (e.g., village economy, village leadership, village geography, or 
demographic composition). It can hence not be the case that some village-specific 
oddities drive our results. For each sample, we show three standard specifications. The 
first specification only controls for the sex of the subject. The second specification adds 
controls for age, education40F19, and wealth. The third specification additionally controls 
for religion, wage labor, and other potentially relevant socio-economic variables. In 
addition to these three standard specifications, we present a fourth specification for the 
pooled sample and the Palawan sub-sample in which we include an interaction of the 
gender and Muslim dummy (columns 4 and 11).  
                                                 
18 Our results are robust to using alternative estimators such as ordered probit (results are available upon 
request).  
19 Note that we failed to record the educational level of two subjects. We allocated these missing values to 
educational level two (elementary), the most common category. All results are robust to allocating these 
two subjects to any other education category or to excluding them from the sample (results are available 
on request). 
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Table 3: Own gamble choice (OLS regression results) 
 Pooled data  Teop (matrilineal)  Palawan (patrilineal) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Male 0.12 0.16 -0.27 -0.27  0.04 0.06 -0.37  -0.32 -0.24 -0.48 -0.27 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.31) (0.31)  (0.26) (0.29) (0.32)  (0.28) (0.28) (0.59) (0.62) 
Palawan 0.91*** 0.86*** 1.12*** 1.01***          
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.32) (0.33)          
Palawan*male -0.41 -0.37 -0.38 -0.12          
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.46)          
Muslim   -0.55* -0.23       -0.70* -0.76* -0.44 
   (0.32) (0.42)       (0.36) (0.38) (0.46) 
Muslim*male    -0.72         -0.72 
    (0.65)         (0.73) 
Age  -0.00 0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01   -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.02)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Elementary  -0.01 -0.32 -0.28   0.12 0.28   0.65 0.26 0.25 
  (0.38) (0.45) (0.46)   (0.54) (0.59)   (0.45) (0.79) (0.80) 
High school  -0.56* -0.54 -0.55   -0.77 -0.70   0.40 0.18 0.15 
  (0.33) (0.35) (0.35)   (0.49) (0.53)   (0.44) (0.59) (0.59) 
Above high school  -0.34 -0.37 -0.41   -0.34 -0.28   0.15 -0.08 -0.19 
  (0.34) (0.35) (0.35)   (0.51) (0.55)   (0.35) (0.47) (0.51) 
Wealth  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01   -0.07 -0.08   0.00 0.05 0.05 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)   (0.13) (0.13)   (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) 
Wage labor   0.32 0.32    0.42    0.15 0.16 
   (0.32) (0.32)    (0.64)    (0.45) (0.45) 
Constant 2.67*** 3.09*** 2.29*** 2.32***  3.14*** 3.56*** 2.87**  3.73*** 3.70*** 3.07*** 2.99*** 
 (0.18) (0.53) (0.78) (0.78)  (0.29) (0.81) (1.36)  (0.26) (0.57) (0.92) (0.92) 
Linear combination of  
Male + Palawan*male 
-0.29 -0.21 -0.65 -0.39          
(0.27) (0.28) (0.40) (0.46)          
Other controls no no yes yes  no no yes  no no yes yes 
Village fixed effects no no no no  yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 199 199 199 199  96 96 96  103 103 103 103 
R2 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.16  0.07 0.11 0.16  0.02 0.07 0.13 0.15 
The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is subject’s own gamble choice (compare Table 1). Gambles increase linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by 
the standard deviation of expected payoff. Other controls include household size, being a household head, marital status and fishing as main economic activity. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
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In no specification do we find evidence for significant gender differences in risk 
preferences. Consistent with previous experimental work in the lab (Holt and Laury, 
2000) and the field (Henrich and McElreath, 2002), sex, age, economic status and other 
characteristics do not predict risk preferences and the inclusion of these variables has no 
significant effect on the gender coefficient. In other words, differences in socio-
economic and demographic background do not confound the (lacking) association 
between gender and risk taking. We only find that among the Palawan Muslims tend to 
be more risk averse than non-Muslims. This finding, however, cannot explain why the 
Teop are generally more risk averse than the Palawan. 41F1 In general, our findings are in 
line with results from previous cross-cultural studies that point towards the importance 
of culture for explaining variation in behavior (e.g., Weber and Hsee, 1998; Henrich et 
al., 2012; Nelson, 2014; Rieger et al., 2014). 
 
4.3 Stereotyping about risk preferences 
In addition to choosing a gamble for themselves, subjects also made a prediction of the 
gamble choice of an unidentified female and male subject. Table 4 presents the 
distribution of predictions of others’ gamble choices by sex and society. 
In line with the previous finding that Palawan subjects are less risk averse than Teop 
subjects, they also perceive themselves to be less risk averse. On average, all (female and 
male) Palawan subjects make significantly higher predictions of the gamble choice of 
both women and men than Teop subjects (3.36 vs. 2.81, p < 0.01 for women; 3.19 vs. 
2.94, p = 0.10 for men). 
 
                                                 
1 We checked for systematic gender differences within the Muslim and non-Muslim sub-samples and 
found no significant differences. We also checked whether there are significant differences in the 
relationship between socio-economic characteristics and risk preferences for Muslims by interacting each 
characteristic with a Muslim dummy. There appear to be no systematic differences. None of the 
interactions turn out to be significant at the ten percent level (results are available upon request). 
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Table 4: Predictions of others’ gamble choices 
Teop (matrilineal) 
 Predictions by all subjects  Predictions by men  Predictions by women 
Gamble For men (%) For women (%)  For men (%) For women (%)  For men (%) For women (%) 
1 13 (14%) 25 (27%)  6 (13%) 8 (18%)  7 (15%) 17 (35%) 
2 23 (24%) 14 (15%)  13 (27%) 3 (7%)  10 (21%) 11 (23%) 
3 26 (27%) 18 (19%)  15 (31%) 12 (27%)  11 (23%) 6 (13%) 
4 25 (26%) 26 (28%)  9 (19%) 17 (38%)  16 (33%) 9 (19%) 
5 9 (9%) 10 (11%)  5 (10%) 5 (11%)  4 (8%) 5 (10%) 
Total  96 (100%) 93 (100%)  48 (100%) 45a (100%)  48 (100%) 48 (100%) 
Mean (s.d.) 2.94 (1.19) 2.81 (1.38)  2.88 (1.18) 3.18 (1.27)  3.00 (1.22) 2.46 (1.41) 
         
Palawan (patrilineal) 
 Predictions by all subjects  Predictions by men  Predictions by women 
Gamble For men (%) For women (%)  For men (%) For women (%)  For men (%) For women (%) 
1 14 (14%) 9 (9%)  8 (17%) 6 (12%)  6 (11%) 3 (6%) 
2 12 (12%) 14 (14%)  3 (6%) 7 (14%)  9 (17%) 7 (13%) 
3 28 (27%) 29 (28%)  15 (31%) 18 (37%)  13 (24%) 11 (20%) 
4 36 (35%) 33 (32%)  19 (40%) 13 (27%)  17 (32%) 20 (37%) 
5 12 (12%) 18 (18%)  3 (6%) 5 (10%)  9 (17%) 13 (24%) 
Total 102 (100%) 103 (100%)  48a (100%) 49 (100%)  54 (100%) 54 (100%) 
Mean (s.d.) 3.19 (1.21) 3.36 (1.18)  3.13 (1.18) 3.08 (1.15)  3.26 (1.25) 3.61 (1.16) 
Gambles increase linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the standard deviation of expected payoff (see Table 1). 
a Predictions by Teop (Palawan) men for women (men) do not sum to total observations of 48 (49) because of three (one) missing values. We failed to record these predictions during 
the experimental sessions. 
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Gender stereotyping is best assessed by comparing actual and perceived risk preferences 
for each sex. For this purpose, we define the prediction error as the difference between 
an individual’s prediction of the gamble choice and the average actual gamble choice of 
a given sex: 
prediction errori, sex = predictioni(gamble choicesex) – average(actual gamble choicesex) 
A prediction error of zero implies that stereotypes about risk preferences are on average 
correct. Accordingly, non-zero prediction errors are associated with incorrect 
stereotypes. Negative prediction errors correspond to overestimating, positive 
prediction errors to underestimating the risk aversion of a given sex. As argued above, 
the larger the bias in perception, the larger the degree of suboptimal decision making 
and the associated efficiency and welfare losses. 
Figure 2 shows the mean prediction error for women’s gamble choices (upper part) and 
men’s gamble choices (lower part) by sex of the predictor and society. Consistent with 
the culture-specific social status of women, there are considerable differences in men’s 
stereotypes about women’s risk choices across the two societies. Men from the 
patrilineal Palawan overestimate women’s actual risk aversion. Their mean prediction 
error for women’s gamble choices of -0.49 is significantly different from zero (p < 
0.01).42F1 By contrast, men from the matrilineal Teop underestimate women’s actual risk 
aversion. Their mean prediction error for women’s gamble choices of 0.51 is also 
significantly different from zero (p < 0.01). Hence, men’s perception of women’s risk 
preferences is considerably biased in both societies but in opposite directions. The 
magnitude of the bias is considerable, amounting to almost half a standard deviation of 
women’s actual risk preferences. 
When it comes to women’s stereotypes about men’s risk choices, there are no such 
differences between the two societies. While Teop women slightly underestimate men’s 
actual risk aversion, their mean prediction error of 0.21 is not significantly different 
form zero (p = 0.24). Palawan women correctly assess men’s risk preferences. Their 
mean prediction error is close to zero (-0.03; p = 0.88). 
                                                 
1 We use a one-sample t-test to test whether prediction errors differ significantly from zero. 
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Men and women in both societies have relatively accurate perception of their own sex’ 
risk preferences. All prediction errors are relatively small and not significantly different 
from zero. Accordingly, gender differences within societies only exist for stereotypes 
about women’s risk preferences. The mean prediction error of Palawan (Teop) men is 
significantly different from the prediction error of Palawan (Teop) women (-0.49 vs. 
0.04, p < 0.01 for Palawan; 0.51 vs. -0.21, p < 0.01 for Teop). 
 
Figure 2: Mean prediction errors for women’s and men’s gamble choices 
 
The prediction error is defined as the difference between an individual’s prediction 
of the gamble choice of an unidentified subject of a given sex and the average actual 
gamble choice of that sex. Positive (negative) prediction errors correspond to 
underestimating (overestimating) the risk aversion of that sex.  
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To assess the robustness of these results against potential confounders, we regress a 
subject’s prediction error for a given sex on the subject’s own sex and several control 
variables. We start with a model that pools data from the two societies. To identify 
culture-specific gender differences in stereotypes, all specifications include a dummy 
variable for belonging to the Palawan society, a dummy variable for being male, and 
their interaction.  
Table 5 presents the results for prediction errors for women’s risk choices using the 
same model specifications as in Table 3 above.43F2 All our previous results hold. There are 
significant gender differences in stereotypes about women’s risk preferences. According 
to column 1, men from the matrilineal Teop underestimate women’s risk aversion. The 
positive and significant coefficient of the male dummy implies that Teop men, 
compared to Teop women, overestimate the gamble choice of women by about 0.7. By 
contrast, men from the patrilineal Palawan overestimate women’s risk aversion. 
Combined with the coefficient of the male dummy the highly significant coefficient of 
the interaction implies that Palawan men, compared to Palawan women, underestimate 
the gamble choice of women by about 0.5. Both the size and statistical significance of 
the point estimates are robust to controlling for age, education, wealth, religion, wage 
labor and other socio-economic control variables as well as for a subject’s own gamble 
choice and prediction error for men’s risk preferences (columns 2-4). The stability of the 
gender coefficient across columns indicates that important observable characteristics 
cannot explain gender differences in stereotypes. Our results are essentially the same 
when we analyse the data separately for the Teop sub-sample (columns 4-6) and 
Palawan sub-sample (columns 7-11). The only exception is that the male dummy 
becomes marginally insignificant in the third specification for the Teop sub-sample (p = 
0.102 column 7). 
                                                 
2 The results shown in Table 5 are robust to various alternative specifications such as estimation with 
clustering standard errors at the village level instead of simple robust standard errors (see Table A2 in the 
appendix), or estimation with a random effects model or ordered probit instead of OLS (results are 
available upon request). One may also be concerned that our dependent variable is bounded from below 
and above and at different values for each society (as the average actual gamble choice for women/men 
differs between the two societies). We address this concern by estimating separate Tobit models for each 
society, in which we use society-specific bounds. Our results are robust to this check (results available are 
upon request). One may also worry that subjects did not genuinely try to predict other subjects’ gamble 
choices, but just used their own gamble choice or the mean gamble choice (3) as their prediction. Given 
that the average actual gamble choice for women/men differs between the two societies, such predictions 
may systematically bias our results. However, our results are robust to excluding subjects who used their 
own or the mean gamble choice from the sample (results are available upon request). 
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Table 5: Stereotyping about women’s risk choices (OLS regression results) 
 Pooled data  Teop (matrilineal)  Palawan (patrilineal) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Male 0.72** 0.66** 0.63** 0.63**  0.71** 0.66** 0.75  -0.52** -0.49** -0.63* -0.72* 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32)  (0.29) (0.31) (0.45)  (0.24) (0.23) (0.34) (0.39) 
Palawan 0.25 0.17 0.21 0.25          
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.34) (0.34)          
Palawan*male -1.25*** -1.16*** -1.21*** -1.31***          
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.40)          
Muslim   -0.05 -0.16        -0.21 -0.33 
   (0.25) (0.34)        (0.32) (0.38) 
Muslim*male    0.26         0.27 
    (0.50)         (0.52) 
Age  0.01 0.01 0.01   0.02 -0.00   0.00 0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.02)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Elementary  0.18 0.32 0.31   -1.33 -1.35   1.01* 1.43** 1.43** 
  (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)   (0.95) (1.03)   (0.58) (0.60) (0.61) 
High school  0.11 0.36 0.37   0.09 0.13   0.91* 1.47*** 1.48*** 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.39)   (0.56) (0.57)   (0.52) (0.46) (0.47) 
Above high school  -0.01 0.22 0.24   -0.06 -0.03   0.77 1.25*** 1.30*** 
  (0.40) (0.41) (0.41)   (0.63) (0.66)   (0.51) (0.42) (0.46) 
Wealth  -0.08 -0.05 -0.05   0.08 0.08   -0.23** -0.17 -0.17 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)   (0.12) (0.12)   (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) 
Wage labor   0.18 0.18    -0.03    -0.06 -0.07 
   (0.26) (0.26)    (0.80)    (0.29) (0.29) 
Gamble choice   0.11 0.11    0.10    0.09 0.09 
   (0.08) (0.08)    (0.13)    (0.11) (0.10) 
Prediction error (men)   0.17** 0.18**    0.13    0.22** 0.22** 
   (0.08) (0.08)    (0.14)    (0.11) (0.11) 
Constant -0.21 -0.41 -1.21 -1.23  -0.09 -0.85 -0.57  0.06 -0.35 -1.55* -1.54* 
 (0.20) (0.54) (0.75) (0.75)  (0.38) (1.06) (1.48)  (0.24) (0.62) (0.81) (0.81) 
Linear combination of  
Male + Palawan*male 
-0.53** -0.50** -0.58* -0.67*          
(0.23) (0.23) (0.30) (0.34)          
Other controls no no yes yes  no no yes  no no yes yes 
Village fixed effects no no no no  yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 196 196 195 195  93 93 93  103 103 102 102 
R2 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.18  0.08 0.14 0.21  0.06 0.17 0.31 0.32 
The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the prediction error for women’s gamble choice, which is defined as the difference between an individual’s prediction of 
the gamble choice of an unidentified female subject and the average actual gamble choice of women. Positive (negative) prediction errors correspond to underestimating 
(overestimating) women’s risk aversion. Other controls include household size, being a household head, marital status and fishing as main economic activity. Gamble choice is an 
individual’s own gamble choice. Prediction error (men) is the prediction error for men’s gamble choice. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at 
the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 6: Stereotyping about men’s risk choices (OLS regression results) 
 Pooled data  Teop (matrilineal)  Palawan (patrilineal) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Male -0.13 -0.12 0.02 0.01  -0.09 -0.13 -0.37  -0.20 -0.07 0.36 0.54 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.29) (0.29)  (0.25) (0.27) (0.34)  (0.25) (0.24) (0.40) (0.48) 
Palawan -0.23 -0.24 -0.44 -0.49          
 (0.24) (0.26) (0.34) (0.34)          
Palawan*male -0.01 0.02 0.21 0.34          
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.38) (0.42)          
Muslim   -0.05 0.10        0.24 0.51 
   (0.25) (0.37)        (0.30) (0.40) 
Muslim*male    -0.35         -0.63 
    (0.50)         (0.53) 
Age  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01   0.01 0.02   -0.02** -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Elementary  -0.18 -0.22 -0.20   -1.21** -0.82   0.17 -0.27 -0.27 
  (0.45) (0.44) (0.45)   (0.58) (0.54)   (0.70) (0.84) (0.86) 
High school  -0.18 -0.04 -0.04   0.16 0.41   -0.23 -0.63 -0.66 
  (0.34) (0.33) (0.33)   (0.48) (0.45)   (0.65) (0.69) (0.70) 
Above high school  -0.50 -0.35 -0.38   -0.00 0.29   -0.91 -1.13* -1.24* 
  (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)   (0.54) (0.47)   (0.64) (0.62) (0.63) 
Wealth  0.04 0.08 0.07   0.04 0.03   0.14 0.15 0.15 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)   (0.12) (0.13)   (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Wage labor   0.26 0.26    1.62***    -0.14 -0.13 
   (0.27) (0.27)    (0.49)    (0.32) (0.33) 
Gamble choice   0.15** 0.15**    0.01    0.23** 0.21** 
   (0.07) (0.07)    (0.10)    (0.09) (0.09) 
Prediction error (women)   0.17** 0.17**    0.10    0.25** 0.26** 
   (0.07) (0.07)    (0.10)    (0.12) (0.12) 
Constant 0.21 0.64 0.06 0.09  0.37 -0.28 -1.11  0.23 1.05 0.48 0.46 
 (0.18) (0.54) (0.76) (0.77)  (0.32) (0.92) (1.12)  (0.24) (0.74) (0.97) (0.99) 
Linear combination of  
Male + Palawan*male 
-0.13 -0.10 0.23 0.35          
(0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.37)          
Other controls no no yes yes  no no yes  no no yes yes 
Village fixed effects no no no no  yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 198 198 195 195  96 96 93  102 102 102 102 
R2 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.12  0.03 0.09 0.22  0.03 0.12 0.26 0.27 
The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the prediction error for men’s gamble choice, which is defined as the difference between an individual’s prediction of the 
gamble choice of an unidentified male subject and the average actual gamble choice of men. Positive (negative) prediction errors correspond to underestimating (overestimating) 
men’s risk aversion. Other controls include household size, being a household head, marital status and fishing as main economic activity. Gamble choice is an individual’s own 
gamble choice. Prediction error (women) is the prediction error for men’s gamble choice. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
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As documented above, among the Palawan, Muslims are significantly more risk averse 
than non-Muslims. To check whether Muslims also have systematically different 
stereotypes about women’s risk choices, we included an interaction of the gender and 
Muslim dummy (columns 4 and 11). Our results remain unchanged. Hence, religion in 
the form of Islam does not drive our results.  
Table 7 presents the results for prediction errors for men’s risk choices using the same 
specifications as above. In line with the descriptive findings, we do not find evidence for 
significant gender differences in stereotypes about men’s risk preferences. Neither the 
male dummy nor the interaction with the Palawan dummy turn out to be significant 
(columns 1-4). In addition, the point estimates of both coefficients are much smaller 
and relatively close to zero. The picture is the same when we look at the Teop sub-
sample (columns 4-6) and Palawan sub-sample (columns 7-11). 
 
5. Discussion 
In this section we briefly discuss why only male stereotyping about women’s risk 
preferences is biased and why the direction of the bias differs between the patrilineal 
and the matrilineal society. We also explore the relationship between stereotypes and 
economic decisions. In particular, we look at occupational patterns and self-confidence 
in the two main subsistence activities, farming and fishing, which require different 
attitudes towards risk. Finally, we present an interpretation of not finding gender 
differences in actual risk preferences. 
Although social norms that regulate the status of women differ between matrilineal and 
patrilineal societies, the division of labor is similar across the Palawan and Teop. In both 
societies, women do the housekeeping, gardening and childcare. Men are the main 
providers of the family. Their activities usually include outside tasks that require a higher 
degree of risk taking and physical strength such as fishing, hunting, logging, house 
building, etc. Moreover, communal activities like leadership and religious services are 
dominated by males. Hence, women’s behavior in risky tasks and public activities is 
hardly or not at all observable to men. As a consequence, men in both societies are 
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more likely than women to make biased assessments of the other sex’ risk behavior. 
This may explain why only men’s stereotypes about women’s risk preferences are biased 
and why there is no biased assessment of men’s risk preferences in both societies. 
The opposite direction of this bias between the two societies can be explained by the 
different social status of women. Women in matrilineal societies enjoy more prestige 
and respect than women in patrilineal societies. Importantly, they also have more 
control over resources and hence better abilities to insure themselves against potentially 
adverse consequences of risk taking. These differences may explain why women’s risk 
aversion is underestimated by men from the matrilineal Teop and overestimated by men 
from the patrilineal Palawan. 
We cannot directly test the effects of men’s misperception of women’s risk preferences 
on women’s economic decisions. We can, however, provide suggestive evidence on how 
this misperception correlates with women’s self-confidence in farming and fishing and 
their economic activities.  
To measure self-confidence in fishing and farming, we asked all subjects to assess their 
fishing and farming skills relative to those of other villagers on a three-point scale as 
worse (1), about the same (2), or better (3). Fishing is a task that is associated with more 
risk, competition and uncertainty in outcomes than farming in this geo-ecological 
setting. Figure 3 shows the mean self-confidence in fishing (upper part) and farming 
(lower part) by sex and society. Teop women and men are equally self-confident in their 
skills in both tasks. By contrast, Palawan women are significantly less confident in their 
fishing skills than Palawan men (1.61 vs. 1.92, p = 0.01). There is no significant gender 
difference in agricultural skills. Hence, among the patrilineal Palawan, men’s 
overestimation of women’s risk aversion is associated with lower levels of women’s 
confidence in a risky task like fishing. This result is consistent with internalized 
stereotypes, which may be the result of different socialization patterns in the two 
societies (Andersen et al. 2013). 
These patterns of self-confidence are reflected in the patterns of economic activities 
across the two societies. While 42 percent of women from the matrilineal Teop engage 
in fishing as their main or secondary economic activity, the corresponding figure is only 
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13 percent for women from the patrilineal Palawan (see Table A1 in the appendix). 
Likewise, the women-men ratio in fishing among the Teop is twice as high as the ratio 
among the Palawan. 
 
Figure 3: Self-confidence in fishing and farming skills 
 
Subjects assessed their fishing and farming skills relative to those of 
other villagers on a three-point scale as worse (1), about the same (2), or 
better (3). 
 
Finally, our result of no gender differences in risk preferences provides further evidence 
for the impact of nurture. In line with previous experimental work conducted in 
traditional and rural societies (Binswanger, 1980; Henrich and McElreath, 2002; Gneezy 
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et al., 2009) sex is not a significant predictor of risk preferences. This may suggest that 
cultural factors that drive gender differences in Western and industrialized societies do 
not apply to traditional societies. This difference could potentially be explained by 
comparing the division of labor between traditional and Western societies after the 
industrial revolution. Sexual stratification coincided with increasing productiveness, 
specialization and complexity of society. The introduction of wage labor, the increasing 
scale of production and the mechanization of agriculture has led to long-lasting changes 
in gender roles. With the expansion of economic opportunities and separation of work 
from the home, men became economically less dependent on women, while women 
became more dependent on men (Hartmann, 1976; Goldin, 1995). This development 
has caused gender differences in employment, income and wealth and may explain why 
women in modern societies are more risk averse than men. 
Nevertheless, one should not overinterpret our results as they are based on subjects 
from only two societies. While our research and econometric design rules out many 
potential confounders, it remains difficult to identify culture as the only relevant 
explanation for the observed differences in gender stereotypes. For firm conclusions, 
more evidence from other paired patrilineal and matrilineal societies is needed. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using a simple gamble choice task developed by Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008a), we 
analyze gender differences in risk preferences and stereotypes in a patrilineal and a 
matrilineal island society in the Pacific. We find no gender differences in actual risk 
preferences among the patrilineal Palawan and the matrilineal Teop. However, we find 
considerable evidence for culture-specific stereotypes about women’s risk preferences. 
Similar to men in Western societies, Palawan men overestimate women’s actual risk 
aversion. By contrast, Teop men underestimate women’s actual risk aversion. 
This suggests that nurture, which is reflected in the different social status of women in 
the two societies, affects men’s stereotypes about women’s risk taking. As perceived, not 
actual risk preferences guide economic transactions with another party, men’s biased 
 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN STEREOTYPES OF RISK PREFERENCES   67 
 
perception of women’s risk preferences likely has adverse consequences for women. It 
may result in worse opportunities, choices and outcomes for women, thus reducing 
efficiency and welfare. 
Our findings may provide important information for policy makers. If gender 
stereotypes are driven by nurture, or an interaction between nature and nurture, policy 
makers may focus on promoting more equitable gender models. Less biased 
socialization and education may then pave the way for a more equal treatment of 
women and men. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Subject’s gamble choice 
 
Each gamble (see Table 1) was presented as a pair of money cards. Gambles 
increase linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the standard deviation 
of expected payoff. 
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Table A1: Subject characteristics 
 Teop (matrilineal)  Palawan (patrilineal) 
 All 
subjects 
Men Women  
All 
subjects 
Men Women 
 mean 
(s.d.) 
mean 
(s.d.) 
mean 
(s.d.) 
 mean 
(s.d.) 
mean 
(s.d.) 
mean 
(s.d.) 
Age (years) 42.06 
(13.68) 
44.23 
(13.56) 
39.90 
(13.59) 
 
40.65 
(15.16) 
40.61 
(15.84) 
40.69 
(14.66) 
Household size 6.03 
(2.11) 
5.92 
(2.10) 
6.15 
(2.14) 
l 4.83 
(2.12) 
4.55 
(1.88) 
5.07 
(2.30) 
Wealth (index)a 2.74 2.88 2.60  2.38 2.45 2.31 
 (1.12) (1.06) (1.18)  (1.17) (1.10) (1.24) 
        
 percent percent percent  percent percent percent 
Educationb        
No school 2.08 % 4.17 % 0.00 %  18.45% 8.16 % 27.78 % 
Elementary 43.75 % 47.92  % 39.58 %  41.75% 46.94 % 37.04% 
High school 40.63 % 37.50 % 43.75 %  34.95% 40.82 % 29.63 % 
Above high school 13.54 % 10.42 % 16.67 %  4.85 % 4.08 % 5.56 % 
        
Main activity        
Farmer 86.46 % 89.58 % 83.33 %  60.19 % 51.02 % 68.52 % 
Fisher 2.08 % 4.17 % 0.00 %  15.53 % 26.53 % 5.56 % 
Wage labor 2.08 % 2.08 % 2.08 %  12.62 % 6.12 % 18.52 % 
Other 9.38 % 4.17 % 14.59 %  11.66 % 16.33 % 7.40 % 
        
Secondary activity        
Farmer 28.13 % 18.75 % 37.50 %  36.89 % 28.57 % 44.44 % 
Fisher 54.17 % 66.67 % 41.67 %  11.65 % 16.33 % 7.41 % 
Wage labor 5.21 % 8.33 % 2.08 %  25.24 % 24.49 % 25.93 % 
Other 12.49 % 6.25 % 18.75 %  26.22 % 30.61 % 22.22 % 
        
Religion        
Christian 100 % 100 % 100 %  50.49 % 57.14 44.44 % 
Muslim     34.95 % 32.65 37.04 % 
Other/no religion     15.02 % 10.21 18.52 % 
        
Observations 96 48 48  103 49 54 
a The wealth index is defined as the sum of assets owned. We consider the following six assets: torch, 
lamp, chair, generator, mobile phone, radio. 
b Note that we failed to record the educational level of two participants. We allocate these observations 
to education level two (elementary), the most common category. 
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Table A2: Stereotyping about women’s risk choices (OLS regression results using clustered standard errors) 
 Pooled data  Teop (matrilineal)  Palawan (patrilineal) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Male 0.72** 0.66** 0.63** 0.63**  0.71* 0.66** 0.75  -0.52** -0.49** -0.63** -0.72** 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)  (0.31) (0.31) (0.51)  (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) 
Palawan 0.25 0.17 0.21 0.25          
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)          
Palawan*male -1.25*** -1.16*** -1.21*** -1.31***          
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26)          
Muslim   -0.05 -0.16        -0.21 -0.33 
   (0.13) (0.17)        (0.15) (0.35) 
Muslim*male    0.26**         0.27 
    (0.11)         (0.40) 
Age  0.01** 0.01 0.01   0.02 -0.00   0.00 0.01 0.01 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Elementary  0.18 0.32 0.31   -1.33 -1.35   1.01 1.43 1.43 
  (0.54) (0.57) (0.57)   (0.95) (0.76)   (1.04) (0.62) (0.60) 
High school  0.11 0.36 0.37   0.09 0.13   0.91 1.47** 1.48** 
  (0.46) (0.43) (0.43)   (0.56) (0.69)   (0.54) (0.19) (0.21) 
Above high school  -0.01 0.22 0.24   -0.06 -0.03   0.77 1.25** 1.30** 
  (0.54) (0.45) (0.45)   (0.63) (0.84)   (0.56) (0.16) (0.21) 
Wealth  -0.08 -0.05 -0.05   0.08 0.08   -0.23 -0.17 -0.17 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)   (0.12) (0.14)   (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) 
Wage labor   0.18 0.18    -0.03   -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 
   (0.19) (0.19)    (0.66)   (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Gamble choice   0.11** 0.11**    0.10   0.09 0.09 0.09 
   (0.03) (0.03)    (0.07)   (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Prediction error (men)   0.17** 0.18**    0.13   0.22** 0.22** 0.22** 
   (0.07) (0.07)    (0.14)   (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Constant -0.21 -0.41 -1.21** -1.23**  -0.09 -0.85 -0.57  0.06 -0.35 -1.55** -1.54** 
 (0.14) (0.39) (0.36) (0.36)  (0.15) (1.06) (0.87)  (0.04) (0.63) (0.22) (0.21) 
Other controls no no yes yes  no no yes  no no yes yes 
Village fixed effects no no no no  yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 196 196 195 195  93 93 93  103 103 102 102 
R2 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.18  0.08 0.14 0.21  0.06 0.17 0.31 0.32 
The table reports OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent 
level. For more details, see caption of Table 5. 
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Experimental instructions (for the Teop in Papua New Guinea) 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. Here you have the 5 Kina for answering the 
questions in the interview you did. This is your money. 
Now we will play two small games and ask you some short questions. In the game you 
can earn some extra money. There is no right or wrong answer in this game and you 
cannot lose any money. The money will be paid in cash immediately after we have 
finished. How much money you make depends to a large extend on your choices.  
Now I am going to explain you how we play the first game. Please listen carefully and 
hold your questions until I have finished the explanations. 
 
Part 1: Participant’s Pair Selection 
We will play the game using 5 different pairs of money-cards. 
Please have a look at these pairs of money-cards. As you can see, each pair has different 
amounts of money on its cards. 
Pair number 1 has one card with 4 Kina and another card with 4 Kina. 
Pair number 2 has one card with 6 Kina and one card with 3 Kina. 
Pair number 3 has one card with 8 Kina and one card with 2 Kina. 
Pair number 4 has one card with 10 Kina and one card with 1 Kina. 
Pair number 5 has one card with 12 Kina and one card with nothing on it. 
You can choose from these 5 different pairs one pair you would like to play. After you 
have chosen a pair, I will separate the cards and put them into this empty bag and mix 
them up. After mixing the cards you draw one card from the bag and earn the amount 
of money which is on the card.  
For example, let us consider you would choose pair number ___. I will separate the 
cards and put them into this empty bag. Now I am going to mix the cards. Then you 
would draw one card from the bag. In this case you would win ___. 
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Here is another example, let us consider this time you would choose pair number ___. 
Again, I will separate the cards and put them into this empty bag. Now I am going to 
mix the cards. Then you would draw one card from the bag. In this case you would win 
___.  
So to summarize, the money you earn depends on which pair of money-card you chose 
and which card you draw from the bag. You are free to choose any of the 5 different 
pairs of money-cards but only one of them. Now I finished my explanations. Do you 
have any questions?  
Okay, now take your time, look at the pairs, and select the one you would like to play.  
 
Part 2: Participant’s Guess 
Before we draw your card we will play the second game which is a guessing game. In 
this game you can also make some extra money.  
Here I have two envelopes. Each envelope contains one pair that other people from 
villages in Teop had chosen to play. They played exactly the same game as you do here 
with us.  
We also asked them which pair out of these 5 different pairs they would like to play. 
However, these people are not here today and after each game played, I change the pairs 
in the envelopes. 
 
Inside this envelope there is a pair that a man from Teop had chosen to play. Which 
pair out of these 5 pairs do you think did this man choose? If your guess is correct you 
get 1 Kina. Please make your guess. 
Inside this envelope there is a pair that a woman Teop had chosen. Which pair out of 
these 5 pairs do you think did this woman choose to play? If your guess is correct you 
get another 1 Kina. Please make your guess. 
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Part 3: Payout 
Okay, now we look if your guesses were correct and we will play out the pair that you 
have chosen. First we compare your guesses with the pairs from the envelopes  
Now we are going to play out the pair that you have chosen. 
This is the money you have won. 
Okay, my assistant will ask you a few questions on your views about some issues. This 
takes only 5-10 minutes. After finishing the questions you get your money.  
Please don’t talk about the game with your neighbors or other participants until we are 
finished the study here. Everyone should have the same chance to make his or her own 
choice in this game. 
 
Ethical aspects of the study 
The surveys and experiments used in this paper do not involve deception and the 
anonymity of the subjects was guaranteed. There was no danger of physical or 
psychological damages to be expected from participants. All people voluntary 
participated in the studies and were told to leave at any point of time if they feel 
uncomfortable with the situation. Moreover, prior the field research was conducted, the 
research teams were requested to give a presentation of the research methods and goals 
to the local communities and regional authorities. In all cases the request was granted 
approval. Our research project was also supported by the regional government of 
Bougainville and by the Teop Council of Elderly. 
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Abstract: 
One major challenge when conducting contingent valuation studies in developing 
countries is the choice of the appropriate payment vehicle. Since regular cash-income 
does not exist for the majority of the population and market integration is low, 
households in rural areas have less experience with monetary exchanges. In these cases 
labor time may be a more appropriate payment vehicle. A common finding of studies 
using labor time as payment vehicle is that households are more often willing to 
contribute working time as compared to money. However, so far empirical evidence is 
missing if the labor time elicitation format reduces respondent’s uncertainty of 
contributions.  
In this study we analyze and compare uncertainty of people’s stated willingness to 
contribute (WTC) time and money for a local public good in a non-monetized small-
scale community in Papua New Guinea. We do so by establishing an open-ended 
method for eliciting people’s WTC, the Range-WTC-method, which elicits the upper 
and lower bound of a person’s WTC. We find that uncertainty is reduced when 
respondents are asked for labor time contribution instead of monetary contributions. 
Thus, we provide empirical evidence that, indeed, labor time is the preferred to money 
in the elicitation of stated WTC in non-monetized communities.  
Keywords: contingent valuation, non-monetized community, payment vehicles, 
preference uncertainty 
JEL classification: D81, Q51, Q56 
                                                 
1 This paper is published as: Pondorfer, A., & Rehdanz, K. (2015). Eliciting preferences for public goods 
in non-monetized communities: Accounting for preference uncertainty (No. 2010). Kiel Working Paper. 
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1. Introduction 
A large literature exists that investigates people’s preferences for environmental goods 
and services that are not traded on markets, but only few of them elicit preferences in 
the context of developing countries. Because of lack of sufficient data for revealed 
preference studies, these studies mostly rely on stated preference approaches. An issue 
which is then of major importance is the elicitation of the willingness to pay (WTP) 
posing many challenges45F1 
One such challenge is the choice of the payment vehicle. Since regular cash-income 
does not exist for the majority of the population and the exchange of goods and services 
is augmented through barter or work exchange, the role of money in the rural 
developing setting is likely to be different from that of an urban developed setting. It is, 
therefore, argued that contributions in the form of work time may seem more realistic 
for rural households in non-monetized communities (see for instance Hardner, 1996; 
Hung et al., 2007; Casiwan-Launio et al., 2011). According to previous findings, 
comparing labour time and money contributions, acceptance rates for the willingness to 
contribute (WTC) time are higher than for money (see Gibson et al. (2015) for a recent 
overview). These studies then conclude that the labor time payment vehicle is a valuable 
alternative to money in a rural developing setting. 46F
2
  
It is plausible to assume that people that are mainly engaged in subsistence activities 
have fewer difficulties in quantifying their disposable time budget as compared to 
disposable cash-income. However, to our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence, if 
respondents are actually more certain about their contribution when using labor time as 
the payment vehicle. In this study we, therefore, analyze and compare uncertainty of 
people’s stated WTC time and money for a local public good in a non-monetized small-
scale community in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. We do so by establishing an 
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion of the challenges associated with contingent valuation studies in developing 
countries, see Whittington (2002). 
2 Usually these studies convert labour time contributions into monetary contributions using information 
on local wage rates.  
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open-ended method for eliciting people’s WTC, the Range-WTC-method, which elicits 
the upper and lower bound of a person’s WTC.47F3 
The main justification for using Range-WTC instead of classical Point-WTC is the 
literature on preference uncertainty. Most of the contingent valuation studies that 
compare WTC time and money in developing countries use the open-ended method 
and elicit the WTC as a single point (see Swallow and Woudyalew, 1994; Hardner, 1996; 
Echessah, 1997; Kamuanga et al., 2001; Arbiol et al., 2013; Vandolia et al., 2014). 48F
4
 A 
drawback of estimating the WTC as a single point is that it does not account for the 
uncertainty of preferences. Preference uncertainty may be caused by incomplete 
knowledge about the features of the object under evaluation or simply by the fact that a 
person is unsure about her own preferences (March, 1978; Gregory et al., 1993; Jacowitz 
and Kahnemann, 1995; Ariely et al., 2003). Due to vagueness of preferences, people 
often have only regions of indifference instead of well-defined indifference curves 
(Loomes, 1988; Butler and Loomes, 2007; 2011), a fact that challenges the existence of a 
single Point-WTP (Wang et al., 2007; Hanley et al., 2009; Dost and Wilken, 2012). As a 
consequence, the classical CV method may impose unrealistic cognitive demands on 
respondents. It was this point that at an early stage prompted Dubourg et al. (1997) to 
argue in favour of analysing WTP confidence intervals.  
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in various ways. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to show that uncertainty decreases when respondents are 
asked for time contributions instead of money. Thus, we provide empirical evidence 
that the use of working time as a payment vehicle can produce more reliable welfare 
estimates than the use of money. Further, we improve techniques of existing contingent 
valuation studies that compare labor time and monetary payment vehicles. While Wang 
et al. (2007) have shown that Range-WTP is better than Point-WTP for predicting 
purchase probabilities of consumer goods, Kniebes et al. (2014) were the first to test in 
                                                 
3 There are two widely used methods – numerical certainty scale and polychotmous choice – for 
estimating preference uncertainty adjusted willingness to pay in contingent valuation (for a review see 
Akter et al., 2008). However, these methods are mostly applied in the context of dichotomous choices, 
while we aim to consider preference uncertainty in the context of an open-ended method.  
4 Other studies used closed-ended methods, for example Hung et al. (2007) and O’Garra (2009). 
 ELICITING PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC GOODS  81 
 
 
a contingent valuation study if the Range-WTP is consistent with theoretical 
expectations eliciting WTP for non-market goods. We take a step forward and apply the 
Range-WTP method among respondents of a non-monetized community in a 
developing country. In doing so, we account for the uncertainty of respondent’s 
preferences. This setting is an improvement relative to the literature initiated by 
previous CV-studies, which compare payment vehicles by eliciting the WTC as a single-
point.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
the elicitation approach. Section 3 includes a short description of the study area (3.1), 
outlines the survey design and sampling strategies (3.2) and the methodology used in the 
analysis (3.3). Section 4 provides the empirical analysis and results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The elicitation approach 
Building upon previous work in marketing science (Wang et al., 2007; Dost and Wilken, 
2012), we follow first advances of Kniebes et al. (2014) in non-market environmental 
valuation and establish the open-ended method, the Range-WTP method, for eliciting 
preferences for non-market goods in non-monetized communities. This measure is 
designed specifically to reflect the effects of uncertainty in purchase decisions.  
Figure 1 illustrates the concept of the Range-WTC. Contrary to point-based WTC 
measures, the range concept introduces two thresholds: the lower bound (LB) below 
which respondents would definitely contribute (choice probability of 1) and an upper 
bound (UB) beyond respondents would no longer contribute (choice probability of 0). 
In the interval between the LB and UB, respondents are indecisive about contributing 
(choice probability between 0 and 1). 49F5 The difference between these thresholds is the 
WTC range and is indicative of the degree of uncertainty (Wang et al., 2007; Schlereth et 
al., 2012; Kniebes et al., 2014; Maier et al., 2014).  
 
                                                 
5 The procedure assumes that contribution probability decreases linearly between the LB and UB. 
 ELICITING PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC GOODS  82 
 
 
 
Figure 1: WTP as a range (adapted from Wang et al., 2007; Dost and Wilken, 2012; and 
Kniebes et al., 2014) 
 
 
In a set-up involving 175 customers, Wang et al. (2007) test the range approach in an 
experimental elicitation of consumers’ reservation prices for chocolate and red wine. 
They assume linear decreasing purchase probabilities between the lower bound (100%), 
indifference range (50%) and upper bound (0%). A lottery ensures incentive 
compatibility, e.g. if the randomly drawn lottery price is lower than the lower bound, 
then the respondent must buy the good at the drawn lottery price. They conclude that 
the WTP-range performs better than point-based methods in terms of predictive 
performance while yielding valuable information about uncertainty in product valuation. 
In line with Wang et al. (2007), Dost and Wilken (2012) also provide empirical evidence 
that “traditional” point-based methods measure expected WTP and neglect individual 
uncertainty, which exists even for daily-use products, such as glasses of caffè latte. They 
argue that point-based methods produce biased pricing which results in poor estimates 
of production capacities. Because this effect tends to grow with the variance caused by 
consumer uncertainty, they particularly recommend range-based methods for new or 
unfamiliar products, as well as public goods. Related, Kniebes et al. (2014) are the first 
to test if the Range-WTP is consistent with theoretical expectations eliciting WTP for 
non-market goods. In their CV study they test theoretical validity and reliability of the 
two open-ended elicitation formats, the traditional approach of eliciting a single value 
and the Range-WTP. Using data from two large-scale surveys on the perceptions of 
solar radiation management, a little-known technique for counteracting climate change, 
they find evidence that the Range-WTP method clearly outperforms the Point-WTP 
method.  
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We follow the approach of Kniebes et al. (2014) and apply the range-based method for 
eliciting contributions to a hypothetical public good. In doing so, we are interested in 
comparing the degree of uncertainty between monetary and labor time contributions in 
a non-monetized economy. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1 The study area  
The data for our analysis comes from a survey conducted in coastal villages in the 
northeastern part of Bougainville Island, Papua New Guinea, in October to November 
2014. Bougainville is located in the Pacific Ocean and is exposed to a large number of 
natural hazards including earthquakes and tsunamis. 50F6 In combination with low adaptive 
capacities and economic development opportunities this makes the island state and its 
many coastal communities particularly vulnerable. So far, protective measures like 
tsunami evacuations routes have not been implemented. Alerts through warning systems 
are available via mobile phone but are more or less rejected by the local population 
perhaps due to lack of knowledge.  
We recruited respondents from small settlements of the Teop society at Tinputz district. 
Figure 2 displays a map of the area and the villages included in the study. Teop people 
live in villages that vary in size from 50 to 200 people, and are either located along the 
coast or inland in the hills.51F7 Their subsistence is based on horticulture and pig 
husbandry, supplemented by fishing, hunting and foraging (Regan and Griffin, 2005). 
Some of the surplus from the subsistence sector is sold on markets. Cocoa and copra 
are the main commercial crops. These crops are harvested several times a year and sold 
to intermediaries in one of the larger capitals at the coast. At present, there are hardly 
any possibilities for engagement in wage labor on Bougainville except for government 
occupations. Thus, regular cash-income does not exist for the majority of the 
population.   
                                                 
6 See http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/glossary/?termID=150. 
7 In our sample, 83 % of the respondents live in coastal villages (including one offshore island) while 17 
% live in inland villages (see also Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Map of the study area (northeastern part of Bougainville island) 
 
C = coastal and offshore island villages 
I = inland villages 
Source: ESRI, own illustration 
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3.2 Survey design and sampling 
The questionnaire was structured as follows: First, respondents were informed about 
how tsunamis arise and the possible consequences of such an event for coastal 
communities living in this area. Then, they were made aware of the fact that people’s life 
could be saved by evacuating them in case of emergency. 52F8 We visualized an example of 
such an evacuation route (see Figure A1 in the appendix) and gave details about the 
necessary tasks associated with its implementation. Then, respondents were asked to 
imagine a hypothetical situation in which the evacuation route would be constructed in 
their village. Next, respondents were asked for their willingness to contribute to support 
the construction of the route in terms of labor time and money. The questions for 
monetary and labor time contributions were presented in randomized order as to not 
bias results. We choose the following elicitation format: Respondents were always asked 
first to state a lower bound (LB) and an upper bound (UB) of their willingness to 
contribute money and labor time (measured in hours). The lower bound was elicited by 
asking respondents to state the amount of money (hours) that they would definitely be 
willing to contribute to support the construction of the evacuation route. The upper 
bound was elicited by asking respondents to state the amount of money (hours) at, or 
above, which they would definitely not be willing to contribute to support the 
construction. In addition to the elicitation of the willingness to contribute, we collected 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents.  
A total of 195 participants – 102 male and 93 female - voluntarily participated in the 
interviews across multiple villages. Recruitment was done by drawing a random sample 
from a residence list. In some cases these lists were already available, in some other 
cases we asked local village chiefs to prepare one. Each respondent was given the 
questionnaire in a face-to-face interview which was conducted by local research 
assistants supervised by the researchers. Before the interviews were conducted, the 
survey was discussed among focus groups and then pretested with a small sample of 
randomly selected respondents.  
                                                 
8 The English translation of the information provided to the respondents is presented in Table A1 in the 
appendix. 
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3.3 Methodology 
To test if the payment vehicle has an effect on preference uncertainty we first present 
descriptive statistics of the LB and the UB for each payment vehicle separately. 
Subsequently, we compare LB’s and UB’s to the average local wage level and the 
average daily working hours by applying mean comparison tests (t-test). This is done to 
identify a possible reference point which may be used by respondents to categorize 
contributions into a certain and uncertain part.  
To compare uncertainty between labor time and monetary contributions independent 
from conversion issues and level of contributions, we had to convert the information 
obtained from the survey participants. We, therefore, specify uncertainty as the relative 
deviation of the LB from the UB. We test the statistical difference of uncertainty by 
applying a mean comparison test (t-test).53F9 Finally, to confirm the robustness of the 
results, we run ordinary least square regressions where we control for socio-economic 
and regional characteristics of the respondent and the study area. The regression analysis 
also allows us to investigate factors that determine the uncertainty of contributions. 
 
4. Empirical analysis and results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics for the two payment vehicles 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the respondents’ age, education level, main 
activity as well as the household income and the size of the household they are living in. 
In addition to statistics for the sample as a whole, the table also provides information by 
gender. It is interesting to note, that there are few differences between men and women 
regarding education, age and monthly income, but significant differences with respect to 
main activities (χ2, p < 0.01).54F10 Women are less engaged in farming and fishing, but 
more engaged in housekeeping and teaching. 
 
                                                 
9 The results presented in section 4.1 and 4.2 are robust to using Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
10 Chi-square tests are used for testing socio-economic differences between men and women. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of respondents 
  
 All 
subjects 
Men Women 
 mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) 
Age (years) 38.43 39.41 37.39 
 (12.49) (13.33) (11.53) 
Household size 5.94 6.27 5.59 
 (3.09) (3.59) (2.41) 
    
 percent percent percent 
Education    
Less educated (below 8 
years) 48.20% 46.10% 50.50% 
More educated (above 8 
years) 51.80% 53.90% 49.50% 
    
Main activity    
Farmer 60.50% 69.60% 50.50% 
Fisher 8.70% 11.80% 5.40% 
Housekeeping 20.00% 7.80% 33.30% 
Wage Labor 2.60% 2.90% 2.20% 
Pupil/Student 3.60% 3.90% 3.20% 
Teacher 2.10% 0.00% 4.30% 
Other 2.50% 4.00% 1.10% 
    
Monthly income    
Category 1 (0 to 30 Kina) 16.00% 15.70% 16.30% 
Category 2 (31 to 200 Kina) 66.00% 63.70% 68.50% 
Category 3 (above 200 Kina) 18.00% 20.60% 15.20% 
    
Observations 195 102 93 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the lower bound (LB) and upper bound (UB) of 
money and labor time contributions, respectively. LB reflects the amount at which or 
below respondents would contribute for sure to support the construction while UB 
stands for the amount at or above which respondents reject to support the construction. 
The difference between UB and LB defines the degree of uncertainty.55F11  
                                                 
11 Note that the number of observations differs slightly between the two payment vehicles due to missing 
values. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of contributions by payment vehicle 
 
monetary contribution 
(Kina)  
labor time contribution 
(Hours) 
  
  
lower 
bound (LB) 
upper 
bound (UB)   
lower 
bound (LB) 
upper 
bound (UB) 
Mean 16.57 43.21 
 
4.05 9.03 
S.D. 32.34 47.26 
 
4.05 9.65 
Observations# 195 195   191 191 
1 Kina = 0.37 US-Dollar 
# Note that observations in the labor time payment vehicle do not sum up to 195 
because of missing values. 
 
Focusing on the monetary contributions first, the mean LB of 16.57 Kina corresponds 
well to the mean local daily wage of 18.42 Kina. 56F12 A one-sample t-test confirms that the 
average amount which participants would contribute for sure (LB) is statistically not 
distinguishable from the local average wage (16.57 vs. 18.42, p = 0.43). However, the 
mean UB of 43.21 Kina is about 2.6 times larger than the LB and statistically different 
from the local average (43.21 vs. 18.42, p < 0.01). Turning to labor time contributions, 
the mean LB of 4.04 h is about one hour lower than the mean local daily working hours 
of 4.99 h. The difference is statistically significant (4.04 vs. 4.99, p < 0.01). Similar to 
above, the mean UB of labor time contributions is about 2.2 times larger than the local 
average and statistically different from the mean of the daily working hours (9.05 vs. 
4.99, p < 0.01).57F13 
Figure 3 combines the mean values for LB and UB with the mean values of local wages 
and working hours separately for monetary (above) and labor time (below) 
contributions. The amount of money (hours) which participants would contribute for 
sure is at (below) the level of local wages (working hours). The difference between LB 
and UB indicates the degree of uncertainty. As Figure 3 demonstrates, the mean LBs are 
very close to local averages for wages and working hours. They seem to represent a 
reference point for respondent’s answers: contributions below this point are more 
                                                 
12 We asked respondents to state how much they would pay others for a full day of work; the average 
payment per day is 18.42 Kina (S.D. 6.66).  
13 We asked respondents to state how much they work on average during the day; respondents work 4.99 
h on average (S.D. 3.27). 
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certain compared to contributions above this point. In other words, the size of the 
contribution is more certain when the costs for supporting the project are equal (lower) 
than earnings from daily wages (working hours).  
 
Figure 3: Mean values of LB and UB by payment vehicle 
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4.2 Comparison of the two payment vehicles 
To compare the two payment vehicles, monetary and labor time contributions, previous 
studies have converted labor time contributions into monetary contributions using 
information on local wage rates (see e.g. Gibson et al., 2015 or Vandolia et al., 2014). As 
the authors of these studies point out, the results are sensitive to alternative conversion 
factors. To compare uncertainty of monetary and labor time contributions independent 
from conversion issues, we define uncertainty as relative deviation of the LB from the 
UB: 
 
                    𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗 =  
𝑈𝐵𝑖,𝑗− 𝐿𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑈𝐵 𝑖,𝑗
;        𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁;   𝑗 = 𝑙, 𝑚 (1) 
 
with j being the payment vehicle (either labor (l) or monetary payment vehicle (m)) and i 
the respondent).  This measure of uncertainty has the advantage that we can take into 
account the level of contribution of a respondent. A simple example illustrates the 
advantage: A difference between LB and UB of 10 cannot unambiguously be considered 
small or big; only a reference to the UB (equivalently, the LB) permits a classification of 
its size. If the UB is 20, the LB is half of the UB (20 – 10 = 10), so the degree of 
uncertainty is relatively big (20 – 10) / 20 = 0.5). In contrast, if the UB is 100, the LB 
amounts to 90, which makes the degree of uncertainty relatively small (0.1). 
Before turning to an analysis on the level of the individual level, Figure 4 presents the 
mean values of the relative deviations for monetary and labor time payment vehicles. 
The mean level of uncertainty of labor time contributions is significantly smaller than 
the mean of monetary contributions (0.48 vs. 0.60, p < 0.01). Hence, uncertainty is 
reduced when people are asked for labor time contributions instead of monetary 
contributions.58F14 
                                                 
14 The results are confirmed, when following the approach of earlier studies using the local minimum 
wage rate to convert labor time contributions into monetary contributions. The mean LBs for the two 
payment vehicles are statistically not different but the mean UBs are; i.e. uncertainty of monetary 
contributions is larger than uncertainty of labor time contributions. 
 ELICITING PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC GOODS  91 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean values of relative deviation of LB from UB by payment 
vehicles 
 
 
To ensure that the differences in the means are not confounded by different 
background characteristics of respondents or geographical characteristics of individual 
villages, we specify the following linear regression model: 
 
                        𝑦𝑖,𝑗 =  𝑎 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖,𝑗 +  𝛽𝑥𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖;       𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁;   𝑗 = 𝑙, 𝑚  (2) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑗 represents the uncertainty of respondent i for payment vehicle j as defined in 
Eq. (1). The dummy variable 𝐷 takes the value 1 for the labour payment vehicle and 0 
for monetary payment vehicle. The parameter 𝛾 captures the difference in uncertainty 
between the two payment vehicles. The vector 𝑥𝑖 contains a set of socio-demographic 
and regional characteristics including among others gender, age, education level, 
household size, marital status, and daily working hours. 𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated. The intercept is denoted by 𝑎 and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
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Table 3 presents results from a simple ordinary least square regression. The basic 
specification (1) controls for respondents’ gender and the payment vehicle. Specification 
(2) extends the basic specification by participant’s daily working hours. In specification 
(3) we add further demographic and socio-economic characteristics.59F15 All specifications 
include village fixed effects and controls for interview effects (i.e., question order and 
enumerator effects). 
 
Table 3: Regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Payment vehicle (1=labor time, 0=money) -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.109*** 
 
(-0.021) (-0.021) (-0.021) 
Gender (0=male, 1=female) 0.001 0.002 -0.005 
 
(-0.022) (-0.021) (-0.026) 
Daily working hours  -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 
 (-0.003) (-0.003) 
Income (category 1 (low) to category 3 (high))   0.008 
 
  (-0.018) 
Education (1=more educated, 0= less educated)   -0.034 
 
  (-0.023) 
Age   0.002**  
 
  (-0.001) 
Constant 0.709*** 0.808*** 0.799*** 
 
(-0.093) (-0.095) (-0.113) 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Interview effects Yes Yes Yes 
Additional socio-economic controls No No Yes 
Observations# 364 364 364 
R-sq 0.21 0.24 0.26 
OLS-regression, robust standard errors in parentheses 
Dependent variable: Uncertainty (relative deviation of LB from UB) 
Interview effects: question order and enumerator effects. 
Additional socio-economic controls: marital status, main activity, household size, and household 
head. 
# Note that observations do not sum up to 386 (195+191) because of missing values. We only 
include non-missing observations with respect to socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
of the respondents.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
  
                                                 
15 Due to missing observations for some socio-demographic characteristics the sample for specification 
(3) reduces from 386 to 363. For comparison, we estimate all specifications with this reduced sample. 
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The regression results confirm our earlier results based on descriptive statistics; 
significant differences in uncertainty exist between labor time and monetary 
contributions. The coefficient of the labor time dummy is negative and highly significant 
in all specifications. Thus, when respondents were asked for labor time contribution, 
uncertainty is reduced by about 11 percentage points compared to the elicitation using 
monetary contribution. In none of the specifications has gender an effect on 
uncertainty. Extending the model to control for further socio-demographic 
characteristics of respondents, longer working hours significantly reduce uncertainty 
independent of the payment vehicle; an additional working hour per day reduces 
uncertainty by 1.3 percentage points. Thus, people who work longer during the day 
compared to others are less uncertain about their contributions. All other socio-
economic and demographic characteristics except for age have no significant impact on 
uncertainty.60F16 Older respondents have significantly higher levels of uncertainty 
compared to younger ones.  
To test the robustness of specification (3) we run regressions where we include 
additional factors that may influence uncertainty. More specifically, we would expect 
those that are more risk averse, those that live closer to the coast, and those that are 
afraid of a tsunami event in the future to be less uncertain. 61F17 Table 4 shows the results 
of the robustness analysis. We find sizeable effects for the new control variables. In 
particular, we find that that people in coastal villages (column 1), with higher levels of 
risk aversion (columns 2) and those with apprehension of a tsunami event (column 3) 
are significantly more certain about their contributions. These findings are as expected. 
However, the main finding remains: the coefficient of the payment vehicle dummy is 
significant, negative and of similar size compared to previous regression models. Thus, 
respondents are significantly less uncertain when they were asked for labor time 
contributions. The results for the other control variables are unchanged.  
                                                 
16 We have also varied the specification of income and education, but the coefficients were never 
significant and more importantly, did not effect of our main variable of interest, the payment vehicle. 
17 We obtained information on risk preferences and subject’s beliefs about tsunami events through the 
questionnaire. The variable risk had four possible answers ranged from “completely avoid to take risks” to 
“very willing to take risks”. The variable apprehension also had four possible answers ranged from “not 
afraid at all” to “very afraid”. Descriptive statistics of the variables are available upon request. 
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Table 4: Regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Payment vehicle (1=labor time, 0=money) -0.108*** -0.110*** -0.108*** 
 
(-0.021) (-0.02) (-0.021) 
Gender (0=male, 1=female) -0.015 0.000 0.008 
 
(-0.026) (-0.026) (-0.026) 
Daily working hours -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 
(-0.004) (-0.003) (-0.003) 
Income (category 1 (low) to category 3 (high)) 0.008 -0.002 0.000 
 
(-0.017) (-0.018) (-0.019) 
Education (1=more educated, 0= less educated) -0.026 -0.03 -0.03 
 
(-0.023) (-0.023) (-0.024) 
Age 0.003** 0.002** 0.002* 
 
(-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) 
Coast (1=coastal village/island, 0=hinterland) -0.091**   
 
(-0.040)   
Risk aversion (1=risk averse, 0=risk seeking)  -0.065***  
  (-0.024)  
Apprehension (1= very afraid, 0 = otherwise)   -0.107*** 
   (-0.031) 
Constant 0.943*** 0.729*** 0.531** 
 (-0.126) (-0.110) (-0.249) 
Village fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Interview effects Yes Yes Yes 
Additional socio-economic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations# 364 364 355 
R-sq 0.20 0.27 0.29 
OLS-regression, robust standard errors in parentheses 
Dependent variable: Uncertainty (relative deviation of LB from UB) 
Interview effects: question order and enumerator effects. 
Additional socio-economic controls: marital status, main activity, household size, and household 
head. 
# Note that observations in specification 3 do not sum up to 364 due to missing values in the 
Apprehension variable, see also notes in Table 3. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5. Conclusion 
In the context of rural households in developing countries, previous studies suggested 
the use of labor time as an alternative payment vehicle to money for the elicitation of 
WTC (see Hardner, 1996; Hung et al., 2007; Casiwan-Launio et al., 2011). The aim of 
this paper is to address the issue of uncertainty in the comparison of people’s stated 
WTC time and money for a local public good in a non-monetized small-scale 
community. 
Using the Range-WTC method in a contingent valuation study, we find strong evidence 
that the degree of uncertainty is reduced in stated WTC when respondents were asked 
for working time contributions instead of money. To avoid conversion issues we define 
uncertainty as the relative deviation of the amount at which or below respondents 
would contribute for sure from the amount at or above which respondents would not 
contribute.  
We also analyzed factors determining the degree of uncertainty. In line with 
expectations, people who have a greater workload during the day (e.g., working close to 
the daily maximum), are less uncertain about their contributions. This effect holds for 
both payment vehicles. It can be argued that people who work relatively more have less 
additional time to allocate and are, therefore, more certain about their contribution. 
Similar, people with a higher work load are more likely to earn cash-income. These 
people might be, therefore, more certain about the value of money. 
Furthermore, we find evidence that people use the local wage (working time) level as a 
reference point for dividing contributions into a certain and uncertain part. For both 
payment vehicles, contributions that lie below the local wage rates can be perceived as 
relatively certain while uncertainty is increasing with the distance to the local wage 
(working time) level. Our results provide, therefore, also valuable information to 
decision makers in non-monetized communities using cost-benefit analyses as one basis 
for decisions on environmental projects.   
However, it is deterred to future research to generalize our findings to other cultural 
settings and to other public goods. Another promising direction is to address the issue 
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of uncertainty in the comparison of people’s revealed and stated WTC time and money 
for a local public good. By applying the Range-WTC, one can then analyze the size of 
hypothetical bias that originates from uncertainty in both payment vehicles. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Information Text 
 
[Read out the following text slowly and make sure that respondent understands everything] 
 
As you may know from own experience, earthquakes of different power occur frequently on Bougainville. For example, earlier this year there were several strong earthquakes 
within a few days that destroyed houses and other parts of villages in several areas of Bougainville. 
 
For people like you living near the coast, earthquakes entail the additional threat of a tsunami. Earthquakes that occur in the open sea close to the coast can cause big waves 
(tsunami). If these waves arrive at the coast, they can cause devastating floods. Depending on the power and location of the earthquake, these floods can then destroy everything 
close to the coastline including beaches, trees, streets, houses and even whole villages. Further, a tsunami can put people’s life in danger if they are not evacuated before the 
waves reach the coast.  
 
Tsunamis cannot be prevented. However, in case of emergency people’s lives can be saved by evacuating them. In order that people know where to go if a tsunami occurs, an 
evacuation route for your community could be built [show picture of tsunami evacuation route]. This evacuation route would enable people to reach a safe place (e.g. higher 
ground away from the coastline) in a short time. Signs will be needed along the evacuation route to direct people in case of emergency. They also help people to find the right 
way even if they are in a hurry. Further, to make evacuation possible for children, old people and disabled people, railings will need to be built at places that cannot be easily 
passed, for example bridges over streams or handrails along steep slopes. 
 
In your community members could be saved from future events by implementing such an evacuation route. Constructing the evacuation route would include the following tasks: 
 
 Purchasing materials for bridges and handrails (e.g. timber and ropes); 
 Purchasing weatherproof signs that indicate the evacuation route; 
 Constructing the evacuation route. This includes physical tasks like cutting bushes, constructing handrails and bridges, placing the signs along the route. 
 Cleaning up the route after construction. This includes physical tasks like collecting and putting away groove, waste and other construction materials. 
 Providing food and water for community members and other people who work on the construction 
 
The construction of this route can be done by community members and other people. However, before any decision about planning or constructing of this route is made, we 
want to know what people in your community think about such a project. In the following we would like to know what you think about this evacuation route and if you would 
personally contribute to its construction. 
 
[Go on to the next page and start with questions B.02 to B.06] 
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Table A2: Willingness to contribute elicitation 
 
Please assume that the evacuation route will be constructed in the near future. 
B.03 B.04 
Would you be willing to contribute 
money to the construction of the 
evacuation route? 
 
 1 Yes  B.04 
 2 No  B.05 
 
In the following we are asking for two different things: 
1) How much Kina would you for sure contribute to support the construction of the evacuation route?  
(Write down amount of Kina) _______Kina 
2) At or above which amount of Kina would you for sure not support the construction of the evacuation route?  
(Write down amount of Kina) _______Kina 
Naturally, the amount of money that you announce in the first question – the money you would give for sure – is 
smaller than the amount of money in the second question which represents a kind of upper limit at which you would 
not support the construction of the evacuation route (money you would not spend since it would be too much). 
Please be as realistic as possible. Remember that you have daily and monthly expenses for food (e.g., rice, tea, sugar) and 
other consumables (e.g., clothes, fuel, seeds).  go on with B.05 
 
 
B.05 B.06 
Instead of money, you could also 
contribute part of your time. Would 
you be willing to contribute part of 
your time to the construction of the 
evacuation route? 
 
 1 Yes  B.04 
 2 No  C.01 
In the following we are asking for two different things: 
1) How many hours would you for sure contribute to support the construction of the evacuation route?  
(Write down number of hours) _______Hours 
2) At or above which amount of hours would you for sure not support the construction of the evacuation route?  
(Write down number of hours) _______Hours 
Naturally, the number of hours that you announce in the first question – time you would spend for sure – is smaller 
than the number of hours in the second question (time you would not spend since it is too much). 
Please be as realistic as possible. Remember that you have demands on your time for example subsistence activities 
(including planting, fishing, housekeeping, etc.) and social activities (like family affairs, meeting friends, community 
meetings, religious services etc.). 
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Figure A1: Picture of a tsunami evacuation route. This picture was 
shown to respondents during the interview 
 
 
 
Ethical aspects of the study 
The surveys used in this paper do not involve deception and the anonymity of the 
subjects was guaranteed. There was no danger of physical or psychological damages to 
be expected from participants. All people voluntary participated in the studies and were 
told to leave at any point of time if they feel uncomfortable with the situation. 
Moreover, prior the field research was conducted, the research teams were requested to 
give a presentation of the research methods and goals to the local communities and 
regional authorities. In all cases the request was granted approval. Our research project 
was also supported by the regional government of Bougainville and by the Teop 
Council of Elderly.  
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Paper 4: Cooperation and punishment patterns in a small-scale 
society: A comparison between second-party punishment and third-
party punishment 
 
Andreas Pondorfera 
a Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiellinie 66, 24105 Kiel, Germany 
 
Abstract: 
This study examines the effectiveness of second-party punishment (punish as active 
party) and third-party punishment (punish as by-standers) by conducting economic field 
experiments in a small-scale society of Papua New Guinea. 
Previous studies propose that second-party punishment is common in small-scale 
societies, while third-party punishment emerges if a society becomes larger and more 
complex. However, none of the existing studies investigate the effectiveness of second-
party punishment and third-party punishment in maintaining cooperation in the form of 
a collective action problem (e.g., the prisoner’s dilemma in its simplest form). 
Furthermore, previous studies restrict their analysis exclusively on altruistic punishment 
and neglect the phenomenon of anti-social punishment (i.e., punishment of 
cooperators). 
Our results provide evidence that second-party punishment promotes cooperation more 
than third-party punishment and that third-party punishment is even detrimental for 
cooperation in a small-scale society. We also show that anti-social punishment is 
endemic and provide suggestive evidence that anti-social punishment is based on 
spiteful behavior. 
 
Keywords: cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma, punishment, economic field experiment, 
small-scale society 
JEL Classification: C71, C93, D63, D64, H41 
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1. Introduction 
The scale of cooperation in both contemporary and past human societies remains a 
puzzle for the evolutionary and social sciences. Cooperation among humans is 
remarkable given that many interactions in large modern societies are one-shot 
encounters between strangers. Cooperation in these instances cannot be explained by 
the benefits that accrue from repeated encounters (Akelrod, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2003; Nowak, 2006; Nowak, 2012; Balafoutas et al., 2014). 
Altruistic punishment (AP) is one of the most prominent theories that have been 
proposed to explain cooperation. The theory of AP proposes that cooperation can be 
sustained in groups if individuals are willing to punish non-cooperators even at a cost to 
themselves (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Boyd et al., 2003; Gintis, 2003; Choi and Bowles, 
2007). Previous research has shown that AP can explain why genetically unrelated 
individuals are often able to maintain high levels of socially beneficial cooperation (e.g, 
Fehr and Gächter, 2002; de Quervain et al, 2004; Gürerk et al., 2006; Rockenbach and 
Milinski, 2006 ). 
Based on evidence from economic experiments conducted in western and industrialized 
societies, some authors propose that humans make use of AP because we exhibit strong 
reciprocity (Gintis, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr et al., 2002). Strong reciprocity 
may involve either second-party punishment, i.e. punishing those who defect on you, or 
third-party punishment, i.e. punishment those who defect on someone else, even if they 
are strangers to you (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). 62F1 Second party punishment appears to 
be motivationally stronger than third punishment. This is shown by the fact that 
emotions of anger and the willingness to retaliate are stronger when one is wronged, 
rather than when one observes others being wronged. On the other hand, third-party 
punishment, by making everyone a possible ‘guardian’ of the compliance by everybody 
else with social norms, ensures a much tighter control over the social order than second-
party punishment. A high percentage of third-party punishers can limit the options of 
                                                 
1 Strong reciprocity is defined as, ‘a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who 
violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs 
will be repaid either by others or at a later date’ (Gintis et al., 2003, p.153). 
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defectors and could lower the costs of punishment if everyone shares the cost. 63F2 In a 
cross-cultural project Henrich et al. (2006) showed that both second-party punishment 
and third-party punishment appear widespread in human groups ranging from small-
scale traditional societies (e.g., foragers) to large-scale complex societies (e.g., college 
students). These findings imply that rational choice theory is not appropriate for 
explaining the variations in human behavior across societies (Henrich et al., 2001, 2005; 
Boyd et al., 2003; Gintis et al., 2003). In particular, people are willing to spitefully punish 
stingy players and tend to be more generous than is necessary to avoid being punished 
(Henrich et al., 2004), and even punish as third parties.  
Using data from Henrich et al. (2006), Marlowe et al. (2008, 2010) investigated if the 
willingness of third parties to punish norm violators exists among all, or even most 
societies where there is no government, law or police – societies more similar to those 
our ancestors lived in before agriculture. They show that people in larger, more complex 
societies engage in significantly more third-party punishment than people in small-scale 
societies. Marlowe et al. (2008, 2010) then infer that second-party punishment may be 
sufficient to explain cooperation in small-scale societies, while third-party punishment is 
a necessary condition if a society becomes more complex, with more anonymity that 
cheating becomes more tempting and more difficult to monitor.  
The present study investigates cooperative behavior in the form of a collective action 
problem. By using experimental economic games, we want to test the hypothesis that 
second-party punishment promotes cooperation more than third party punishment in a 
small-scale society. Moreover, we are interested in studying the two possible directions 
of punishment: punishment of defectors (altruistic punishment) and punishment of 
cooperators (anti-social punishment). 
                                                 
2 Reputation offers an alternative solution to altruistic punishment because third parties could simply 
avoid interacting with those who have a bad reputation rather than paying a direct cost to punish (Gintis 
et al., 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004, 2005; Smith, 2005; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006). However, 
with greater anonymity in larger populations, there is a greater likelihood of interacting with a stranger 
whose reputation is unknown. The lack of information on the history of past encounters prevents 
reputation to be efficient in maintaining cooperation. Third-party punishment then poses a possible 
solution to this problem because any third party may punish even a stranger who defects on someone 
else. 
 COOPERATION AND PUNISHMENT IN A SMALL-SCALE SOCIETY  106 
 
 
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in various ways. First, Henrich et 
al. (2006) and Marlowe et al. (2008, 2010) interpret their results with respect to 
deviations of a distribution norm, while we extend their analysis to deviations of a 
cooperation norm in a collective action problem.64F3 From an evolutionary perspective, 
cooperation problems may be even more important than division problems since they 
permit efficiency gains. Thus, we can draw inference on the effectiveness of second-
party punishment and third-party punishment in maintaining cooperation in a small-
scale society. Secondly, Henrich et al. (2006) and Marlowe et al. (2008, 2010) restricted 
their analysis exclusively to altruistic punishment. In our analysis we consider the 
phenomenon of anti-social punishment, that is, people might punish not only defectors, 
but cooperators too.  
Anti-social punishment is widespread in some societies but not in others (Herrmann et 
al., 2008; Beckmann et al., 2002). The underlying motivations for anti-social punishment 
are not clear. They may range from spitefulness, rejection of anti-conformist behavior, 
or (in repeated interactions) vengeance (for more details see Jensen, 2010). Existing 
studies in evolutionary theory even show that costly punishment no longer promotes 
cooperation when anti-social punishment is present (Rand et al., 2010; Rand and 
Nowak, 2011). In a cross-cultural study using economic experiments, Herrmann et al. 
(2008) find that the existence of anti-social punishment is correlated with the lack of 
norms of civic-oriented behavior. Anti-social punishment may then be widespread in 
small-scale societies where norms of civic cooperation are weak, and thus, should be 
considered when investigating the effectiveness of AP in maintaining cooperation. 
Third, the interplay between second party and third party punishment, and their 
psychological underpinnings, are still largely unexplored topics. The empirical evidence 
is limited to virtually one study (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). In the present study we 
can provide a rigorous comparison between the two mechanisms. 
                                                 
3 Henrich et al. (2006) and Marlowe et al. (2008, 2010) conducted the following three experimental 
economic games: the ultimatum game (UG), the third-party punishment game (3PPG) and the dictator 
game (DG). The UG is used to examine second-party punishment. This is done by analyzing player 2’s 
willingness to reject an offer made by player 1. The 3PPG is used to analyze third-party punishment. In 
this game, a third party (Player 3) can decide to punish a dictator (Player 1) who decides how much of the 
shared stake to give to Player 2. For more details about the experimental games, see supporting online 
material in Henrich et al. (2006). 
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To provide evidence, we implemented a series of anonymous, one-shot, prisoner’s 
dilemma (PD) games among the Teop, a small-scale society located in Bougainville, 
Papua New Guinea. Centralized institutions for the enforcement of legal rules are 
largely absent in PNG, meaning that social norms almost exclusively regulate social life. 
In addition, PNG societies more closely resemble the human societies under which our 
social preferences evolved than the modern, complex societies in which most people at 
present live.65F4 Therefore it is an ideal environment for studying the mechanisms of 
second-party punishment and third-party punishment in the context of a collective 
action problem. 
Our experimental design consists of three treatments. In the baseline treatment two 
participants take part in a standard PD. This treatment is intended to measure the basic 
level of cooperation in the society. In the second-party punishment treatment (hereafter, 
2PP) the PD is followed by a second stage where players can spend money to reduce 
the counterpart’s payoff. In the third-party punishment treatment (hereafter, 3PP) we 
examined the willingness of a third party to punish deviations from cooperation norms 
in the PD. 
We find that second-party punishment promotes cooperation significantly more than 
third-party punishment. However, we are the first to show that third-party punishment 
has detrimental effects for the effectiveness of maintaining cooperation in a small-scale 
society. The level of cooperation in the 3PP treatment is significantly lower than the 
level of cooperation in the baseline treatment. We also show that anti-social punishment 
is endemic in 2PP and 3PP. Defectors are significantly more punished than cooperators 
in the 2PP treatment, while the patterns of punishment are more complex in the 3PP 
treatment. Based on these findings we can speculate that anti-social punishment has a 
spiteful component. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
the Teop society. Section 3 includes a description of the experimental design (3.1), and 
                                                 
4 Henrich et al. (2010) make a compelling argument that WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, 
and democratic) societies are relatively novel within evolutionary history and that data from non-Western 
small-scale societies are essential for testing hypotheses that relate to the human condition. 
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procedures (3.2). Section 4 provides the results for cooperation and punishment 
patterns. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results and concluding remarks. 
 
2. Subject pool: the Teop society 
The Teop society represents a unique Austronesian language group and is one of the 21 
ethno-linguistic groups living in the island of Bougainville, an autonomous region of 
Papua New Guinea. Less than 10,000 people belong to the Teop. Our subjects were 
recruited from small settlements located in the northern part of the main island (see 
Figure A1 in the appendix). 
Teop people live in villages that vary in size from 50 to 200 people, and are either 
located along the coast or in the hills. Their subsistence is based on horticulture and pig 
husbandry, supplemented by fishing, hunting and foraging (Regan and Griffin, 2005). 
Gardening is the main subsistence activity, but hunting provides a welcome addition to 
their diet. Sweet potatoes and taro are the main food. Most families raise chicken and a 
few pigs, which are an integral part of the gifts presented in the exchanges and 
ceremonies recurrent in village life (e.g. bride price, compensation fee). 
Some of the surplus from the subsistence sector is sold on markets. Small outdoor 
markets are found occasionally along the roads, where women and children sell their 
garden produce, and other commodities such as string bags, betel nuts, and limes. 
Cocoa and copra are the main commercial crops. These crops are harvested several 
times a year and sold to intermediaries in one of the larger capitals at the coast.  
Formal (centralized) institutions for the enforcement of legal rules and shared morality 
are largely absent in PNG. This means that social norms almost exclusively regulate 
social life (Bernhard et al., 2006). Teop is one of the tribal societies of 
Polynesia/Melanesia where these social norms are guarded by big men. Big men have a 
large group of followers within their clan or related groups. They possess exclusive 
knowledge and ‘imposed discipline, upheld the traditional way of life and gave executive 
directions’ (Cochrane, 1970, p. 137). Social disputes or problems of coordination 
between clans (wantoks) have traditionally been dealt with under the supervision or 
explicit intervention of big men.  
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Another unique feature of Teop society is matrilineality. Women’s social position in 
Bougainville culture has its origin in land ownership. The matrilineal kinship structure 
gives women considerable power over material resources and activities that are 
economically and ritually important. Women’s prerogative over land includes defining 
land boundaries, giving permission to hunt or to harvest timber, and the exclusive right 
to veto decisions on land-related matters. While male relatives have rights to ownership, 
their rights are limited and conditional on female relatives’ permission (Saovana-Spriggs, 
2003). Moreover, unmarried, divorced, or widowed brothers and sons reside in the 
home of their female relative. Even married men who live with their wife’s family are 
expected to spend much of their time in their mother’s or sister’s household. Still, there 
are some predominantly male domains. Women hardly participate in politics (neither 
regional nor local) and do not physically take part in tribal or civil conflicts. 
 
3. Experimental design and procedure 
3.1 Methods and experimental design 
In this study, we conducted a series of anonymous, one-shot, prisoner’s dilemma (PD) 
games involving two participants. The experimental design and methods presented in 
this section are comparable to those of Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). Figure 1 
summarizes the design of the experiment.  
 
Figure 1: Experimental design (baseline, 2PP and 3PP) 
 
                        keep or give K10                                 spend K0, K2 or K4 
A 
B 
A' 
B' 
A'' 
B'' 
C 
D 
baseline 
2PP 
(second-party punishment) 
3PP 
(third-party punishment) 
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In the baseline condition both participants (A and B) received 10 Kina (K10) to be used 
in the game (Endowment I) and K4 (Endowment II) that was not used in the game but 
was cashed in at the end of the game.66F5 Participants had to decide whether they wanted 
to keep K10, or give K10 to the other participant. If a participant kept the K10, this 
person would cash in the K10 at the end of play. If a participant gave K10, the other 
person would receive K20 at the end of play. Therefore, if both participants kept their 
K10 (mutual defection), they would both receive K10 at the end of play. If both 
participants gave K10 to the other person (mutual co-operation), both would receive 
K20. If one participant kept K10 and the other gave K10, the former would receive 
K30 while the latter would receive K0. Table 1 summarizes the payoff matrix of the 
prisoner’s dilemma. This payoff structure, in its simplicity, resembles a “tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin, 1968). Participants aiming to maximise their individual earnings 
should always keep their Endowment I. But this results in a collective loss in 
comparison to both players giving to the other. Participants made their decision 
privately and anonymously, not ever knowing who their co-player was. The only 
information they received is that the co-player was from their own village or other 
villages in the area. Unlike other research conducted in small-scale societies, 
experimenters left the experimental room when participants made their choice, so they 
ignore participants’ decisions. A total of 85 participants took part in the baseline 
treatment. 
 
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) 
Player A/ Player B Cooperation Defection 
Cooperation K20, K20 K0, K30 
Defection K30, K0 K10, K10 
 
 
                                                 
5 1 Kina ~ 0.4 US-Dollars. K10 correspond to about 50 % of the one day’s wage in the area. 
 COOPERATION AND PUNISHMENT IN A SMALL-SCALE SOCIETY  111 
 
 
Second-party punishment (2PP treatment) was modelled as standard in the literature 
(Gächter and Fehr, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) by introducing a punishment 
stage after participants played the PD game described above. Either player could spend 
the K4 from Endowment II to reduce the other participant’s payoff. Each participant 
could spend K0, K2 or K4 to reduce the counterpart’s payoff by K0, K10, or K20, 
respectively. The strategy method was used to investigate punishment patterns. Each 
participant had to make two decisions under the assumption that the other participant 
had either kept K10 or given K10. This set up allows to examine patterns of both 
“altruistic” punishment and “anti-social” punishment (Hermmann et al., 2008). Such a 
punishment ratio of 5:1 is larger than what commonly used in the literature (Anderson 
and Putterman, 2006),. but ensures that defectors final payoffs - in case the other player 
cooperated –goes significantly below that of mutual cooperation if the defector is 
punished. It also enabled us to keep the explanation and the computation of payoffs in 
the game as simple as possible. Since the Kina currency has both K2 and K10 bills, we 
could visually show on the playing board that every time a K2 bill was spent by one 
player, the other player’s money was reduced by K10. Handing out the K4 
“Endowment II” in all treatments guarantees the absence of income effects across 
treatments (net of the punishment decision in the punishment treatments). In the 2PP 
treatment the punishment stage followed the PD game and decisions were, again, made 
privately. A total of 59 participants took part in the 2PP condition. 
Third-party punishment was modelled by introducing the possibility of third party 
punishment into a prisoners’ dilemma (PD) game, hereafter referred to as 3PP. Like 
above, 3PP had two decision stages. In the first stage, two participants (A and B) took 
part in a PD game as described above. The data from this first stage provides 
information about the level of cooperation when a third party is able to punish norm 
violations. In the second stage, two third participants (C and D) had the opportunity to 
reduce the payoff of one each of the two participants who had taken part in the first 
stage of the 3PP treatment. Third parties received an endowment of K34 at the 
beginning of the second stage (after not receiving any endowment in the first stage). 
Once in the second stage, they could spend then K4 to reduce the payoff of one of the 
participants in the first stage.  He/she could spend K0, K2 or K4 to reduce payoffs by 
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K0, K10, or K20, respectively. The K30 were not used in the game and cashed out at 
the end. We choose such a high amount in order to avoid that punishment behavior is 
driven by aversion to disadvantageous inequality (the maximum payoff in PD equals 
K30). Again, the strategy method was used to investigate punishment patterns. The 
third party had to make four decisions under the assumption that the PD-player had 
either kept K10 or given K10, conditional on the other player either keeping K10 or 
giving K10. A total of 25 participants took part in the PD and 21 participnats acted as 
third parties.67F6 To compensate this disparity in the matching-process, we used the 
decisions of four randomly drawn third parties, and applied their decisions to the 
second parties.  
As mentioned above, the experimental design of the present study closely follows the 
protocol of Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), but differs from it in some imporant respects. 
To compare 2PP and 3PP, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) conducted a specifically 
designed third-party punishment treatment, in which there is no external player C (see 
Figure 2). Rather, player A and player B both acted as third parties with respect to two 
other PD-players in another game. In other words, both players took part in a PD 
followed by a punishment stage where they could only sanction one of the other players 
(A or B) of another PD group (not the other player of their own group). 68F7 Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004)’s implicit justification for using this form of “concatenated” 
punishment across pairs of PD-players is that in this way in both the 2PP and the 3PP 
the punisher had been involved in a PD prior to make their decisions, and as such it 
permits to contrast in the most rigorous possible way 2PP and 3PP. In our context, 
implementing a matching like the 3PP used in Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) would have 
likely proved too complex for our participants. Moreover, the punishment choices in 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) may possibly depend on the expectation of the outcomes 
from the PD played in the first stage and cause some endowment effects. Since 
cooperation levels are likely to be higher under 2PP than in 3PP, this may introduce a 
                                                 
6 Note that the observations in baseline, 2PP and 3PP are not balanced. This was partly due to time and 
financial constraints. In particular, the procedures of the 3PP treamtnet are much more time-consuming 
compared to the baseline and 2PP. 
7 For more details, see chapter 5 and Figure 7 in Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). 
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confound in punishers’ behavior between 2PP and 3PP. For this reason we think that it 
is interesting to test the robustness of Fehr and Fischbacher (2004)’s findings using a 
different design, where the punisher in the 3PP has not played a PD prior to her 
engagement in the game and when no uncertain endowment effects may condition her 
choice. Arguably, having a third party who has not been previously involved in a PD 
game may be seen as being closer to the original “idea” behind third-party punishment, 
in that the third party is a complete stranger to the interaction. A prior involvement of 
the third party in the PD game, as in Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), may urge individuals 
to act according to motivations such as indirect reciprocity (I punish A’’ because I 
expect B’ to punish my counterpart A) or even wishful thinking, which are all too 
common in human behavior (e.g. Foddy et al., 2009). Finally we note that in our design, 
similarly to Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), the third-party in the 3PP is restricted to 
punish only one player, as is the punisher in the 2PP. We can use these data to compare 
it with punishment patterns of the 2PP treatment. Moreover, we think the indpendence 
of player C and D is necessary to reflect the true characteristics of a third-party.  
 
Figure 2: Design of the third-party punishment treatment in Fehr 
and Fischbacher (2004) 
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3.2 Procedure 
The field research took part from October to November 2014 in the east northern part 
of Bougainville Island (PNG). A total of 190 participants - 97 male and 93 female - 
voluntarily participated in 26 experimental sessions across 13 villages (Table A1 
summarizes demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the participants). 
Recrutment was done by drawing a random sample from a residence list. In some cases 
these lists were already availabe, in some other cases we asked local village chiefs to 
prepare one. People were informed about their participation one day in advance. They 
were asked to show up at a given time. In order to minimize collusion we allowed only 
small groups of people to participate at once. Experimetnal sessions in a village did not 
last longer than 3 days.  
Procedures followed those set out by Henrich et al. (2006).69F8 Participants were 
summoned in the ‘waiting area’, and were assigned an ID-number by our local research 
assistants (see Figure A2 in the appendix). Participants completed a questionnaire 
including socio-economic characteristics and received K5 in cash as a show-up fee.70F9 
Unlike Henrich et al. (2006), the game was never introduced at this stage, in order to 
minimise the risk of collusion or contagion. Subsequently, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two experimenters in two separated ‘playing areas’ (PA) (see 
Figure A3 in the appendix). In order to facilitate comprehension, the game was 
illustrated using a playing board and real money. Participants’ comprehension was tested 
asking them to calculate payoffs corresponding to different actions. We recorded the 
number of mistakes in the four comprehension questions. In case of mistakes, the game 
was explained again and participants were asked to recalculate. Only participants who 
answered correctly were allowed to take part in the game (about 8 % were dismissed 
from the experiment). In treatments 2PP and 3PP we used a similar procedure in order 
to test comprehension for the punishment option. 
                                                 
8 See protocols in the appendix. All sessions were conducted in Tok Pisin. 
9 We followed Henrich et al. (2006) when determining the amount of the show-up fee. K5 correspond to 
about 25 % of the one-day’s wage in the area. 
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After passing the comprehension stage, participants made their decisions inserting K10 
bills into one of two envelopes. One envelope was labelled ‘Give’ and the other ‘Keep’.  
Both envelopes were then inserted into a large envelope to protect the anonimity of the 
choice. The K10 bills were tied to a stick so the experimenter could check the 
correctedness of the choice manipulating the large envelope from the outside. 
Participants in the 2PP and 3PP treatments made their punishment decision similarly. 
They indicated their punishmend decision by putting a stick into one of the three 
envelops labelled with ‘spend K0’, ‘spend K2’ and ‘spend K4’. In 2PP, participants had 
to make two decisions. First, they were asked to decide how much of their K4 
endowment to spend to reduce their counterpart’s payoff assuming this person had kept 
K10. Subsequently they were asked to decide how much money to spend assuming that 
their counterpart had given K10. In 3PP, the third party had to make four decisions. 
First, they were asked how much they want to spend to reduce Player A’s (B’s) payoff 
assuming both players kept K10. Secondly, third parties were asked how much they 
want to spend to reduce Player A’s (B’s) payoff assuming Player A (B) kept K10 and 
Player B (A) gave K10. Thirdly, third parties were asked how much they want to spend 
to reduce Player A’s (B’s) payoff assuming both players gave K10 to their counterpart. 
Fourthly, they were asked how much they want to spend to reduce Player A’s (B’s) 
payoff assuming Player A (B) gave K10 and Player B (A) kept K10. We kept the order 
of punishment decisions constant throughout all sessions. 
Experimenters and assistants left the room when participants made their decision in 
order to guarantee anonymity of decisions.  
To minimize village and session effects that influence our treatments, we randomized all 
treatments over villages and sessions. In doing so, treatments were administered 
following a pre-fixed order whose sequence was randomised prior to the session. 
Payment of participants was done at the end of each session or when leaving the village. 
We put the money into untransparent envelops labelled with the ID-number, which 
were handed out to the participant holding the corresponding ID-number.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Cooperation rates 
Cooperation is highest in the 2PP treatment. 58 % of participants gave their 
Endowment I to their counterpart in the 2PP condition, in comparison to 46 % in the 
baseline condition. However, this difference is statistically not distinguishable (Z = -
1.382, p = 0.167).71F10 The most striking result is the low level of cooperation in 3PP. Only 
20 % of the participants decided to give their Endowment I to their counterpart in this 
treatment. Hence, cooperation rates are not only lower in 3PP than in 2PP but even fall 
below the level of the baseline condition. These differences are statistically significant 
(0.46 vs. 0.20, Z = 2.312, p = 0.021; 0.58 vs. 0.20, Z = 3.143, p = 0.002). Table 2 
includes summary statistics of cooperation rates in more detail. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of cooperation rates 
treatment mean S.D. N 
baseline 0.46 0.50 85 
2PP 0.58 0.50 59 
3PP 0.20 0.41 25 
 
To ensure that these findings are not confounded by different background 
characteristics of subjects across sex or environments, Table 3 presents results from a 
simple regression model. We use a logit model because cooperation is a dichotomic 
variable, which equals 1 if a participant co-operated and 0 otherwise. Column 1 includes 
a specification that controls for the environment of a village (mountain or coastal) 72F11, 
experimenter effects, gender and comprehension. The specification in Column 2 adds 
additional demographic controls, such as, age, education and an index of household 
wealth. Introducing such extra controls comes at the cost of losing many observations 
due to no-responses; hence we report both analyses in Table 3. However, all previous 
                                                 
10 All tests in means are conducted by using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
11 Villages at the study site can be grouped into a mountain (3 villages) or a coastal environment (10 
villages). We used this categorization to generate a ‘mountain dummy’ which equals 1 if the village is in 
the mountain and 0 otherwise. This ‘mountain dummy’ captures most of the between-village variability in 
‘behavior’ observed in the experiment (cooperation and punishment). Further, including the mountain 
dummy instead of village fixed effects allows us to save degrees of freedom. 
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results hold even in the specification with fewer observations (column 2). The level of 
cooperation is significantly lower in 3PP than in the baseline and 2PP condition. Among 
the controls, age is strongly positively associated with co-operation which is in 
agreement with what has been found in Western societies (Bellemare and Kröger, 2002). 
It is worth noting, that our measure of comprehension does not drive the differences in 
the treatments. 
 
Table 3: Logistic linear regression, all treatments 
Dependent variable  'Cooperation' 
  (1) (2) 
2PP 0.501 0.438 
 
(0.346) (0.373) 
3PP -1.312** -1.405** 
 
(0.591) (0.708) 
Gender -0.353 -0.527 
 
(0.332) (0.380) 
Age  0.040*** 
 
 (0.015) 
Education (6 to 10 years)  0.688 
 
 (0.885) 
Education (above 10 years)  0.912 
 
 (1.138) 
Wealth  -0.072 
  (0.206) 
Wald test of equality of 
coefficients 
  
H0: 2PP = 3PP 1.813*** 1.843** 
 (0.616) (0.721) 
N 169 155 
pseudo R-sq 0.07 0.12 
Log lik. -108.250 -93.352 
Note: A logistic regression model has been fitted. Huber-Whyte 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is Cooperation. It equals 1 if a participant gave 
the sum of K10 to the counterpart and 0 if they kept it.  
Both models include the following additional controls: mountain 
dummy, experimenter dummy and comprehension measure. 
The Wald tests reported at the bottom of the table are run on the null 
hypothesis that pairs of dummy coefficients identifying a treatment are 
equal to each other. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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4.2 Punishment patterns 
The main results of the analysis of 2PP and 3PP can be summarized as follows: both 
second parties and third parties strongly punish cooperators, and thus, anti-social- 
punishment (ASP) is widespread in the small-scale society of Teop. Defectors are 
significantly more punished than cooperators in the 2PP condition, while the patterns of 
punishment are more complex in the 3PP condition. Third parties punish defectors who 
were matched with another defector nearly as much as they punish cooperators who 
were matched with other cooperators in the PD. Moreover, the difference in the 
strength between second-party punishment and third-party punishment depends on the 
role of the punished person’s PD partner and is of similar size for AP and ASP. The 
high patterns of punishment of cooperators even in third-party punishment sessions 
suggest that spitefulness played a conspicuous role in motivating punishment in our 
experiments.  
Table 4 provides support for this claim. The table presents the average fraction of 
endowment II (K4) spent for altruistic punishment (punishing defectors) and anti-social 
punishment (punishing cooperators) in 2PP and 3PP. For the 3PP condition we include 
all four situations that can emerge in the PD. 
 
Table 4: Mean fractions of Endowment II (K4) spent for punishment in 2PP and 
3PP (standard deviation in brackets) 
Punished 
person is a 
2PP 
3PP if the punished 
person’s PD partner 
cooperates 
3PP if the punished 
person’s PD partner 
defects 
Defector 
0.66 
(0.40) 
0.67 
(0.29) 
0.42 
(0.40) 
Cooperator 
0.51 
(0.47) 
0.50 
(0.35) 
0.19 
(0.29) 
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In 2PP, respondents spent on average 66 % of their Endowment II to punish defectors 
and 51 % to punish cooperators. This difference is statistically significant by using a 
Mann-Whitney test (Z = -2.087, p = 0.037) and robust to potential confounders (see 
ordered logit regression in Table 5).73F12 
 
 
Table 5: Ordered logit regression, 2PP treatment 
Dependent variable  'Punishment' 
  (1) (2) 
Anti-social punishment -0.62** -0.73** 
 
(0.29) (0.32) 
Gender 0.18 -0.32 
 
(0.42) (0.50) 
Age  -0.03 
 
 (0.02) 
Education (6 to 10 years)  1.30 
 
 (0.98) 
Education (above 10 years)  0.56 
 
 (1.46) 
Wealth  0.19 
  (0.35) 
N 118 106 
pseudo R-sq 0.02 0.07 
Log lik. -119.67 -102.77 
Note: An ordered logit model has been fitted. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Clusters are given 
by individuals. The dependent variable is Punishment, which takes on the 
values K0, K2 and K4. The columns report results for overall 
punishment, that is, pooled data of punishment decisions (against both 
defectors and cooperators); 
Both models include the following additional controls: mountain dummy, 
experimenter dummy and comprehension measure. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
  
                                                 
12 We also analyzed punishment patterns of 2PP with respect to the participant’s choice in the PD. 
Cooperators and defectors spend on average exactly the same amount for punishing defectors (66 % of 
Endowment II). In contrast, cooperators tend to spend more of their Endowment II than defectors for 
the punishment of cooperators (57 % vs. 42 %), although this difference is statistically not significant (Z 
= 1.24, p = 0.22). These results suggest that anti-social punishment in 2PP is not only high (on average 51 
%) but also has a spiteful component. 
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Figure 3: Mean fraction of Endowment II (K4) spent in 3PP 
 
 
The patterns of punishment in the 3PP treatment are more complex. Figure 3 illustrates 
these patterns separately and shows that punishment behavior follows a linear pattern. 
Third parties spent the largest fraction of their Endowment II for punishing a defector 
who was matched with a cooperator (67 %). Surprisingly, the mean of this fraction is 
hardly statistically distinguishable from the mean of the fraction that is spent for 
punishing a cooperator who was matched with another cooperator in the PD (0.67 vs. 
0.50, Z = 1.571, p = 0.116). Moreover, the mean fraction of Endowment II used for 
punishing a defector who was matched with another defector is statistically not different 
from the mean fraction for punishing a cooperator who was matched with another 
cooperator (0.42 vs. 0.50, Z = -0.649, p = 0.516). Third parties also spend a 
considerable amount of their endowment for punishing a cooperator who was matched 
with a defector in the PD. The average of 19 % is the smallest fraction of Endowment 
II spent for punishment within the 3PP treatment. Mann Whitney tests indicate that 
these differences are significant (0.19 vs. 0.42, Z = 2.060, p = 0.039; 0.19 vs. 0.50, Z = 
2.857, p = 0.004; 0.19 vs. 067, Z = 4.176, p = 0.000). To sum up, third parties punish 
people who behave prosocial in the PD nearly as heavily as norm violators, that is, free-
riders. These findings suggest that anti-social punishment is endemic and has a spiteful 
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component. All the above findings are robust using the same specifications as above 
(see ordered logit regression in Table 6). 
Table 6: Ordered logit regression, 3PP treatment 
Dependent variable  'Punishment' 
  (1) (2) 
D/D 1.55*** 1.66** 
 
(0.53) (0.66) 
D/C 2.95*** 3.22*** 
 (0.65) (0.78) 
C/C 1.95*** 2.04** 
 (0.69) (0.81) 
Gender 0.75 0.69 
 
(0.50) (0.58) 
Age  0.02* 
 
 (0.01) 
Education (6 to 10 years)  -1.18 
 
 (0.93) 
Education (above 10 years)  -1.27 
 
 (1.24) 
Wealth  1.01* 
  (0.56) 
Wald test of equality of coefficients   
H0: D/D = D/C 1.39** 1.56** 
 (0.67) (0.71) 
H0: D/D = C/C 0.39 0.37 
 (0.64) (0.67) 
H0: D/C = C/C 1.00* 1.18* 
 (0.53) (0.62) 
N 84 76 
pseudo R-sq 0.15 0.19 
Log lik. -75.81 -65.63 
Note: An ordered logit model has been fitted. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Clusters are given by 
individuals. The dependent variable is Punishment, which takes on the 
values K0, K2 and K4. The columns report results for overall punishment, 
that is, pooled data of punishment decisions (all four situations that can 
emerge in the PD). 
D/D = punished person is a defector; punished person’s PD partner is a 
defector; D/C = punished person is a defector, punished person’s PD 
partner is a co-operator; C/C = punished person is a co-operator, 
punished person’s PD partner is a co-operator; C/D = punished person is 
co-operator, punished person’s PD partner is a defector (reference group); 
Both models include the following additional controls: mountain dummy, 
experimenter dummy and comprehension measure.  
The Wald tests reported at the bottom of the table are run on the null 
hypothesis that pairs of dummy coefficients identifying a treatment are 
equal to each other. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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A comparison between 2PP and 3PP shows that fractions of endowment spent for 
altruistic and anti-social punishment are exactly the same when the punished person’s 
PD partner cooperates (0.66 vs. 0.67, Z = 0.305, p = 0.761; 0.51 vs. 0.50, Z = 0.093, p 
= 0.926) but significantly different from each other when the punished person’s PD 
partner defects (0.66 vs. 0.42, Z = 2.279, p = 0.027; 0.51 vs. 0.19, Z = 2.678, p = 0.007). 
These results are comparable to Marlowe et al. (2010). They find that 2PP and 3PP is of 
the same size in small scale societies that have an ethnic population size of less than 
40000 people, while in larger societies people are more likely to engage in 3PP than in 
2PP. The ethno-linguistic group of the Teop society clearly belongs to the “small end” 
of this spectrum (population size of Teop < 10000). In contrast to Marlow et al. (2010), 
we investigate violations from a cooperation norm and take into account anti-social 
punishment. In doing so, we find a difference in the strength of punishment between 
2PP and 3PP in the small-scale society of Teop. However, this difference depends on 
the role of the punished person’s partner in the PD.74F13  
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this study we use the prisoner’s dilemma game to compare the effectiveness of 
second-party and third-party punishment in a small-scale society. In contrast to Henrich 
et al. (2006) and Marlowe et al. (2008, 2010), we investigate cooperative behavior and 
associated punishment patterns in the form of a collective action problem. 
We find that second-party punishment promotes cooperation more than third-party 
punishment. The low level of cooperation in the 3PP treatment (significantly below 
baseline) even proves that third-party punishment can be ruled out as an effective way 
of maintaining cooperation in small-scale societies. In this case, the third-party – 
designed as a mechanism to maintain cooperation in the PD – is counterproductive and 
may lead to a crowding out of social preferences such as altruism, ethical norms or 
intrinsic motives (see Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). The establishment of centralized 
institutions such as courts or police – which act as third parties and solve disputes 
                                                 
13 Due to the nature of the experimental design (two decisions in 2PP and four decisions in 3PP), we 
cannot compare and test the robustness of these results in regression models.  
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between parties in accordance with the rule of law – may help to explain these findings. 
While these institutions are quite common in modern societies (i.e., western and 
industrialized societies), institutions of the enforcement of legal rules of law have been 
established quite recently in PNG. Like many other developing countries, PNG faces 
challenges with the national implementation of these legal rules of law. In many tribal 
societies the sanctioning of norm violations (e.g., theft, murder, rape, etc.) is still 
regulated directly between groups without the interference of the state. For example, 
police intervention in local disputes is often not accepted by people and even leads to 
tensions among them.75F14 People’s lack of compliance with the law in combination with 
weak execution of these rules in PNG may explain the crowding out of cooperators in 
the 3PP treatment of our experiment.  
We also extend the analysis of Henrich et al. (2006) and Marlowe et al. (2008, 2010) to 
the phenomenon of anti-social punishment. The high level of anti-social punishment in 
2PP and 3PP is striking and requires explanation. 76F15 Due to the nature of the one-shot 
interaction in our experiment, we can rule out that any strategic behavior or revengeful 
acts played a role for punishing cooperators (Cinyabuguma et. al., 2006; Denant-
Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008). Participants had to pass through a 
comprehension stage in each game played. They had to calculate payoffs for themselves 
and the other participant(s) in the PD. Those who did not understand were dismissed 
from the game (about 8 % of subjects). Thus, we can also rule out that people may have 
                                                 
14 This argument can be supported by anecdotal evidence from the field. During a stay in a village, two 
families were arguing about land properties and the harvesting of cocoa. The verbal confrontation became 
physical and the police showed up. Two policemen tried to interfere but recognized soon that their 
intervention intensified the conflict and more people become engaged. In the end, the local people 
regulated the conflict by themselves and the police was observing the situation from a safe distance 
(outside the village). 
15 Anti-social punishment was hardly observed in Fehr and Fischacher (2004) but has already emerged in 
several other studies (Herrmann et al., 2008; Gächter et al., 2010; Gächter and Herrmann, 2011). 
However, most of these studies conducted public good games with repeated interactions and none of 
them analyzed anti-social punishment in the context of third-party punishment. Thus, these studies are 
not comparable to our study. The study by Gächter and Herrmann (2011) offers the only suitable 
comparison to the 2PP treatment in our study since they use a one-shot public goods game followed by a 
punishment stage. The punishment results in the Russian sample of their study are very similar to the 
punishment patterns in the 2PP treatment of our study. 
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not understood how punishment works in our experiment. 77F16 Another issue which may 
lead people to punish cooperators is inequality aversion. Inequality aversion is 
understood as disutility arising from differences between one’s own payoff and other’s 
payoff (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). A third party in our experiment received K30 which 
corresponds to the maximum payoff a participant can receive in the PD. This means 
that they are for sure better off than any cooperator in the PD. Inequality aversion then 
cannot explain these patterns of anti-social punishment. 
Based on these findings, we can speculate that spiteful behavior might have played an 
important role in our experiment. Spite has been defined as the motivation to maximize 
(rather than minimize as per the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function) one’s 
advantageous inequality vis-à-vis others. A spiteful punisher is thus a person who 
punishes cooperators and defectors at the same time. The fact that the punisher’s spent 
amount in the 3PP seems to vary almost linearly with the recipient’s payoff, is consistent 
with the idea that this motivation played a relevant role for the third parties. Spiteful 
behavior may be a successful strategy in societies where local competitiveness is likely to 
provide a considerable improvement in the socio-economic condition of the individual. 
This is particularly true for societies where tribal warfare and conflicts between groups 
are continuing events. Behavior in these societies is also strongly driven by competition 
for status and being aggressive towards possible opponents can be the best surviving 
strategy within this environment. Small-scale societies may then be those where anti-
social punishment evolves on a broader scale. Punishing cooperators is just one way to 
gain an advantage over others and may constitute to a selfish behavior that positively 
affects individual survival and well-being (Sylwester et al., 2013).  
From an evolutionary perspective, however, punishment in our experiment is a 
destructive mechanism. Looking at the average payoffs per treatment allows us to 
compare the relative success of different mechanisms for enforcing cooperation. We 
assume, as it is typical in evolutionary analyses of social behavior, that societies using 
                                                 
16In order to test our protocol in the context of a Western society, we replicated the study of the 2PP 
condition at the University of Kiel, following as closely as possible the original protocol. We can notice 
that only 7 % of Endowment II was spent for the punishment of cooperators in Germany. This is in line 
with other experiments conducted in Western Europe (e.g., Gächter and Hermann, 2010, 2011). Hence, 
we infer that nothing in our protocol induces an especially high level of anti-social punishment.  
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mechanisms that yield higher average payoffs could draw upon those material resources 
to maximize the capacity of their members to survive and reproduce. Due to the high 
level of altruistic punishment and anti-social punishment, average payoffs are 
substantially lower in 2PP (K6.01) and 3PP (K6.00) than in the baseline condition 
(K18.59). These findings suggest that the introduction of punishment devices is overall 
detrimental for this society. 
Our findings may provide valuable information for policy makers. In order to solve 
collective action problems in small-scale societies, policy makers may focus on 
supporting mechanisms that promote cooperation in a more efficient way. Policy 
instruments based on the theory of indirect reciprocity (i.e., maintain cooperation 
through reputation building or social image concerns) may provide an alternative, more 
costless solution to maintain cooperation in small-scale societies where reputation 
information can be easily diffused. 
 
Acknowledgments 
The research was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
through the project "BIOACID (03F0655H)”, from the Spanish Ministry of Education 
(grant ECO 2011-23634) and from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. We 
declare no competing financial interests. We thank our local assistants Eliuda Maravut, 
Horai Magum, Philippe Hus, Nigel Henry, Saeleah Gordon, Siko Gordon and all the 
people who helped us in this research. We thank Vincent Richrath for his help in 
assembling the dataset. 
  
 COOPERATION AND PUNISHMENT IN A SMALL-SCALE SOCIETY  126 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
Source: Regan and Griffin (2005) 
 
 
 
  
Figure A1: Map of languages of Bougainville and location of Teop  
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Figure A2: Registration and pre-play interview taking place in a waiting area 
 
 
 
Figure A3: A playing area 
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Table A1: Summary statistics of subject pool 
Treatment 
Variable 
Sex 
(1=Female) 
Age Educationa Wealthb 
ALL Mean 0.49 37.66 0.99 0.70 
 
St. Dev. 0.50 14.14 0.43 0.91 
 
Min 0 17 0 0 
 
Max 1 91 2 3 
 
N 190 180 180 190 
Baseline Mean 0.53 36.84 1.04 0.68 
 
St. Dev. 0.50 14.92 0.37 0.94 
 
Min 0 17 0 0 
 
Max 1 91 2 3 
 
N 85 80 80 85 
2PP Mean 0.49 36.42 1.05 0.63 
 
St. Dev. 0.50 11.70 0.40 0.91 
 
Min 0 17 0 0 
 
Max 1 56 2 3 
 
N 59 55 55 59 
3PP - PD Mean 0.40 40.56 0.84 0.92 
 
St. Dev. 0.50 14.14 0.55 0.86 
 
Min 0 19 0 0 
 
Max 1 76 2 2 
 
N 25 25 25 25 
3PP – Third 
party Mean 0.43 40.70 0.85 0.71 
 
St. Dev. 0.51 16.98 0.49 0.85 
 
Min 0 22 0 0 
 
Max 1 88 2 2 
 
N 21 20 20 21 
K-Wallis test  χ2(4) 1.235 2.403 3.363 2.393 
 p-value 0.7446 0.4931 0.3389 0.4950 
a Education is a categorical variable which takes on the values 0 (below 6 years of education), 1 (6 
to 10 years of education), and 2 (above 10 years of education). 
b Wealth is defined as the sum of livestock types owned. We consider the following livestock: pigs, 
chicken, and rooster. The index takes on the values 0 (holding no livestock types), 1 (holding 1 out 
of 3 livestock types), 2 (holding 2 out of 3 livestock types), and 3 (holding all three types of 
livestock). 
K-Wallis tests indicate that there are no differences in the socio-economic and demographic 
variables between treatments 
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PROTOCOLS 
 
Pre-Experimental Instructions 
 
The following instructions were read by the local research assistant individually to 
subjects in the waiting area (WA=Waiting area; PA = playing area; LE1=Lead 
Experimenter 1; LE2=Lead Experimenter 2; RA1 = research assistant 1, presiding over 
WA, helped by other research assistants from our team or from the village; 
RA2=research assistant 2; assisting LE1; RA3 = research assistant 3, assisting LE2). 
 
Hello! My name is [RA1] and I am here with [LE1] and [LE2] to conduct this study. 
They are researchers from the University of [Name University where LE1 and LE2 are 
affiliated]. Thank you for taking the time to come today and taking part in it. Here you 
have 5 Kina (K5) for your participation and for the interview. This is your money. I 
cannot take it back again. Take them and put it away in some safe place, they will not be 
needed for the decisions you will make later on. 
Ok, this survey is about how people make decisions. Before we begin I want to make 
some general comments about what we are doing here today and explain some rules 
that we need to follow. By making decisions in the following game you can earn real 
money that you will take home. This money is yours to keep. But maybe you won’t get 
any money. There is no right or wrong decision and you cannot lose any money. You 
should understand that this is not my own money and it is not [LE1’s] or [LE2’s] 
money. It is money given to them by their university to use to do a research study. The 
money will be paid in cash when the sessions are finished. You should come here with 
this card that you have just drawn and your payments will be given to you in an 
envelope. Please remember to take this number with you when you come to collect your 
payment. 
Before we proceed any further, let me stress something that is very important. Many of 
you were invited here without understanding very much about what we are planning to 
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do today. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to 
participate in for any reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started the 
game or not. Let me tell you something about the decisions you are going to make. 
Decisions are made by two individuals, you and another person. {3PP : Decisions are 
made by two or more individuals, you and another person} This person may be from 
this village, or from another village from this area. Before coming here we run this 
research in other villages as well. None will know with whom you are matched.  
We have invited many people from this area to take part in this game. At the end of the 
sessions, we will take your decision and match it randomly with the decision of another 
participant. 
You will be making decisions with these envelopes here. You will receive your money in 
this envelope named “My Earnings”. Now I write your number on this envelope and on 
all other envelopes. The other person also receives his money in an envelope like this 
one. 
Now let us explain how we pair the two persons who will make a decision. At the end 
of the session we will draw two envelopes at a time at random from the “Decisions” 
box. These two people will be matched, and their decisions will determine their 
earnings. [Show an example of matching. Do NOT show content of envelopes] 
For instance, here I draw envelope # X and envelope # Y. So, participant # X and 
participant # Y will be matched together and their decisions will determine their 
earnings. 
You will be explained the decision later in the room over there. Please wait your turn 
quietly here. Everyone caught talking about the game before or after he participates will 
not receive any money! After you finish the game, you may not enter the WA again 
under any circumstances. If you do so, we may have to cancel the session and leave this 
village without handing out any payment. [When a PA is free, RA1 invites the participant to 
go to that PA.] 
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Individual instructions in the experimental session 
 
Script of the Game: Prisoner’s Dilemma (baseline, 2PP, 3PP) 
Hello and thank you for you coming here. My name is LE1/LE2. I hope you can 
understand my Tok Pisin. If not, I will ask our assistant to translate. I am here with 
[RA2/RA3]  
Now I explain the game with this board. {2PP, 3PP: There are two parts in this game. I 
start explaining the first part.} It is important that you understand well, because only 
people who understand the game well will take part in it. Moreover, what you will earn 
depends on the decision you make, so you must understand well. You will receive your 
earnings inside this envelope “My earnings”. [Put envelope “My earnings” by participant’s side. 
Also point to envelope “Other person’s earnings”.] 
Decisions are made by two individuals, you and another person. The other person is not 
here now but he or she will make a decision in exactly the same way as what you are 
going to do. Perhaps he or she has already made a decision. This person may be from 
this village, or from another village from this area. Before coming here we run this 
research in other villages as well. The other person, too, will receive his money inside an 
envelope similar to yours. 
Ok, now I give you K14. The other person also receives K14. The K10 I give the other 
person in this board have a green stick. These K4 will not be used in the game, and will 
be paid out to you when you come to collect your payments inside your “My Earnings” 
envelope. Now I put this K4 aside and you can forget about it for the rest of the game. 
[Put the K4 in the envelope marked “”My Earnings”.  Do the same for other participant.] {2PP: 
These K4 will be used later in the second part of this game so I put them aside. Let’s 
now see the first part of this game}. [Put the two K2 bills aside. Put aside K10 belonging to 
other person. Put K20 bills towards the middle of the board, and say that this is your (i.e. the 
researcher’s) money.].  
Now I tell you what you can do with your K10. You can make one out of two things. 
You can either keep these K10 or give these K10 to the other person. If you keep the 
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K10, these K10 are yours. They will be put inside your “Earnings” envelope [Show K10 
going into Earnings envelope]. If you give the K10 to the other person, I will add K10 and 
pass them on to the other person. So the other person receives K20 while you are left 
with nothing. I will put these K20 inside the “Earnings” envelope of the other person. 
[Move the K10 bill across the line and add another K10] 
The other person has the same choice as you. [Remove subject’s own K10 from board and put 
green K10 onto other person’s side]. If the other person keeps the K10, these K10 are his and 
I will put them inside his “Earnings” envelope. If he gives the K10 to you, I will add 
K10 and pass them on to you so that you end up with K20 while the other person is left 
with nothing. I will put these K20 inside the “Earnings” envelope of the other person. 
[Move the other person’s K10 bill across the line and add another K10]. So, every time a person 
gives K10, I add K10 and the other person receives K20. [Show again for both giving and 
receiving K10.] 
After each Person makes the decision to keep or give the money {Baseline: the game is 
over.}; {2PP, 3PP: the first part of the game is over.} 
 
Ok, let us check if you are clear about the game. I am going to show you some 
examples. You will tell me how much money you and the other person will get. You can 
use the board to move the money and add K10 to calculate the payoffs. [All the examples 
below should be visualized on the board, placing the two envelopes “My Earnings “Other Person’s 
Earnings” at the top end of the table. If more test questions are needed the researcher or assistant should 
again start from the first example]. 
Example No.1: You and the other person both keep the K10. How much money 
would you get inside your envelope at the end of this example? How much does the 
other person have? [K10; K10] Ok. So you both have K10 in this situation. Now the 
next example. 
Example No. 2: You keep your K10 and the other person gives his K10 over to you. 
How much money would you and the other person have inside your envelope at the 
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end of this example? [K30; K0] Ok. So you have K30 and the other person has nothing 
in this situation. Now the next example. 
Example No. 3: You give your K10 over to the other person, and the other person 
keeps his K10. How much money would you and the other person have inside your 
envelope at the end of this example? [K0; K30] Ok. So you have nothing and the other 
person has K30 in this situation. Now the next example. 
Example No. 4: You and the other person both give the K10 to each other. How 
much money would you and the other person get inside your envelope at the end of this 
example? [K20; K20] Ok. So you both have K20 in this situation. 
[Give time to answer each question and explain the correct answer if the participant gives the wrong 
answer. If participant does not answer correctly all questions, the game is explained again and the 
participant is asked to answer again. The number of mistakes in the first set of questions is recorded. In 
the subsequent checks, participants should answer correctly the first question and at least another 
question. If they still make mistakes, participants are said that they cannot take part in the game.] 
 
{Baseline: Now we have finished with the explanations of the game. Do you have any 
questions?} 
{2PP, 3PP: Now we have finished with the explanations of the first part of the game. 
Do you have any questions?} 
 
Script of the Game: Punishment stage in 2PP 
Ok, let’s now come to the second part of this game. After you have made your first 
decision, you will make two more decisions that will affect how much money you and 
the other person take home. [Show second board. Leave first board to its left, placing K20 on both 
players’ sides on the first board.]. 
For this second part you use the K4 that we left aside from the first part. [Place the two 
K2 bills in front of both players on the second board.] Let us suppose that both you and the 
other person have K20 at the end of the first decision. [Put K20 at the other person’s side on 
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first board]. In this second part you can spend some money to reduce the other person’s 
earnings. If you pay K2 I will reduce by K10 the money that the other person will take 
home. [Show on board]. If you pay K4 I will reduce by K20 the money that the other 
person will take home. [Show on board]. If you pay nothing, I will not reduce the other 
person’s money. [Show on board]. 
So, you can do one thing out of three things: Option number 1: You can keep your K4. 
Option number 2: You can keep K2 and spend K2. I reduce the other person’s earnings 
by K10; Option number 3: You can keep nothing, spend K4, and I will reduce the other 
person’s earnings by K20. [Show three envelopes with three options]. 
Remember that the other person has the same 3 options: Option number 1: He can 
keep his K4. Option number 2: He can keep K2 and spend K2. I reduce your earnings 
by K10; Option number 3: He can keep nothing, spend K4, and your earnings will be 
reduced by K20. 
Remember, the money you spend and the money I take away will go outside the game; 
you will not receive this money nor the other person will receive your money. [Show on 
board, using K2 sticks for other person and K10 belonging to subject.] 
 
Is this clear? Ok, I would like you to answer what is the correct answer to the following 
examples:  
Example No. 1: Suppose that the other person has K20 after the first decision. 
Suppose you decide to spend K0. How much money do I take away from the other 
person? [Solution: None.] 
Example No. 2: Suppose the other person has K10 after the first decision. You decide 
to spend K2. How much money do I take away from the other person? [Solution: K10]. 
Example No. 3: Suppose that you have K30 after the first decision. The other person 
decides to spend K4. How much money do I take away from you? [Solution: K20]. 
 COOPERATION AND PUNISHMENT IN A SMALL-SCALE SOCIETY  135 
 
 
Example No. 4: Suppose that you have K10 at the end of the first decision. The other 
person decides to spend K4 to reduce your earnings. What are the final earnings for 
you? 
Ok, this is a special situation. The other person wants to reduce your earnings by K20, 
but you only have K10. In all situations where one person wants to reduce the other 
person’s earnings by an amount bigger than what that person has, I take away all the 
money that that person has, but nothing more. In this case I take away your K10. 
 
So, the money you will take home at the end of the session is: how much money you 
have from the first part, minus how much money the other person takes away from you, 
plus the money you keep from these K4. 
Example No. 1:  You and the other person have K20 at the end of the first part. The 
other person takes K10 away from you. You spend K2 to take away K10 from the other 
person. How much money do you take home? [Ask participant to answer.] In this case you 
both take home K12.  
Example No. 2: You have K30 at the end of the first part. The other person has 0K. 
The other person spends K2 and takes away K10 from you. You spend nothing. How 
much money do you and the other person take home? [Ask participant to answer.] 
In this case you take home K24. The other person takes home K2.  
Example No. 3: You and the other person have both K10 at the end of the first part. 
The other person takes no money away from you. You take no money away from the 
other person. [Ask participant to answer.] In this case you take home K14.  
Ok, now I add an important thing: You will make two decisions in this second part. 
One decision is for when the other person keeps the K10 in the first part. The other 
decision is for when the other person gives you K10 in the first part. At the end of the 
session I will see what the other person has done. So I take away money or not take 
away money from his according to your decision. 
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Script of the Game: Punishment stage in 3PP 
Ok, let’s now come to the second part of this game. After you have made your first 
decision, a third person will make a decision that may affect how much money you and 
the other person take home. [Show second board. Leave first board to its left, placing K20 on both 
players’ sides on the first board. Second board should have “Namba 3 man o meri” clearly indicated.]. 
We will call the person who makes the decision in this second part the ‘third person’. 
This person is NOT the person with whom you have made the previous decision. This 
is another person who made her decisions in the previous days. You and the other 
person from the first part don’t have to make any decisions here. [Place the two K4 in front 
of both players on the second board.] 
Let us suppose that both you and the other person have K20 at the end of the first 
decision. [Put K20 at the other person’s side on first board]. Person 3 receives some money 
from me. He can then spend K4 to take away some money from you and the other 
person. The third person can make one thing out of three things: The third person can 
spend K2 to subtract K10 from the money you will earn at the end of the day; or the 
third person can spend K4 to subtract K20 from the money you will earn at the end of 
the day; or the third person can spend nothing, i.e., the third person keeps the money 
and leave your earnings unchanged. Let’s see on the board how this works. Let´s 
suppose that you have K20 from the first part of this decision. 
So, the third person can do one thing out of three things. Option number 1: The third 
person can keep K4. Option number 2: The third person can keep K2 and spend K2 to 
take K10 away from you. Option number 3: The third person can keep nothing, spend 
K4, and take K20 away from you. 
Ok, now I add an important thing: The third person will make four decisions in this 
second part. One decision is for when both you and the other person keep K10 in the 
first part. One decision is for when both you and the other person give K10 in the first 
part. One decision is for when you keep K10 and the other person gives K10 in the first 
part. The last decision is for when you give K10 and the other person keeps K10 in the 
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first part. At the end of the day I will see what you do and take away money or not take 
away money from you according to the third person’s decision.  
Remember, the money that I take away will go outside the game; the third person will 
not receive this money, nor the other person will receive this money. 
Ok, now I add another important thing. There is another fourth person in the second 
part. This person will receive also money from me. The fourth person can then spend 
money to take away some money from the person you are matched in the first part of 
the game. The fourth person makes the same four decisions in the second part like the 
third person does. 
 
Is this clear? Ok, I would like you to answer what is the correct answer to the following 
examples. [Show on board, using K2-sticks for third person and K10 belonging to subject.] 
Example No. 1: You and the other person have both given K10 and you have K20 at 
the end of the first part. Person 3 decides to spend K2 when both of you give K10. 
How much money do you take home? [Solution: K10]. [If they answer correctly go to example 
3. Otherwise go on with example 2] 
Example No. 2: Suppose you have K10 after the first decision. The third person 
decides to spend K2. How much money do I take away from you? [Solution: K10]. 
Example No. 3: Suppose that you have K30 after the first decision. The third person 
decides to spend K4. How much money do I take away from you? [Solution: K20]. 
Example No. 4: Suppose that you have K10 at the end of the first decision. The third 
person decides to spend K4 to reduce your earnings. What are the final earnings for 
you? [Solution: K0] 
Ok, this is a special situation. The other person wants to take away K20 from you, but 
you only have K10. In all situations where one person wants to take away more money 
than another person has, we take away all the money that that person has. In this case I 
take away your K10. 
So, the money you will take home at the end of the day is: how much money you have 
from the first part, minus how much money the third person takes away from you. 
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Script of the Game: Explanation of how to make decisions in the PD (baseline, 
2PP and 3PP) 
Now you will make your decision {2PP: in the first part of the game}. I give you two 
envelopes, one called “Keep” and the other called “Give”. If you want to keep the K10, 
you will have to place the K10 into this envelope. If you want to give the K10, you will 
have to place the K10 into this envelope. [Show envelopes.] 
While you make your decision, I will not be at this table so we will not watch your 
decision. When you are finished, please put your two envelopes “Keep” and “Give” 
into this big envelope. [Show decision envelope.] If it is all clear, you can make your decision 
now and I will go out. Please call us when you are finished. [After decision has been made] 
Ok, now I am going to put your decision inside the Decision box. 
 
Script of the Game: Explanation of how to make decisions in the second part of 
2PP: 
Now you will make the decisions for the second part of the game. Let’s first consider 
the situation when the other person keeps the money in the first half of the game. Here 
these three envelopes represent your three possible options. [Show on first board that K10 
are above “Other person’s earnings” envelope.] You have to put this stick inside the envelope 
that matches what you want to do. [Put the stick inside the 3 envelopes. Illustrate 3 envelopes]. 
After you have made your decision, you will put the three envelopes into this big 
“Decision” envelope. [RA2/RA3] and I will go out. Please call us when you are finished. 
[Come back when subject has finished.] Ok, now I am going to put your decision inside the 
Decision box. 
[Explain and repeat for envelope “Person 2 gives”. In this case put K20 by the subject’s side. Say:] 
Let’s now consider the situation when the other person gives you the money. In this 
case the other person gave you K10, so here are K20 going to your payment envelope. 
Here these three envelopes represent your three possible options. [RA2/RA3] and me 
will go out. Please call us when you are finished.  
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Script of the Game: Explanation of PD and how to make decision for the third 
party in 3PP: 
 
Explanation of PD 
Hello and thank you for you coming here. My name is LE1/LE2. I hope you can 
understand my Tok Pisin. If not, I will ask our assistant to translate. I am here with 
[RA2/RA3]. 
Now I explain the game with this board. There are two parts in this game. I start 
explaining the first part. It is important that you understand well, because only people 
who understand the game well will take part in it. Moreover, what you will earn depends 
on the decision you make, so you must understand well. You will receive your earnings 
inside this envelope “My earnings”. [Put envelope “Mani bilong mi” by participant’s side. Also 
point to envelope “Mani bilong narapela man o meri”.] 
Decisions in the first part are made by two individuals, which we call Person 1 and 
Person 2. These two people are not here now. They will make their decisions in the next 
days in exactly the same way as what you are going to do. These people may be from 
this village, or from another village from this area. 
Person 1 and Person 2 will receive K10 each. [Put the 10 Kina onto the two sides of the board.] 
Person 1 and Person 2 can make one out of two things. Each of them can either keep 
these K10 or give these K10to the other Person. If Person 1 keeps the K10, these K10 
are hers. They will be put inside her “Earnings” envelope.[Show 10 kina going into Earnings 
envelope] If Person 1 gives the K10 to the other person, I will add K10 and pass them on 
to the other Person. So the other person receives K20 while Person 1 is left with 
nothing. [Move the 10 Kina bill across the line and add another 10 Kina] - 
Person 2 has the same choice as Person 1. [Remove subject’s own 10 Kina from board and put 
green 10 kina onto other person’s side.] If Person 2 keeps the K10, these K10 are hers and I 
will put them inside her “Earnings” envelope. If she gives the K10 to Person 1, I will 
add K10 and pass them on to Person 1 so that Person 1 ends up with K20 while the 
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Person 2 is left with nothing. I will put these K20 inside the “Earnings” envelope of the 
other person. [Move the other person’s 10 Kina bill across the line and add another 10 Kina] 
So, every time a person gives K20, I add K10 and the other person receives K20. [Show 
again for both giving and receiving 10 kina.] 
After each Person makes the decision to keep or give the money, the first part of the 
game is over. 
Ok, let us check if you are clear about the game. I am going to show you some 
examples. You will tell me how much money Person 1 and Person 2 will get.  You can 
use the board to move the money and add K10 to calculate the payoffs. [All the examples 
below should be visualized on the board, placing the two envelopes “Mani bilong mi” “Mani bilong 
narapela man” at the top end of the table]. If more test questions are needed the researcher or assistant 
should again start from the first example.] 
Example No. 1: Person 1 and Person 2 both keep the K10. How much money would 
they get inside their envelopes at the end of this example? [K10; K10] 
Ok. So they both have K10 in this situation. Now let’s see the next example. 
Example No. 2: Person 1 keeps her K10 and Person 2 gives her K10 over to Person 1. 
How much money would they have inside their envelopes at the end of this example? 
[K30; K0] 
Ok. So Person 1 has K30 and Person 2 has nothing in this situation. Now let’s see the 
next example. 
Example No 3: Person 1 gives her K10 over to the other person, and the other person 
keeps her K10. How much money will they have inside their envelopes at the end of 
this example? [0 Kina; 30 kina].  
Ok. So Person 1 has nothing and Person 2 has K30 in this situation. Now let’s see the 
next example. 
Example No 4: Person 1 and Person 2 both give the K10 to each other. How much 
money would you and the other person get inside their envelopes at the end of this 
example? [K20; K20] Ok. So they both have K20 in this situation. 
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[Give time to answer this question. If payoffs are unclear, go through the examples again and check. If 
payoffs still unclear, turn the subject away without paying the extra kina. They should answer correctly 
the first question with no help, and at least another questions even with one cue. If they don’t get one 
question right with at least one giving go through 4 examples again.] 
Now we have finished with the explanations of the first part of the game. Do you have 
any questions? 
 
Explanation of punishment stage 
Ok, let’s now come to the second part of this game. Now you will make a decision that 
may affect how much money Person 1 and Person 2 take home. [Show second board. Leave 
first board to its left, placing 20 kina on both players’ sides on the first board. Second board should 
have “Mi” clearly indicated.] 
Now I give you K34. These K34 are yours. 
Let us suppose that both Person 1 and Person 2 have K20 at the end of the first 
decision. You can spend some of your money to take away some money from Person 1. 
You can spend K2 to subtract K10 from Person 1’s money; or you can spend K4 to 
subtract K20 from Person 1’s money. Or you pay nothing and don’t take away money 
from Person 1. [Show on board] 
So, you can do one thing out of three things: Option number 1: You don’t spend any 
money and keep all of your K34. I don’t take away money from Person 1. Option 
number 2: You can spend K2. I take away K10 from Person 1; Option number 3: You 
can spend K4, and I take K20 away from the other person. [Show three envelopes with three 
options]. 
Remember, the money that I take away will go outside the game; you will not receive 
this money, nor the other person will receive this money. 
Another important thing: there will be another person who, like you, receives K34. This 
person can spend money to take away money from Person 2, like you did for Person 1. 
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Is this clear? Ok, I would like you to answer what is the correct answer to the following 
examples. [Show on board, using 2-kina sticks for third person and 10-kina belonging to subject] 
Example No. 1: Suppose that both Person 1 and Person 2 have given. They have K20 
after the first part. Suppose you decide to spend K0. How much money does Person 1 
take home? [Solution: 20 kina] [They should answer correctly this example, leading answer is OK. If 
they do, just show second example without requiring answers. Otherwise require answer (again, leading 
answer by experimenter is OK). - 
Example No. 2: Both Person 1 and Person 2 have kept their K10 in the first part. 
They both have K10 at the end of the first part. You spend K2. How much money does 
Person 1 take home? [Solution: K0]  
Example No. 3: Person 1 has kept her K10 while Person 2 has given her K10 to 
Person 1. Person 1 has K30 at the end of the first part and Person 2 has nothing. You 
spend K4. How much money does person 1 take home? [Solution: K10 ] [Require answer 
from Example 3.] 
Example 4: Person 1 and Person 2 have held beck her K10. Both Person 1 and Person 
2 have K10 at the end of the first part. You spend K4. How much money does Person 1 
take home? [Solution: K0] 
Ok, this is a special situation. You want to take away K20 from Person 1, but Person 1 
has nothing. In all situations where one person wants to take away more money than 
another person has, I take away all the money that that person has, but nothing more. In 
this case I take away your K10. 
Ok, now I add an important thing: You will make four decisions in this second part, for 
each possible choices that Person 1 and Person 2 can make. The first decision is for 
when Person 1 and Person 2 both keep the K10 in the first part. The second decision is 
for when Person 1 gave K10 and Person 2 kept K10. The third decision is for when 
Person 1 and Person 2 gave K10. The fourth decision is for when Person 1 kept K10 
and Person 2 gave K10. 
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Now I don’t know what the other players have done. So I am asking you to tell me what 
to do for each possible case. When I know their decisions, I will take away money or 
not take away money from Person 1 according to your decision. 
 
Decision 
Now you will make the decisions for the second part of the game. Let’s first consider 
the situation when Person 1 and Person 2 both kept K10 in the first half of the game. 
Both have K10 after the first part of the game. Here these three envelopes represent 
your three possible options. How much do you want to spend, K0, K2 or K4? You 
have to put this stick inside the envelope that matches what you want to do. [Put the stick 
inside the 3 envelopes. Illustrate 3 envelopes]. After you have made your decision, you will put 
the three envelopes into this big “Decision” envelope. [RA2/RA3] and I will go out. 
Please call us when you are finished. [Come back when subject has finished.] Ok, now I am 
going to put your decision inside the Decision box. 
Let’s now consider the second situation when Person 1 gave K10 and Person 2 kept 
K10. Person 1 has K0 and Person 2 has K30 after the first part of the game. Here these 
three envelopes represent your three possible options. How much do you want to 
spend, K0, K2 or K4? You have to put this stick inside the envelope that matches what 
you want to do. [Put the stick inside the 3 envelopes. Illustrate 3 envelopes]. After you have 
made your decision, you will put the three envelopes into this big “Decision” envelope. 
[RA2/RA3] and I will go out. Please call us when you are finished. [Come back when 
subject has finished.] Ok, now I am going to put your decision inside the Decision box. 
Let’s now consider the third situation when Person 1 gave K10 and Person 2 gave K10. 
Person 1 has K20 and Person 2 has K20 after the first part of the game. Here these 
three envelopes represent your three possible options. How much do you want to 
spend, K0, K2 or K4? You have to put this stick inside the envelope that matches what 
you want to do. [Put the stick inside the 3 envelopes. Illustrate 3 envelopes]. After you have 
made your decision, you will put the three envelopes into this big “Decision” envelope. 
[RA2/RA3] and I will go out. Please call us when you are finished. [Come back when 
subject has finished.] Ok, now I am going to put your decision inside the Decision box. 
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Let’s now consider the fourth situation when Person 1 kept K10 and Person 2 gave 
K10. Person 1 has K30 and Person 2 has K0 after the first part of the game. Here these 
three envelopes represent your three possible options. How much do you want to 
spend, K0, K2 or K4? You have to put this stick inside the envelope that matches what 
you want to do. [Put the stick inside the 3 envelopes. Illustrate 3 envelopes]. After you have 
made your decision, you will put the three envelopes into this big “Decision” envelope. 
[RA2/RA3] and I will go out. Please call us when you are finished. [Come back when 
subject has finished.] Ok, now I am going to put your decision inside the Decision box. 
You have made all decision now and the session is over. 
 
Ethical aspects of the study 
The surveys and experiments used in this paper do not involve deception and the 
anonymity of the subjects was guaranteed. There was no danger of physical or 
psychological damages to be expected from participants. All people voluntary 
participated in the studies and were told to leave at any point of time if they feel 
uncomfortable with the situation. Moreover, prior the field research was conducted, the 
research teams were requested to give a presentation of the research methods and goals 
to the local communities and regional authorities. In all cases the request was granted 
approval. Our research project was also supported by the regional government of 
Bougainville and by the Teop Council of Elderly. 
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